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Abstract 
Information technology (IT) projects in the government (public) sector 
experience significant challenges. Despite decades of research, the adoption of 
formal methods, the use of external suppliers and packaged software, these 
remediation attempts have not appeared to have reduced nor mitigated the 
problems faced when the public sector undertakes large IT projects. Previous 
studies have examined the causes of IT project failure, in particular these have 
focused on factor analysis. A relatively limited number of studies have investigated 
the contribution of IT competence, and even fewer have considered the role and 
contribution of non-IT executives in IT project outcomes. This study sought a 
deeper understanding of what drives the behaviour of large scale IT projects. Of 
particular note was the finding that ‘the skills required to do the job are the same 
skills needed to identify competence in others’ (Kruger and Dunning 2009). It was 
this finding which was found to most influence the observed behaviours of 
executive leadership leading to IT project failure. 
This research reports on a qualitative study that investigated 181 interviews 
and 5,000 pages of project data drawn from a large-scale public sector IT project 
which resulted in a cost overrun that exceeded AUD$1 Billion. The interview 
transcripts and project data were analysed using an inductive case study 
methodology and the research process was influenced by aspects of Grounded 
Theory.  
A new Theory of Situational Incompetence has been developed as a result 
of the analysis. The research culminates in a proposed measurement instrument 
intended to gauge leadership competence in the context of increasing project size 
and complexity.  
KEYWORDS: IT project failure, public sector waste, failed projects, governance, project 
management, critical success factors, situational incompetence
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
‘There are many ways to make large software systems fail. There are only a few ways of 
making them succeed’ 
Capers Jones (2004) 
This chapter initially presents the motivations for this study. Namely, why 
IT Project Management of very large projects in the public sector is an important 
topic for research and why the competence perspective of non-IT management is 
crucial to gaining a deeper understanding of the influences on project outcomes. 
Then the research question being answered by this study is described. A brief 
outline of the research approach taken in the study is presented and finally, the 
structure of this thesis is outlined. 
1.1 Why IT Project Management? 
The primary question of this research is why? Why, despite all of the 
experience, the research, and the training that is available, the consultants and 
software companies focusing attention on IT projects and the billions upon billions 
of dollars spent, IT projects continue to fail at a rate that appears little changed 
over the decades? Evidence will be presented to demonstrate the enormous 
impact that failed IT systems have on business, government and the community. 
Evidence will be presented as to what previous research has offered to explain IT 
project failure. Theories will be put forward to explain the observed phenomenon 
in the case studied which forms the foundation of this research. A theory will be 
expounded to address the question of how and why IT projects continue to fail 
despite all the efforts that have been expended for more than fifty years. Finally, 
an instrument will be proposed to measure the competence of individuals engaged 
in project governance, oversight and management contrasted with the complexity 
of the project being undertaken. 
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1.2 Problem Background 
The government of the United Kingdom initiated a project management 
improvement research collaboration with several universities. Tony Meggs, leading 
this effort, stated that ‘projects and programmes are the means by which 
government policies are made real; their successful implementation is vital to our 
economic wellbeing’ (Meggs 2016). Projects and their cost effective performance 
are critical to bureaucracies, and to private organisations, and their implementation 
has been widely studied.  
Information Technology projects fail, and the cost of these failures is 
staggering (for example; Hidding and Nicholas 2017, Engelbrecht, Johnston et al. 
2017, Hughes, Rana et al. 2017, Hughes, Dwivedi et al. 2016, Hughes, Dwivedi et 
al. 2016,Johnson 1994, Johnson 1995, Johnson 1996, Johnson 1999, Johnson 
2001, Johnson 2009, Johnson 2010, Johnson 2013, Johnson 2014, Johnson 2015). 
This concern has been highlighted and repeated for more than forty years (see; 
Davis 1974, Lucas 1981, Maddison, Baker et al. 1983,  Avison and Fitzgerald 1995, 
Avison and Fitzgerald 2003, Hoffer, Valacich et al. 1998, Lauden and Lauden 1998, 
Hawryszkiewycz 2001, Nickerson 2001).  
Research has proposed a host of different reasons to explain project failure 
(Prater, Kirytopoulis et al. 2017,  Ewusi-Mensah 1997, Baccarini, Salm et al. 2004), 
Al-Neimat 2005, Al-Ahmad, Al-Fagih et al. 2009). Recent research by the Standish 
Group has found that for ‘development projects that exceed $100 million in labor 
costs, only 2% are successful, meaning on-time and within budget. Another 51% 
are considered challenged or over budget, behind schedule or didn't meet user 
expectations. The rest, 47%, are seen as outright failures’ (Thibodeau 2017). 
One of the reasons for explaining this high rate of failure, is that it has been 
assumed that IT project failure is due to shortcomings in generic project 
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management capability, rather than due to attributes of IT projects in particular. 
For example, according to Hidding and Nicholas (2017,p.81), ‘most of the 
improvement efforts have focused on advancing variations of the traditional project 
management paradigm, such as (that which) is embodied by the Project 
Management Body of Knowledge’. 
Two questions arise regarding IT project failure research. First, why is the 
success rate of IT projects so poor? And secondly, why, despite the efforts of 
decades of research and industry practice, the situation fails to improve? The 
problem is known as ‘Cobb’s Paradox’ (Bourne 2011). Cobb’s Paradox states: ‘We 
know why projects fail; we know how to prevent their failure—so why do they still 
fail?’. Cobb (cited in Bourne, 2011) made the observation in 1995 while attending 
a presentation by the Standish Group (authors of the Chaos series of reports) while 
working at the Secretariat of the Treasury Board of Canada. Cobb’s observation 
that “we know why projects fail” should not be taken in a literal, completely black 
and white sense, rather it should be considered to be a reference to the collective 
body of expert commentary, opinion, research and project practitioners that have 
offered solutions. Despite the successful implementation of major IT projects, 
repeatable success continues to be elusive (Thibodeau 2017). 
Cobb was not alone in observing that there is a great deal studied and 
written about project failure, and that consulting firms and government agencies 
have proposed methodologies and remedies, but little actual progress appears to 
have been made with respect to the delivery of projects that meet expectations or 
budget performance. The International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) 
Working Party 8.6 ran a conference to address this specific issue asking ‘why our 
scholarship has not been more effective. Is the fault one of theory and inadequate 
understanding? Or is the problem one of knowledge transfer, the failure to embed 
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research knowledge in the working practices of managers and policy-makers’ 
(Dwivedi, Wastell et al. 2015).  
This study sets out to understand why large-scale IT projects in the public 
sector continue to fail. The vehicle used to shed light on ‘Cobb’s Paradox’ is a very 
large and complex project in the public sector. 
1.3 Research Aims 
The aim of this study was to explore, in depth, the behaviours of project 
leaders engaged in a very large project that was not successful. It sought to do this 
by examining the interview transcripts of all those involved, and by re-constructing 
project documents in an effort to understand what was known by whom, and when 
did they know. The study sought to answer the following research question: 
Why do IT projects continue to fail despite what is known about how 
to make IT projects successful?  
IT project failure is thought to be a very complex issue, one that may be 
highly contingent upon specific and very localised circumstances. While previous 
research has identified high-level issues such as a lack of senior management 
involvement (Fortune and White 2006) or a lack of clearly identified deliverables 
(Bannerman 2008), these factors identify what went wrong, but don’t address the 
underlying question of why they occur time and time again. Given that these factors 
have been studied and understood for a very long time, this research is taking a 
slightly different perspective to ask the question of why these factors are still 
causing projects to fail. In order to uncover explanations of IT project failure, that 
might lead to a causal understanding, this research examines a project that is 
widely regarded to have failed, and one for which a great deal of data has been 
preserved. The explanations for project failure are intended to go beyond high-
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level generalisations and to critically examine more detailed explanations, which 
have potential to offer guidance for future project improvements.   
If explanations of the project’s failure are found to be something which has 
not been previously identified in the literature, then this research will contribute 
new findings to inform the conduct of IT project quality management. On the other 
hand, if it is found that the identified explanations were previously understood and 
known, then this research will confirm those issues and contribute to improved 
project quality governance knowledge. 
Should it transpire that the contributory factors for IT Project failure are well 
understood, widely published and known then there is an issue to be examined as 
to why industry has not benefited from this research, or why industry generally may 
be regarded as having ignored the research findings when it comes to the practice 
of IT project management. 
For the purposes of consistency this research has adopted the widely 
understood term for project failure as being projects that fail to be delivered on 
time, on budget with required functionality. 
1.4  The Project Management Domain 
(Lucas 1981.p14) characterises an IT project as a ‘process which includes 
the entire development of the system from the original suggestion through to the 
feasibility study, systems analysis and design, programming, training, conversion, 
and installation of the system’. Research into the area of systems implementation 
has provided the majority of early studies and typically fell into two categories: 
process models, such as the systems development lifecycle (SDLC); and factor 
studies (Newman and Robey 1992).  
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The fact that IT Projects perform poorly is widely accepted by many 
commentators, with an extensive body of research quoting and investigating failure 
rates that would be unacceptable in any other engineering discipline (Baccarini, 
Salm et al. 2004, Al-Neimat 2005, Al-Ahmad, Al-Fagih et al. 2009). 
Software projects are considered to be at high-risk of failure through not 
delivering what was intended or at greatly increased cost than intended 
(Bannerman 2008, Charette 2005). Furthermore, these challenges have not been 
remediated by the adoption of pre-packaged solutions and products (Barki, Rivard 
et al. 2001), approaches that were intended to reduce IT software development 
and implementation risks. 
Capers Jones analysed 250 projects and identified that ‘25 were deemed 
successful in that they achieved their schedule, cost and quality objectives. About 
50 had delays or over-runs below 35 percent, while about 175 experienced major 
delays and over-runs, or were terminated without completion’ (Jones 2004 p.5). 
Charette stated: ‘the problem only gets worse as IT grows ubiquitous’ 
(Charette 2005 p.1). Continuing this assertion, Charette states ‘organizations and 
governments will spend an estimated $1 trillion on IT hardware, software, and 
services worldwide. Of the IT projects that are initiated, from 5 to 15 percent will 
be abandoned before or shortly after delivery as hopelessly inadequate. Many 
others will arrive late and over budget or require massive reworking. Few IT 
projects, in other words, truly succeed’. 
The consequences of failure extend beyond the cost of the IT Project. For 
example, directly attributed to the failure of a major IT Project, the FoxMeyer 
pharmaceutical company, located in Texas USA, went from being a USD$5 billion 
successful company to announcing bankruptcy (Charette 2005). 
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The Chaos Reports (1994-2017) by the Standish Group reported in 1994 
that ‘a staggering 31.1% of projects will be cancelled before they ever get 
completed. Further results indicate 52.7% of projects will cost 189% of their original 
estimates’. In their twenty-first anniversary edition of the Chaos reports, Standish 
Group noted that ‘in 2013, the number of projects that were on time, on budget, 
and on target had improved to 36% (from 31% in 1994). On the other hand, 21 
years ago the failure rate was 16%. In 2013, the failure rate is also 16%’. These 
problems have led others to characterise the software industry as being in a state 
of crisis (Ewusi-Mensah 1997). 
The Standish data quoted above is aggregated across all project sizes and 
provides a potentially misleading impression as to the success of very large and 
very complex projects. Below (figure 1) is more recent data which breaks out 
projects according to size. 
Figure 1: Project Performance Data, from Standish Group 2014 & 2017 
It has been determined (Emam and Gunes-Koru 2008 p.89) that ‘between 
16 and 22 percent of delivered projects were considered unsuccessful on the basis 
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of their performance’. This refers to those projects that were not cancelled in-flight, 
but were instead judged performing acceptably well enough during the project 
phase to be allowed to complete. Later research (eg:Thibodeau 2017) shows that 
those concerns remain relevant.  
An industry report produced by (Meiritz 2012) suggests a high failure rate 
within large projects. In recent years there have been many large scale IT project 
failures reported within the public sectors of Australia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States of America amounting to billions of dollars (Bacon and Hope 
2013). The contributory factors of these project failures have been reported and 
studied for decades. The major findings include poor project planning, a weak 
business case, and a lack of top management involvement and support (Whittaker 
1999). Despite gathering data, studying these projects, and reporting on the 
causes of these project failures, the scope, size and frequency of project failures 
would seem to be increasing, becoming more frequent, and having greater impact 
on the achievement of intended outcomes (Johnson 2010). 
1.5 Case Study Selection 
In order to undertake a post-mortem examination of a failed project, the 
researcher needs access to a wide range of project artefacts. Furthermore, the 
documentation required to complete an effective post-mortem investigation needs 
to be comprehensive. Access of this nature, and to the detail and specificity 
required would be virtually impossible to obtain from a failed private-sector project 
where knowledge of that project’s failure is closely guarded and restricted by 
commercial confidentiality. The researcher is therefore directed towards projects 
in the public sector. Because of the accountability and transparency required of 
government projects, public sector organisations maintain formal documentation, 
and the data can be potentially accessed under freedom-of-information requests. 
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Both the Victorian State Government and the Queensland State 
Government (Australia) have, over recent years, completed performance audits of 
IT Projects and published extensive audit reports. The Queensland Government 
went further than the Victorian Government in launching a Commission of Inquiry 
into their biggest failure, the Queensland Health Payroll Project (QHPP). 
The Commission of Inquiry report (Chesterman 2013) stated that ‘the 
replacement of the QH payroll system must take a place in the front rank of failures 
in public administration in this country. It may be the worst.’  
The extent of the Commission, and its ability to lawfully compel the 
provision of evidence, has created a rich pool of data to undertake an effective 
examination of the life of the Queensland Health Project, and to examine events 
as they unfolded over many years. The extent of the material available from a 
Commission is much greater than what would be available in other public sector 
reports, such as Auditor General reports and so on. In this way, the QH Payroll 
Project failure is somewhat unique in the amount of material available for an 
independent researcher to examine and investigate. 
The Commission has published into the public domain an exhaustive list of 
transcripts and witness statements. In addition to these, the researcher has also 
procured, through the use of freedom-of-information requests, all available project 
documents including project plans, emails, steering committee reports, and other 
project artefacts that were not part of the published Commission of Inquiry data 
set. This archival material forms the primary data resource of this research project. 
This research then is drawing from a single, albeit very large, unusually rich, 
documented case study, in order to produce context dependent insights drawn 
from actual experience that would be otherwise unattainable. 
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1.6  Research Approach and Outcomes 
This research adopts a case based approach to understanding IT project 
failure that has occurred in a ‘sticky, practice-based problem’ (Benbasat, Goldstein 
et al. 1987 p.369). Therefore, the research follows an approach that contributes to 
‘theory building’ (formative) rather than ‘theory testing’ (confirmatory) (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner 2007). 
‘Building theory from case studies is a research strategy that involves using 
one or more cases to create theoretical constructs, propositions and/or midrange 
theory from case-based, empirical evidence’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007 p25). 
The process of ‘theory building’ is undertaken by examining a case in 
detail, by starting with little or no preconceived notion of the theory which will 
ultimately emerge from the data  (Eisenhardt 1989 p.534). ‘Induction is viewed as 
the key process, with the researcher moving from the data to empirical 
generalisation and on to theory’ (Heath and Cowley 2004 p.144). (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007) refer to this method as ‘Inductive Case Oriented Research’. 
Both inductive case-oriented research and grounded theory form part of 
the body of knowledge relating to qualitative data analysis (QDA), and both have 
as their objective the development of a theory to explain an observed 
phenomenon. 
For this researcher the observed phenomenon for which explanations are 
sought is the ongoing and continual failure of information technology projects to 
deliver on time, to an agreed budget, and to meet the value and quality objectives 
of the enterprises that they are meant to serve.  
Combining aspects of Multi-Grounded Theory (Goldkuhl and Cronholm 
2003) this research has adopted inductive case study as an effective approach to 
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collecting and analysing the data from the project being studied, and to 
simultaneously explore literature on the subject as theories emerge from the data. 
In particular the approach to this research has followed a process of ‘empirical 
grounding, theoretical grounding, and internal grounding’ (Goldkuhl and 
Cronholm 2003 p.2). The effort of this researcher has been to ground the findings 
in observations of the data (empirical), and to validate these against theories as the 
data emerges, in a constant and repetitive (recursive) fashion until saturation 
occurs. 
In a typical inductive case-study research project the literature review will 
emerge in stages as hypotheses are identified and explored. ‘Induction moves from 
the particular to the general: it develops new theories or hypotheses from many 
observations. This means that grounded theory studies tend to take a very open 
approach to the process being studied’ (Sbaraini, Carter et al. 2011). 
In practice, the steps in an inductive methodology are recursive, not linear 
or rigidly sequential. Data collection proceeds to coding and analysis which leads 
back, in recursive fashion, to more data collection and additional literature review. 
The literature review in particular is ongoing and is motivated primarily by the 
findings, which emerge from the data collection and coding in a recursive manner. 
1.7 Research Objective 
The purpose of this study is to go beyond identifying the proximal causes 
of failure, and to examine why project failure continues after more than fifty years 
of research and education. The objective of this study is to understand why project 
cost over-runs and project failures continue, and to suggest methods to avoid 
repeating these same failures on other projects, elucidating actionable 
explanations for the failures from the findings of this research. 
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1.8 Significance of the Research 
Through this case study, this research is intended to produce a better 
understanding of the reasons for the failure of large-scale IT projects. The research 
aims to inform understanding of what caused this particular project to fail and 
propose remedial action that may have been applied to ensure that the project 
was a success, and which have potential application to improve the management 
of other large IT projects. It is anticipated that the framework developed as a result 
of this research (Chapter 6) is, theoretically, generalisable to a much broader 
audience, and potentially contribute to improvement in a whole range of different 
types of projects. 
For the practical project implementation, the research findings and model 
developed could potentially lead to greater awareness of quality management and 
governance challenges imposed by large IT projects. For example, potential 
benefits include; a change in hiring practices, changes to governance 
arrangements and changes to contractual arrangements with external service 
providers. 
The research may lead to an additional research methodology into 
previously little understood aspects of project management and governance of 
very large (grand and mega) projects, beyond the realm of information technology, 
but more broadly extended to other technical and demanding domains. 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis  
This document contains six chapters in total. A summary of each chapter is 
provided in the following. 
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Chapter One  
Chapter One sets out the rationale for undertaking this research and why 
resolving this problem may be important to the field of information systems project 
management. 
The concept of Cobb’s Paradox is introduced which asks the question “if 
we know so much about how to manage IT projects why do they keep failing?” 
(Bourne 2011). This question was the impetus for this research, in a context where 
the continued and apparently increasing rates of IT project failure are of concern 
and no mitigation appears to be successful. 
The cost of IT project failure is introduced, and the current domain is 
outlined in brief. the reasons for the selection of Queensland Health Payroll project 
as a case study are explained. 
 The rationale for methodological approach to the research is 
described, and is demonstrated to be based upon grounded theory and utilises an 
inductive case study approach to elicit information which is then explored in more 
depth. This “recursive” approach seeks to elicit themes that emerge from both the 
data and the literature, that have potential utility for IT project management quality 
improvement and to constantly revisit both the data and the literature as themes 
and concepts emerge from the research. 
Chapter Two  
Chapter Two describes the scale and magnitude of the information 
technology project failure problem and the nature of the literature’s commentary 
on this problem. 
The data and costs presented in this section enumerate only the direct 
project costs and losses. The opportunity cost, impact or loss of benefit has not 
been calculated. That the costs of IT project failure are so enormous indicates the 
12 December 2018 
Situational Incompetence: an investigation into the causes of failure of a large-scale IT project  
Darryl Carlton  page  14 of 219 
importance of making progress on identifying contributory factors that are 
actionable and may lead to some improvement.  
The projects which are identified in Chapter Two come from both the 
Public and Private sectors and represent projects from all over the world. The list 
of projects described are not intended to be complete as they are intended to 
illustrate that IT project failure is a global problem, and that the costs and stakes 
are substantial. 
Chapter Three 
In this Chapter the research methodology is described. This comprises an 
iterative process of identifying themes from the case study data, exploring those 
themes in the literature and extrapolating how the themes are articulated, with a 
view to having feasible and practical utility for IT quality management 
implementation in the future. 
Achievement of this goal would provide a foundation to build a new theory 
or set of explanations as to what might contribute to IT project failure, and identify 
that these causes have not previously been articulated or adequately researched.  
Chapter Four 
Chapter Four examines a particular project, the Queensland Health Payroll 
Project. This project was selected as the case study after examining other possible 
projects. The other primary candidate for investigation was the Victorian 
Government’s myki transport ticketing system. Initially both projects were pursued 
as “Freedom of Information Requests” in order to uncover sufficient data to inform 
the research. 
The Victorian Government was very reluctant to release information while 
the Queensland Government was forthcoming and cooperative. In the end the 
availability of data made the decision about which case study would be pursued. 
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The Queensland Health Project was a rich source of data, comprising: 
• 122 witness statements totalling 3,850 pages 
• 350 project related files totalling more than 5,000 pages 
Chapter Five 
This Chapter analyses both the project data and themes from the literature. 
From this analysis, a number of themes emerged as being the “likely indicators” of 
project failure for which further and more detailed investigation was warranted. 
As themes emerged these were examined and compared and contrasted 
with the literature in an effort to understand if there were any theoretical 
underpinnings that might “shed some light” on why these factors were prevalent 
in the project. Several theories were identified which provided clarity as to what 
was occurring on the project and potentially why. These theories provided greater 
insight into the behaviours occurring on the project and contributed to the 
emergence of a new theory to explain why the Queensland Health Payroll project 
experienced such difficulties, despite their executives and project leadership being 
made aware of the risks and challenges that it was facing. 
Chapter Six 
Chapter Six discusses the emergent theme of leadership on competence 
and expertise in IT project management and its impact on project outcomes. 
A theory of project failure named as “Situational Incompetence” emerged 
from the data and is offered in this chapter to explain the findings. 
Situational Incompetence applies when an otherwise experienced 
executive is placed in a position of authority or accountability for which they lack 
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experience, training or specific skills. This finding has implication for how leaders 
are selected for complex tasks requiring specialist IT domain knowledge and 
technical competence. Potential approaches to remediation and future research 
are discussed.  
Chapter Six concludes with a proposed measurement instrument for 
examining Leadership Competence versus Project Complexity and Size, i.e., 
measuring competence in the context of the situation being managed.  
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Chapter Two – Literature Review 
This chapter undertakes a review of the literature into IT project failure 
which stretches over nearly fifty years. This historical perspective helps to put into 
context that the factors which are observed and classified as being the causes of 
project failure have been evident across almost every type and size of project and 
have been consistently evident for an extended period of time. The review 
considers the literature that informs this research with respect to the scale and 
magnitude of the IT Project delivery problem, and the prior research which sets out 
to describe the factors which have caused IT projects to fail. 
The fundamental argument being put forward by this researcher is that the 
factor analysis that has informed the majority of prior research has focused on the 
symptoms of IT project failure and not the causes. Further, it is argued that if prior 
research had identified the factors which caused IT project failure, then we would 
have seen a demonstrable and measurable improvement in IT project performance 
over an extended period. The data suggest that with the exception of projects that 
cost less than USD$1 million in productive labour, or consume less than 10,000 
hours of productive labour, the performance of projects has either not improved 
or has worsened. This is especially true for very large-scale projects in the public 
sector. Research being undertaken at the Said Business School of the University of 
Oxford suggest that ‘pilot studies indicate that performance in major ICT 
programmes is even more problematic than in other types of major programmes, 
resulting in waste of taxpayers' and shareholders' money for public and private 
projects, respectively’ (Budzier and Flyvbjerg 2018). 
2.1 Scale and Magnitude of the IT Project Delivery Problem 
While there is a significant body of literature about IT project failure, the 
scale and impact of IT Project failure appears to show that the industry is not 
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benefiting from that research, and that the failure rates may be getting worse 
(Johnson 1994 to 2015). The failure of the industry to improve the performance of 
IT projects is a problem of potentially increasing significance, particularly as the 
world becomes more dependent on digitalisation. 
To put this problem into context, public sector spending on information 
technology is approximately 9.1 percent of total operational expense (Gartner 
2013) making investments in information technology one of the single largest items 
of government expenditure. Seventy-one percent of that expenditure is estimated 
to be on operating activities, and twenty-nine percent  on new initiatives and new 
programs (Gartner 2013), but the success of these new initiatives has been limited 
with ’a number of high profile cost and time blow-outs in ICT’ (Victorian 
Government Ombudsman 2011,  p.38). The Ombudsman’s report points out that 
the costs involved in the failures of public sector IT projects can be significant, as 
can be seen with highly criticised projects such as MyKi (AUD$1.5 billion), the 
abandoned HealthSmart project (AUD$600 million), and Link and RandL projects 
where projected spend was doubled. 
A report by the UK Government National Audit Office (nao.org.uk 2011 
p.4) has identified that the whole-of-life cost of projects underway amounts to 511 
billion British pounds (GBP), with thirty-four percent of those projects assessed as 
“in doubt or unachievable” amounting to active projects at risk of some GBP173 
billion (AUD$315 Billion). 
To illustrate the prevalence of IT project failure rates, the Standish Group 
(Johnson 2010) put the declining success rate at just 6 percent of all projects 
undertaken in 2010, having previously been recorded at 14 percent in 1995. There 
is contention about whether the Standish data is completely accurate, and some 
have argued that the lack of transparency in the Standish Group collection and 
analysis process makes the data unreliable (Eveleens and Verhoef 2010, Emam and 
12 December 2018 
Situational Incompetence: an investigation into the causes of failure of a large-scale IT project  
Darryl Carlton  page  19 of 219 
Gunes-Koru 2008, Glass 2005, Glass 2006, Jorgensen and Molokken 2006, Sauer, 
Gemino et al. 2007), however the Standish reports have been heavily relied upon 
for a wide range of academic papers. Furthermore, comparing the Standish data 
over the period 1994 to 2015 at a minimum provides a measure of internal 
consistency and can be seen as reliably demonstrating a trend, even if different 
researchers hold alternative views about the actual data points. 
The published research, which includes for example: (Engelbrecht, 
Johnston et al. 2017, Hidding and Nicholas 2017, Hughes, Rana et al. 2017, 
Hughes, Dwivedi et al. 2016, Hughes, Dwivedi et al. 2016, Al-Neimat 2005, 
Baccarini, Salm et al. 2004, deBakker, Boonstra et al. 2010, Bannerman 2008, 
Benamati and Lederer 2001, Beynon-Davies 1999, Boehm 1991, Jones 2004, 
Jones 2006, Charette 2005, Curtis, Krasner et al. 1998, Drummond 1998, Oz and 
Sosik 2000, Emam and Gunes-Koru 2008, Ewusi-Mensah 1997, Glass 2006, Goh 
and Kaufmann 2004, Grenny, Maxfield et al. 2007, Budzier and Flyvbjerg 2018, 
Hass 2007, Humphrey 2005), shows that success is rare in IT project delivery, 
irrespective of whether or not that success rate should be measured at the Standish 
Group defined criteria, or by some other indicator (see: Figure 1: Project 
Performance Data, from Standish Group 2014 & 2017). 
The International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) working 
group 8.6 noted, in their editorial (Dwivedi, Wastell et al. 2015 p.1) that ‘despite 
decades of research and the accumulation of a substantial knowledge-base within 
MIS, further progress is required to improve the conduct of information systems 
initiatives. Faced with this, it is pertinent to ask why our scholarship has not been 
more effective. Is the fault one of theory and inadequate understanding? Or is the 
problem one of knowledge transfer, the failure to embed research knowledge in 
the working practices of managers and policy-makers’.  
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That projects continue to fail without signs of improvement, it can be 
speculated that either the reasons for project failures remain unknown, or that 
project teams don’t effectively take account of the advice that exists about what it 
takes for a project to be successful. It is also possible, that project executives 
choose to ignore the advice that they are given preferring to act on their own 
instincts. Irrespectively, the problem of IT project success and failure, including its 
potential contributory factors and remedies, is a significant problem worthy of 
study. Given the ubiquitous nature of information technology into many facets of 
life and society, understanding why IT projects are so unsuccessful is of 
considerable importance. 
The scale and scope of information technology project failure is massive. It 
occurs in every country, and every discipline. Government agencies and businesses 
that a casual observer might assume to be efficient and well managed display 
incredible ineptitude when it comes to IT projects. 
2.2 Measuring Project Success  
In this chapter we will undertake a brief review of various approaches which 
have been suggested for measuring and tracking project success. We will conclude 
this chapter by defining how project success was measured for the purposes of this 
research. 
The literature on failed information technology projects is vast and 
stretches back over almost fifty years. ‘The History of Project Management’, (Kozak-
Holland 2011) traces the same project management disciplines back to the time of 
the construction of the Great Pyramids of Giza and the Great Wall of China. In 
construction of the Great Wall of China the stages of planning, executing, 
controlling and monitoring, and closing as being evidenced (Kozak-Holland 2011 
p.81). When reviewing the construction of the Great Pyramids, the archeological 
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evidence suggest the creation of an advanced sundial which divided time into 12 
roughly equal segments during daylight hours and is evidence that ‘scheduling was 
done using the day as the basic unit of measure’ (Kozak-Holland 2011 p.66).  
Project management has been part and parcel of economic activity for the 
entirety of human existence, and yet we still struggle with the basics and IT projects 
at least continue to demonstrate very poor success rates. 
Figure 2: adapted from Kerzner 2017 
A generic project management construct has been provided by Kerzner 
(Kerzner 2013 p.19) and sets out the basic steps that any project would follow, as 
outlined in Figure 2. 
Much of the existing research into IT project failure appears to have 
assumed that failure is due to shortcomings in generic project management 
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capability, and consequently ’most of the improvement efforts have focused on 
advancing variations of the traditional project management paradigm, such as (that 
which) is embodied by the Project Management Body of Knowledge’ (Hidding and 
Nicholas 2017, p.81) 
Figure 2 identifies the broad steps of “inputs - processes - outputs”. In this 
model the project management processes are limited to a focus on the activities 
associated with a very narrow definition of project execution. This potentially 
constrains the scope of any research away from those activities which are 
characterised as inputs or outputs limiting insight to what was previously discussed 
as ‘generic project management capabilities (Hidding & Nicholas 2017, p.81). The 
Victorian Auditor General’s report (VAGO 2015), found that while 70% of projects 
had a business case, only 38% contained what was considered a complete set of 
data, and only 10% undertook any form of benefits realisation. Much of the failure 
research relies on compilations of prior literature and has collated those findings, 
for example: (Fortune and White 2006) and (Nasir and Sahibuddin 2011) and has 
not suggested any findings that might extend beyond the boundaries of the task 
management of the project management discipline to include the input or output 
activities. It is unclear whether or not prior research has considered a broader 
scope, or that no negative outcomes were observed when looking at the impact or 
contribution beyond the project management processes. 
It has been stated that the most common cause of project failures 
originates in the project management function (Al-Neimat 2005, Jones 2006, 
Dorgan, Dowdy et al. 2004, Oz 2001, Ewusi-Mensah 1997, Grenny, Maxfield et al. 
2007), and aligning of IT with an organisation’s culture (Tilmann and Weinberger 
2004), and this has directed much of the existing research to focus on the day-to-
day issues of running projects and managing teams. 
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Humphrey, the creator of the Capability Maturity Model (CMMI) observed 
(Humphrey 2005, p.25) that ‘the principal problem was the lack of plans. In the 
early years, I never saw a failed project that had a plan, and very few unplanned 
projects were successful’.  
To further illustrate the lessons learned from observation of projects in a 
case study environment, a phenomenon has been observed in project 
management called ‘fact-free planning’ (Grenny, Maxfield et al. 2007.p2). ‘Project 
leaders under pressure from various stakeholders determine deadlines, scope, 
deliverables and budget with little or no regard for the hard facts about what will 
actually be required. At other times, they base their estimates on facts, only to have 
the estimates ignored. In either case, the result is a set of project parameters and 
goals that is unrealistic from the beginning’. Reading between the lines it might 
also be construed that tension exists between those with domain expertise and the 
‘pressure exerted’ by the non-technical representatives with an interest in the 
project. 
Capers Jones (Jones 2004,p5) created a working hypothesis of the 
contributory factors of project failure as being ‘(1) poor quality control is the largest 
contributor to cost and schedule over-runs, and (2) poor project management is 
the most likely cause of inadequate quality control’. It is unclear in this example 
where ‘control’ of the project emanates from. 
There has been an old adage in IT that “we don’t have a problem with 
project management, we just cannot estimate!”. While this statement is treated as 
a joke, like a lot of humour it has a basis in reality. Particularly for public sector 
projects, where the budget is often declared in a political press release, estimating 
(budget expenditure or project completion timelines) has always been fraught with 
dangerous assumptions. And when projects start to exceed their time and cost 
estimates the constant cycle of “new estimates and re-baselining” often relies upon 
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adding more resources to the project. Brooks argued that there is a non-linear 
relationship between resources assigned to a project and project output (Brooks 
1975). As resources are added to a project there are other tasks that grow and 
reduce overall team productivity (Al-Neimat 2005, Grossman 2003). Estimating and 
project management are inextricably linked. It is important to understand that 
estimating is not a one-off event that happens before a project commences. 
Estimating is done constantly throughout the life of the project. This challenge with 
estimating is at the core of the difference between agile and waterfall (plan based) 
project management approaches. The underlying assumption behind all pland-
based methodologies is that if only we do more planning then the project will be 
manageable. Agile methods, on the other hand, start with the assumption that 
planning will not be effective so it should be minimized. 
A difference amongst studies about successful projects reported in the 
literature, is the criteria used in defining project success or failure. The CHAOS 
studies (amongst others) measure the success of a project as on time, on budget, 
with the full scope of requirements (Andersen 2011, Baccarini, Salm et al. 2004). 
However, critical commentators find these criteria incomplete because ‘they do not 
consider, for example, usefulness, value or user satisfaction’ (Emam and Gunes-
Koru 2008, Eveleens 2009, Glass 2005, Jorgensen and Molokken 2006, Sauer, 
Gemino et al. 2007). 
In addition to this variability of success criteria used in studies about 
projects, commissioning organisations also appear to pay little attention to 
assuring or understanding the nature of project success.  (Marchand and Peppard 
2008 p.10) observed that ‘very few companies actually track the benefits from IT 
investments and have no way of knowing what, if any, business benefits were 
realized’. The Victorian Government audit of IT projects (VAGO 2015 p.xii) found 
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that ‘of the 788 completed projects, a little over 10 percent have had their 
expected benefits assessed’. 
Most companies measure the success of IT projects as meeting 
implementation deadlines, budgets and agreed requirements. Yet, projects can be 
on-time and within budget and deliver no actual business value according to  
Marchand and Peppard (2008). Whilst an investigation into success and failure 
measurement is a worthwhile endeavour, for the purposes of this research, the 
determination of success or failure will be the generally accepted on-time, on-
budget with the agreed level of functionality - this was the criteria applied to the 
Queensland Health Payroll project by the Commission of Inquiry (Chesterman 
2013). 
2.3 Factor Analysis  
Nasir and Sahbuddin (2011) conducted a comprehensive analysis of the 
literature about factors contributing to IT project success. They collated data from 
43 peer-reviewed papers from 1990 to 2010. They grouped by frequency of 
mention in order to construct a hierarchy that appears to imply that if a subject is 
mentioned most frequently then it must be the most important. It was claimed that 
‘in a result unique to our study, we found that the factors of clear and frozen 
requirements, realistic estimation of the schedule and budget, along with a 
competent project manager are the five most critical success factors of software 
projects’ (Nasir and Sahibuddin 2011,p.1). 
Fortune and White (2006) described the critical success factors of projects 
drawn from a review of 63 peer-reviewed publications. They observed that there 
was ‘a lack of agreement between authors’ (Fortune and White 2006, p54) as to 
what were the critical success factors (CFS’s) for project success or failure, and that 
the ‘inter-relationships between factors was at least as important as the individual 
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factors’. Fortune and White (2006) grouped their data according to the kinds of 
approaches used by the 63 studies reviewed: 
1. Survey and questionnaire data; 
2. Case study semi-structured interview data; 
3. Conceptual and theoretical papers. 
Table 3 (below): Fortune and White’s (2006) portrayal of critical success 
factors summarising sixty-three (63) IT project failure studies - theoretical and 
empirical survey outcomes: 
Table 3: Fortune and White (2006) Critical Success Factors 
 Empirical Data from Surveys 
Emprical Data 
from Case Studies Theoretical Total 
support from senior 
management 19 11 9 39 
user/client involvement 11 7 6 24 
skiled/suitably 
qualified/sufficient staff 9 7 4 20 
effective change 
management 9 7 3 19 
clear realistic goals 16 6 9 31 
strong/detailed plan 
kept up to date 16 6 7 29 
good 
communication/feedba
ck 
14 6 7 27 
competent project 
manager 8 6 5 19 
strong business 
case/sound basis for 
project 
8 6 2 16 
good leadership 5 6 4 15 
 
An alternative ‘first principles’ approach (Ward and Elvin, 1999) identifies 
a set of critical success factors, different to those identified by factor analysis, as 
comprising: 
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(1) Ensure that the intended outcome, objectives and benefits are 
appropriate for this IT project; 
(2) Understand the organisation's capability to actually carry out the 
intervention and identify areas where knowledge or skills are lacking 
and need to be developed; 
(3) Involve the key stakeholders in a structured, open, and honest debate 
to elicit the factors and assess their specific relationships to the 
intervention and their likely impact; 
(4) Allocate responsibility for action by the owners or the appropriate 
stakeholders. 
Oz (1994) examined the failure of a large and very public project intended 
to provide a new reservation system (CONFIRM) for Hilton Hotels, Marriott 
Corporation, Budget Rent-A-Car, and American Airlines. Oz (1994) noted that a 
leading cause of the project’s failure was a failure of professional ethics, an issue 
that did not appear in any of the literature based on factor analysis or collations of 
previously reported findings. Ethics are a contributory factor that do not appear 
broadly in the literature even today. Oz (1994, p.35) stated that ‘the CONFIRM 
case contains many ingredients that are common in cases that have been reported 
in the media and trade journals.’ In the same article Oz (1994) cites the Chairman 
of the consortium developing CONFIRM stating that ‘some people who have been 
part of CONFIRM management did not disclose the true status of the project in a 
timely manner’ (Oz, 1994, p.29). 
The ground-breaking work by Brooks (1975), ‘The Mythical Man Month’, 
followed his work at IBM where he discovered, while running the team developing 
OS/360, the then groundbreaking operating system for IBM’s new mainframe.  
Brooks identified that adding additional resources to the project actually slowed 
12 December 2018 
Situational Incompetence: an investigation into the causes of failure of a large-scale IT project  
Darryl Carlton  page  28 of 219 
the project down rather than improving performance. Brooks’ Law (Brooks, 1975), 
as it became known, states that ‘adding manpower to a late software project makes 
it later’. Brooks’ research, and subsequent publication, was grounded in the 
experience of an actual project, a very large and complex project – the creation of 
a new operating system for an IBM mainframe.  
Research since the 1970s has focused on identifying critical success factors 
(CSFs) that might be leading indicators of project success or failure (deBakker, 
Boonstra et al. 2010). 
Successful projects, according to Capers Jones, always excel in these 
critical activities: planning, estimating, change control, and quality control’ (Jones 
2004 p.9). Later, Jones went on to say that ‘more than 50 years of empirical studies 
have proven that projects with effective quality control cost less and have shorter 
schedules than similar projects with poor quality control’(Jones 2006 p.7). In the 
current context it would be important to understand where does “quality control” 
come from, and what is meant by “quality control”. Is quality control narrowly 
defined as the quality of computer coding, or is it more broadly defined as the 
governance of the overall project conducted in a high quality manner delivering 
the agreed outcomes? 
Three principal recommendations have been suggested for running 
projects effectively  (Sauer, Gemino et al. 2007 p.2): 
1. For project managers to structure projects into smaller units, 
to invest in selecting the right team and involving them in 
decision-making, and to invest their own time and effort in 
self-development;  
2. For senior IT managers responsible for IT project managers 
to establish a focus for project management in their 
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organisation, create a project management career path, 
identify and develop the right individuals, and create real 
accountability through more effective performance 
management;  
3. For senior business managers/sponsors to develop client-
side understanding of project management and more 
actively involve themselves with projects for which they are 
responsible. 
Factor analysis has produced essentially the same perspective on project 
failure for decades. One reason for this may be that this type of research collates 
the opinions of project observers and participants, and usually this is done after-
the-fact. If the research into IT project failure was being conducted as “clinical 
research” there would be evidence of a “control group” to show that where 
particular factors did not exist, then project outcomes were improved and vice-
versa. The factors are invariably presented as “facts”, without corroborating 
evidence, and without data to prove that their presence or absence had an 
influence on project outcomes. The research lacks evidentiary support that is 
convincing in its argument that these factors are indeed the causes of project 
failure, and avoiding (or applying) them will ensure improved project outcomes. 
2.4 The Complexity of an IT Solution 
In very large IT projects, the type which the Standish Group (Johnson 2015)  
have identified as having the lowest success rate, the complexity inherent in the 
solution being built is very great. With great complexity in the solution itself, added 
to the complexity of the technology being utilised, the need for experienced and 
skilled project management is increased. 
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‘Today, business processes are more complex, interconnected, 
interdependent and interrelated than ever before. Additionally, they reject 
traditional organisational structures in order to create complex communities 
comprised of alliances with strategic suppliers, outsourcing vendors, networks of 
customers and partnerships with key political groups, regulatory entities, and even 
competitors’ (Hass 2007,p.2). 
It is this level of complexity which permeates every aspect of a project 
(Baccarini 1996), from the internal complexity of the business problem being solved 
(Al-Neimat 2005), to organisational complexity that complicates what should have 
been relatively simple (Drummond 1998). When discussing complexity in this 
context most projects would be looking at the complexity of the business problem 
to be addressed, the complexity of the technology being deployed, the inter- and 
intra-organisational complexity of dealing with competing demands (Thomas and 
Mengel 2008). 
Project size and complexity are seen (Johnson 2015) as key drivers of 
project failure. The larger and more complex the undertaking the more likely that 
the project will fail.  
The Standish Group data shows clearly that the bigger the project, the 
greater the risk and more likely that project is to experience failure. Standish Group 
classify the size of the projects as;  
• Small: is generally under a million dollars in productive labor or less 
then 10,000 hours of productive labor. 
• Moderate: is a million to 3 million dollars in productive labor or 10,000 
to 30,000 hours of productive labor. 
• Medium: is 3 million to 6 million dollars in productive labor or 30,000 
to 60,000 hours of productive labor. 
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• Large: is 6 million to 10 million dollars in productive labor or 60,000 to 
100,000 hours of productive labor. 
• Grand: is over 10 million dollars in productive labor or over 100,000 
hours of productive labor. 
Table 4: Standish Group (2015) all projects FY2011-2015 
Project Size Scale SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGED FAILED 
Grand Over USD$10m 2% 9% 16% 
Large $6m to $10m 8% 18% 25% 
Medium $3m to $6m 11% 28% 35% 
Moderate $1m to $3m 25% 29% 16% 
Small Under $1m 54% 16% 8% 
  100% 100% 100% 
 
2.5 Project Reporting 
A further topic in IT project management concerns the contribution of 
project control mechanisms and their impact project outcomes. Reporting has 
always been problematic for all forms of management where ‘much hard 
information is too aggregated for effective use’ (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand et al. 1998, 
p70), and managers often dispense with detailed reports without ever reading 
them (Mintzberg 1990). Another potential reason for project failure is not the lack 
of project control methods, but that methods, even though available and in place, 
are often not used. Good communication, one of the top ten issues identified by 
Fortune and White (2006) and represented in Table 3 (above) can only be 
considered ‘good’ if the recipient reads and understands the reports and is capable 
of identifying appropriate actions as a result of that comprehension. 
This lack of project control utilisation, has also been linked to broader 
issues such as ethical conduct. In fact, failure to make oneself fully informed 
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(especially when the data is available) might be seen as a failure of accountability 
and ethical responsibility. Jones (2006, p.4) points out that ‘software project status 
reporting is often wrong and misleading’, while Oz (2001) and Ewusi-Mensah (1997) 
both reported incidents of unethical behaviour associated with reporting progress 
on projects. At least one senior executive reported: ‘they have deliberately 
concealed a number of important technical and performance problems’ (Ewusi-
Mensah 1997 p.77). 
Drummond (Drummond 1998,p.142) reported an interview with an 
executive at the London Stock Exchange about their failed Taurus project. 
‘Everyone knew what Taurus was, until they tried to explain it.’ Projects suffer 
constant change. Especially after the project schedule and budget have been 
confirmed (Al-Neimat 2005), suffering from the twin problems of scope and feature 
creep. ‘Absorbing changing requirements during the project’ Jones argued (2004, 
p.9) is a constant challenge for all projects and project managers. 
2.6  Normalisation of Project Failure 
Beginning in 1995 Keil observed the escalating rate of IT project failure 
and its cost on business and government (Keil 1995,p.421). The generic phrase 
“poor project management” (Keil 1995 p.422) is far too broad to provide clarity for 
what actually drives project escalation and ultimately failure. Keil adopts the 
definition of escalation as being “continued commitment in the face of negative 
information about prior resource allocations, coupled with uncertainty surrounding 
the likelihood of goal attainment” (Keil 1995,p.422). 
According to Keil “projects are more prone to escalation when they involve 
a large potential payoff, when they are viewed as requiring a long-term investment 
in order to receive any substantial gain” (Keil 1995 p.422-423). Keil touches on 
“psychological factors” which may impact a managers decision to continue with a 
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project that appears doomed to failure, and suggests that “escalation is more likely 
to occur when managers make errors in processing information” but does not delve 
deeper into why managers make those errors in processing information, whether 
there are different outcomes associated with different “types” of managers, or 
whether or not there are underlying factors as to how managers process the 
information coming to them. 
Keil suggests that certain psychological factors may have contributed to 
escalation in the case reported. These factors include: 
1. prior history of success, 
2. high degree of personal responsibility for the outcome of the 
project, 
3. errors in information processing, and 
4. emotional attachment to the project.  
Prior history of success correlates to Vaughan’s observations as to the 
contributory factors of Normalisation of Deviance. Where an organisation has not 
previously experienced negative outcomes they will continue to assume that taking 
the same actions or decisions will not produce deleterious results. The fact that 
failure had not occurred previously is not proof that their decision making was 
sound, rather it was “luck” that no disaster had previously befallen them. A well-
researched example of Normalisation of Deviance is the NASA Challenger space 
shuttle disaster which occurred on January 28th 1986 (Vaughan 2016). In the 
specific case if the NASA Challenger space shuttle, various other launches had 
been successful despite components such as the O-Rings operating beyond their 
specified tolerances, and so it was assumed that earlier decisions to launch were 
sound and this decision would also prove to be sound. The most likely description 
is however that previous launches prior to the Challenger explosion were “lucky” 
that components operating outside of tolerances had not caused a disaster to 
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occur similar to what happened with the Challenger. A decision by NASA to 
implement processes to ensure that O-Rings were checked on future launches (the 
proximal cause) would do nothing to ameliorate the underlying cause 
(normalization of deviance). 
Optimism bias in a project management environment (Prater, Kirytopoulis 
et al. 2017), may also account for why project managers maintain a “continued 
commitment in the face of negative information” (Keil 1995 p.422). But what is 
absent from the literature is why an experienced manager would suffer from what 
amounts to a delusional optimism bias in the face of hard evidence to the contrary. 
Does the project executive not understand the information being presented to 
them? Does the project executive somehow consider that they are immune from 
the risks and failures that the majority of projects face? What propels a project 
executive to operate under the assumption that their project will somehow be one 
of the very few to be successful? The fact that project executives ignore negative 
information about project escalation is supported by the findings of the case study 
that formed the basis of this research. Even the fact that project executives may 
suffer from optimism bias fails to clarify why an executive would remain optimistic 
despite all evidence to the contrary? Do they know something that no-one else 
knows? What conditions or conditioning lead the project executive to ignore clear 
evidence that their project is doomed to fail? 
Continuing the research into project escalation, Keil, Rai and Mann (2000) 
had refined the definition of escalation to “a commitment to a failing course of 
action” (Keil, Rai et al. 2000.p631) and had identified “runaway systems that far 
exceed original budget and schedule projections. Keil, Rai et al (2000, p.632) 
commented that “projects that escalated had project outcomes that were 
significantly worse in terms of perceived implementation performance and 
perceived budget/schedule performance, as compared to those that did not 
12 December 2018 
Situational Incompetence: an investigation into the causes of failure of a large-scale IT project  
Darryl Carlton  page  35 of 219 
escalate” confirming that ‘runaway projects’ fail by almost every observable 
measure. 
Similar to the findings of this research, Keil, Rai et al (2000) posited theories 
from the social and behavioural sciences as being potential drivers of executive 
behaviour during the conduct of a project, particularly when that project is 
demonstrating negative outcomes. Drawing on the escalation literature the authors 
suggested that “self-justification theory (SJT), prospect theory (PT), agency theory 
(AT), and approach avoidance theory (AAT)” (Keil, Rai et al, 2000 p.634) may be 
potential factors to explain project escalation. 
Self-Justification Theory “posits that individuals tend to escalate their 
commitment to a course of action (and undergo the risk of additional negative 
outcomes) in order to self-justify prior behavior (Staw and Fox 1977 quoted by Keil, 
Rai et al, 2000). SJT is based on the notion that "individuals seek to rationalize their 
previous behavior...against a perceived error in judgement" (ibid) 
Prospect Theory “posits that individuals exhibit risk averse or risk seeking 
behavior depending on how a problem is framed. Specifically, prospect theory 
suggests that individuals will exhibit risk seeking behavior in choosing between two 
negative alternatives, especially when the choice is between a sure loss and the 
possibility of a larger loss combined with a chance to return to the reference point 
(Whyte 1986 quoted by Keil, Rai et al, 2000). In other words, someone who has not 
yet come to terms with an earlier loss is likely to adopt a negative frame of 
reference and is, therefore, more likely to engage in risk seeking behavior”. (ibid) 
It could be seen that prospect theory supports the theory of normalization of 
deviance, in that an actor holds out the prospect of the project being a success 
because they have not yet come to terms with an earlier failure. 
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Under approach avoidance theory, “escalation is conceptualized as a 
behavior that results when driving forces that encourage persistence seem to 
outweigh restraining forces that encourage abandonment (Brockner and Rubin 
1985 quoted by Keil, Rai et al, 2000). These competing forces create a conflict over 
whether to continue or withdraw. According to approach avoidance theory, in 
escalation situations, the cost of persistence (a restraining force) is often 
overshadowed by one or more driving forces such as: (1) the size of the reward for 
goal attainment, (2) the cost of withdrawal, or (3) the proximity to the goal (ibid) 
Under agency theory, “goal incongruency between principal and agent 
can create a situation in which the agent acts to maximize his or her own utility, 
rather than acting in the best interests of the principal. The concept of information 
asymmetry is central to all principal-agent models” (ibid). Information asymmetry 
is discussed in more detail in Section 5.1 (page 118) when discussing Goffman’s 
dramaturgy. Agency Theory is discussed in the context of how it plays out in the 
public sector in particular reference to ‘agency drift’ in Section 5.4 (page 139). 
Keil, Rai et al (2000, p. 635) posit that “individuals exhibit risk averse or risk 
seeking behaviour depending on how a problem is framed”. Drawing on Kruger 
and Dunning (1999 & 2009), and in particular on their observation that the skills 
needed to identify competence in others are the same skills needed to perform a 
task (Kruger and Dunning 2009), one might argue that it’s not how a problem is 
framed, but rather how the receiver of the communication ‘hears’ the problem 
based upon their own internal cognitive biases and abilities. A skilled and practiced 
leader “when confronted by ill-structured problems, is shown to rely largely on 
non-verbalisable intuitive thought processes based on concrete experience” 
(Silverman 1985). This is in contrast to the non-expert as project executive who has 
no ‘intuitive thought processes’ upon which they can rely. “It is well established 
that intuition plays an important role in experts' decision making and thinking 
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generally” (Chassy and Gobet 2011). The role that intuition plays was supported 
by Vo-Tran (2014) where he observed that skilled and experienced practitioners 
were able to “intuit” a response to a problem, where the inexperienced tradesman 
referred to process and procedure upon identifying the same problem (Vo-Tran 
2014). 
Zhang, Keil, Rai and Mann (2002) constructed a neural-network application 
to model the likely contributory factors of project escalation. What this solution 
discovered was that the most likely cause of a runaway project was the “sunk cost” 
(Zhang, Keil et al. 2002 p.127). Essentially, where a project has already expended 
significant sums, then the predilection is to continue the project in order to try and 
spend their way out of trouble. This finding offers substantial support to the 
definition adopted by Keil in his earlier published works describing a runaway 
project as being “continued commitment in the face of negative information about 
prior resource allocations, coupled with uncertainty surrounding the likelihood of 
goal attainment” (Keil 1995 p.422). The more common phrase of ‘good money 
after bad’ would appear to apply here, and resurrects one of the research questions 
posed at the outset of this thesis: 
• That at least a large majority of organisations involved in IT project 
developments have ignored the lessons learned and the published 
research 
Keil and Mahring (2010) continue their research into the practical 
observation of runaway projects, and construct a framework for dealing with project 
escalation. In particular they refer to “the mum effect” in which executives or 
project team members “have been ignored (or worse still, punished) for having 
reported problems or raised concerns” (Keil, Cule et al. 1998 p.18). This is 
consistent with findings that “the involvement of non-IT stakeholders can actually 
work detrimentally and confound and confuse proceedings, even causing error” 
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(Engelbrecht, Johnston et al. 2017 p.1003). Engelbrecht, Johnston et al (2017, 
p.1004) additionally observed that “non-IT experienced management, placed in a 
position of authority may be influenced by some suppliers or colleagues to whose 
knowledge they had access, and insist on a certain course of action”.  
Lyytinen  (1988) observes that “scholars have shown that problems with IS 
are wide-spread and pervasive”. Lyytinen opines that most research has suffered 
from two weaknesses: 
• That IS failure has been poorly articulated, and 
• That the majority of research has been undertaken from the 
management perspective which he defines as providing “inadequate 
models of IS failure and considered too little the environment and 
types of IS failure” (Lyytinen 1988 p.45) 
Lyytinen (1988) defines what was at the time of publication a new concept 
that he termed “Expectation Failure”. 
Expectation Failure is defined as “a gap between stakeholders’ 
expectations expressed in some ideal or standard and the actual performance” 
(Lyytinen 1988 p.46). Lyytinen defines two different failure scenarios – development 
failure, and usage failure. For each of these Lyytinen outlines different 
characteristics or distinctive types of failure. In the research he also distinguishes 
between “dead or life” failures (Lyytinen 1988, p.50). Viewing failure from the 
perspective of different stakeholders, and considering the failure in the context of 
‘dead or alive’ offers an interesting perspective. 
Contrasting the ‘dead or alive’ issue with Keil’s terminology of “escalated” 
or “run-away project” one might take the view that from the perspective of (say) a 
computer programmer working on the Queensland Health payroll project there 
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could be an interpretation that says ‘the solution went live, it is paying staff, and it 
meets its basic requirement’, therefore the project could be regarded as a 
successful completion of the programmers task. 
Continuing their research into Information Systems Failure; Keil, Cule, 
Lyytinen and Schmidt (1998) state that “one explanation for the high failure rate is 
that managers are not taking prudent measures to assess and manage the risks 
involved in these projects” (ibid:p.76).  
Figure 5 – A Risk Categorization Framework (Keil, Cule et al, 1998) 
Keil, Cule et al (1998) created a “risk categorization framework” (figure 5) 
based on their Delphi studies of the contributory factors of information systems 
project failure. In the “risk framework” the Customer Mandate quadrant “requires 
risk mitigation strategies that create and maintain good relationships with 
customers and promote customer commitment to the project”. The customer 
mandate quadrant is seen by the participants as being of high-risk to project 
outcomes and possessing a low-level of control by the project manager thereby 
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creating potentially ‘life-threatening outcomes’, if not managed effectively. This 
quadrant continues the theme developed in much of the research literature of the 
importance of senior management commitment to the project. 
Wu, Rose and Lyytinen (2011) considered the outcomes and performance 
of what they termed “black swan projects”. Black Swan Projects are projects 
“where knowledge from previous projects do not provide significant insight into 
how they can be managed” (Wu, Rose et al. 2011 p.1). 
Where the project executive with ultimate accountability and responsibility 
for the projects’ success, failure and outcomes has no (or limited) prior project 
experience it might be argued that every undertaking represents a “black swan 
project”. In this instance, the project executive is not bringing to the project any 
prior experience or insight that could be relied upon to deliver a successful project 
outcome. 
Wu, Rose and Lyytinen (2011) argue that project executives faced with a 
“black swan project” have the option of scaling up known project management 
methods, but they also argue that this approach appears to be highly ineffective. 
Similarly, Vo-Tran (2014) found that executives lacking domain competence will rely 
upon known methods and procedures when faced with challenging tasks, while 
experts will rely on their experience to construct a mental/cognitive model and 
heurististics to ‘intuit’ an appropriate course of action. The lack of specific domain 
knowledge and experience denies the project executive the ability to ‘intuit’ an 
appropriate response to project or incident stimuli. What this means is that where 
the expert ‘knows’ what a specific stimuli or event might mean for the project, the 
unskilled manager will instead rely upon procedure to determine what action to 
take. 
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According to Wu, Rose and Lyytinen (2011, p.2) “prior work that has 
examined how managers can recognize and measure a project’s level of 
complexity, argue for a need to modify the project management process to fit the 
unique nature of managing highly innovative information technology projects. This 
need to consider changes to the basic IT project management framework can be 
crucial for the success of highly innovative or radical IT projects”. 
Lyytinen (1988) observed that project success and failure needs to be 
considered from the lens of the stakeholder. With this as a working principle a 
response to a project stimuli from the perspective of an inexperienced IT project 
manager would be any set of conditions that they have not previously experienced. 
Applying the lessons learned from Kruger and Dunning (2009) in this situation the 
researcher might postulate that, the project executive will over-estimate their 
competence and demonstrate a high degree of unjustified confidence in their 
ability to perform these complex tasks. This was demonstrated in the Queensland 
Health payroll project, where the technically inexperienced executive increasingly 
acted independent of the advice from the Departments own experts. 
2.7 Expert Leadership in IT Projects 
Goodall (2006) examined “expert leadership” where the research shows 
that 'organizations on average perform better when they are led by individuals with 
expert knowledge. In random samples of 35,000 US and UK workers, we found that 
a boss's technical competence is the single strongest predictor of a worker's job 
satisfaction. Our latest research suggests that this happens because expert leaders 
understand how to create the right work environment, and how to appropriately 
assess, consult and support staff’. 
Goodall (2006) studied the correlation between University rankings and the 
citations of University presidents (the most highly ranked leader of a University 
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irrespective of local title). A list of the world’s Top 100 Universities according to 
Institute of Higher Education at Shanghai Jiao Tong University in their Academic 
Ranking of World Universities was used as the basis for identifying the candidate 
institutions of higher education. Data was then collected on the citations of the 
Presidents (Vice-Chancellors) of the Universities. 
Goodall’s findings state that “the most highly ranked universities have 
leaders who are more highly cited” (Goodall 2006 p.9). The research discussed 
‘outliers’ and noted that “there are top universities led by presidents with few or 
no citations. However, these cases are in a minority” (Goodall 2006 p.11). 
There was a clear correlation between the research expertise and 
reputation of the University President and the global ranking of that institution. 
Goodall extended this research into a longitudinal study (Goodall 2009) 
and found that “on average the research quality of a university improves some 
years after it appoints a president (vice chancellor) who is an accomplished scholar” 
(ibid:p.1). 
Goodall noted four themes which emerged from this longitudinal study 
(Goodall 2009 p.3):  
• First, scholars are seen as more credible leaders. A president who is a 
researcher will gain greater respect from academic colleagues and 
appear more legitimate. Legitimacy extends a leader’s power and 
influence.  
• Second, it is argued that being a top scholar provides a president with 
a deep understanding or expert knowledge about the core business of 
universities. This informs a president’s decision-making and strategic 
priorities.  
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• Third, interviewees suggested that it is the president who sets the 
quality threshold in a university, and, therefore, that the bar is raised 
when an accomplished scholar is hired. Thus, a standard bearer has first 
set the standard that is to be enforced.  
• Finally, a president who is a researcher sends a signal to the faculty that 
the leader shares their scholarly values, and that research success in the 
institution is important. It also transmits an external signal to potential 
academic hires, donors, alumni and students 
In response to a call by Khurana and Nohria (Khurana and Nohria 2008) to 
“make management a true profession”, Goodall has argued that management is 
not what organisations do. Management is a means of supporting organisations to 
execute their expertise, ‘occupations such as medicine, architecture or law require 
expertise of a technical kind, such that failure to conform to the standards imposed 
by their professions could lead to loss of life or freedom. These professional 
enterprises still require management systems and managers in order to operate. 
Thus the two -- technical expertise and management expertise -- are not 
interchangeable” (Goodall 2010 p.3).  
Management has been described (Peter Drucker cited in Cohen 
2008,p.228) as having a focus on “hygiene matters” and on attention to 
information and compliance and should be seen as distinct from leadership. While 
management is required in all organisations, management does not replace 
leadership which has been shown conclusively to be positively correlated with 
technical expertise in the specific domain. For example, in studying professional 
basketball teams in the USA, Goodall, Kahn et al (2011) has shown that “leaders 
draw upon their technical ability in, and acquired expert knowledge of, the core 
business of their organisation” in order to produce above-average results. 
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Goodall’s research identifies that, for the data set investigated, “former 
NBA all-stars have much higher average winning percentages and more playoff 
success than the other groups, and non-players have the least success of the three 
groups” (Goodall, Kahn et al. 2011,p.18). 
 Goodall, Kahn et al (2011) showed that the competence and technical 
abilities of the leader are strongly correlated with positive outcomes in basketball, 
Formula1 motor racing, hospital administration, and university administration 
(amongst others) and that this may be generalisable to other domains. While this 
has not been tested in information technology projects, these findings are 
consistent with the themes found in this research and suggest that this would form 
a fruitful stream of future research. 
‘Someone implementing IT needs to know which levers to pull, in which 
context, and at what time’ (Dwivedi, Wastell et al. 2015,p.149). Figuring out which 
levers to pull, in which context and at what time requires competence and the 
intuition borne of experience. Project leadership requires expertise. 
2.8 Experts Require Deliberate Practice 
In the world of ‘pop-psychology’ Malcolm Gladwell (2008) argued that to 
become an expert one needs ten-thousand hours of practice. While Gladwell’s 
assertions are ‘stretching the truth’ they are not without foundation. ‘In domains 
where expert performance is measurable, acquisition is gradual and the highest 
levels are only attained after 10 years of intense preparation—even for the most 
talented’ (Ericsson and Ward, 2007 p.346). To achieve the performance of an 
expert one needs to undertake ‘deliberate practice’ (Ericsson and Pool, 2016 ch.5). 
Ericsson distinguishes between repetition and deliberate practice, emphasising 
that it is not enough to simply repeat what one has always been doing. Repetition, 
according to Ericsson, does not lead to improvement and certainly does not lead 
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to expert performance in any field. Expertise requires a deliberate and determined 
effort to improve at the task, and to measure oneself against a goal (Ericsson and 
Ward, 2007, p.348). In their book ‘Peak”, Ericsson and Pool (2016, p.13) relate that 
someone that has been performing a task for a very long time will rapidly achieve 
a satisfactory level of performance, but the mere repetition will not make them an 
expert. In a scientific explanation of the adage “one years experience twenty times 
over”, the authors demonstrate that new doctors were better at performing 
diagnoses than doctors of twenty years routine experience. Rising above 
‘acceptable performance’ requires that the practitioner undertakes ‘deliberate 
efforts to improve’ (ibid.p.14) without which their skills will deteriorate. 
Similarly, in the business of managing large and complex information 
systems projects, it takes years of experience and practice to acquire the skills, 
insights and intuition necessary to ensure a project meets its objectives. And it 
requires a deliberate and thoughtful effort to constantly measure performance and 
to target improvements. It might be argued, in the context of this research, that 
one does not become an expert at project management simply by being 
appointed to the position. 
2.9 The Peter Principle 
The Peter Principle: Why Things Always Go Wrong was written in 1969 by 
Laurence J. Peter and Raymond Hull. The Peter Principle is summarised as ‘Every 
new member in a hierarchical organisation climbs the hierarchy until he/she reaches 
his/her level of maximum incompetence’ (Pluchino, Rapisarda & Garofalo, 2010 
p.467). The essence of the Peter Principle is that as individuals receive promotion 
based on their performance at one level in the hierarchy, and as they ascend to 
ever higher levels, the skills and competence required to succeed at those new 
levels is different to the skills they exhibited and for which they were promoted. 
Ultimately an individual reaches a level in the hierarchy where they are no longer 
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competent to perform the task and they cease to be promoted. Peter and Hull 
(1969, p.173) observed that ‘work is accomplished by those employees who have 
not yet reached their level of incompetence’. 
In critique of the Peter Principle, Lazear (2004, p.142) argues that a lower 
performance after promotion is to be expected, and firms should account for this 
in their hierarchical strategies and make allowance for new promotees where a 
‘decline in ability that is seen after promotion is the natural outcome of a statistical 
process that displays regression to the mean’. 
In any event, it is clear that much research supports the notion that when 
an individual is moved to a role that requires new and unfamiliar skills their 
performance will decline (at best) and be seen as incompetent (ibid).  
2.10 Summary 
The preponderance of research has focused on identifying the factors that 
have contributed to project failure. These research outputs have consistently 
highlighted the leading causes of project failure, with the following being the most 
regularly cited causes (Fortune & White, 2006): 
• a lack of support from senior management 
• projects must have clear and realistic goals 
• strong and detailed plans, kept up to date 
• good communication and feedback 
• user/client involvement 
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Testing these criteria against the Queensland Health payroll project leaves 
significant gaps in promulgating these criteria as serious contenders for being the 
leading contributory factors to project failure. 
The literature on IT project management and project failure does not 
provide evidence of the quantum or type of senior management support that 
would objectively produce a different project outcome. However, when one digs 
more broadly into the questions of quality management it can be seen that the role 
and contribution of senior management is far more explicitly drawn out. ‘The crucial 
role top management plays in driving company-wide quality management efforts 
has been recognized by practitioners and researchers as one of the major factors 
for achieving successful quality performance’ (Subba-Rao, Solis et al. 1999,p1050). 
Further it is argued that ’it is the role of top management to formalize the company 
quality values and vision and project them in a clear, visible and a consistent 
manner (Puffer and McCarthy 1996, Waldman, Lituchy et al. 1998). This clarity of 
the role of senior management is not called out in the literature on IT project 
failures, yet ‘lack of senior management support’ is highlighted many times over as 
the leading cause of project failure, without ever indicating what senior 
management support entails. It has become an article of faith in the IT literature 
and more broadly an excuse for project failure, that ‘lack of senior management 
support’ causes projects to fail without providing any evidence for what could be 
done differently. If senior management support requires clear and visible 
commitment to quality values, it is difficult to understand exactly how a senior 
executive with little to no exposure to IT and its execution would be in a position 
to lead the determination of quality standards and values. 
Clear and unambiguous goals, frozen according to some research papers 
(eg: Nasir & Sahibuddin, 2011), is an unrealistic, and not desired objective when 
viewed through the lens of agile methodologies. Clear, frozen, realistic project 
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goals is more reflective of traditional (waterfall) methodologies which for decades 
have practiced this method, with very poor project outcomes (refer Chaos Reports 
from Standish Group, 1994 to 2015). Is the lack of clear requirements a cause or a 
symptom of this example of project failure? 
Strong and detailed plans may be appropriate where they allow flexibility 
for changes in circumstance as the project progresses. There is an implication in 
the statement “strong and detailed” that these plans may be inflexible. Several of 
the failed projects discussed in Chapter 2 exhibited inflexibility to the degree that 
when budgets were not approved the project continued unabated only to end in 
a completely predictable failure. The plan for Queensland Health was known, 
updated regularly, constantly reported. Deviance from the plan and risks with the 
plan were highlighted by consulting reports, so it becomes questionable whether 
or not a strong and detailed plan is a cause of failure or a consequence of some 
other factor in the project. 
Good communication and feedback might be considered a generic 
requirement for all management undertakings. As discussed above previously ‘the 
job of managing is fundamentally one of processing information, notably by talking 
and especially by listening’ (Mintzberg 1990,p.21) but each individual sees 
themselves performing on a stage and discloses and/or withholds information 
according to how they perceive that stage (Goffman 1959, Manning 2008). Project 
management is at its core a task of organising groups of people to produce an 
outcome, and so communication and feedback is clearly an important component, 
as it is with every management undertaking. However, to single communication 
out may be just too generic to be listed as a major contributor to IT project failure, 
and in the instance of this case study, there was an abundance of formal and 
informal communication. As the project was an obvious failure, it is in hindsight 
that the researcher can observe that the communications may not have met the 
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standard of being “good”. A broader question emerges however, in the heat of 
the project what would constitute good communication that would have a positive 
impact on the projects outcome? 
User/Client involvement seems to be one of those criteria that is self-
evident. Engelbrecht et al (2017) found that an unskilled user is likely to exert a 
negative influence on a project, taking their lead from sources that are not optimal 
for a positive project outcome.  
The Agile Manifesto has user/client involvement as one of their twelve core 
principles: ‘Business people and developers must work together daily throughout 
the project’ (Agile-Manifesto 2001). The agile approach demands that business and 
technical people work side-by-side. User/Client involvement should not mean that 
all decision making is turned over to the user/client, rather as in the agile manifesto 
“working together” seems to be an appropriate objective. 
Nothing raised in prior literature explains how a project, in this instance the 
Queensland Health Payroll project, can apparently ignore every lesson learned and 
every research published. The literature does not offer any clues as to why an 
informed and professional management team of clients and vendors will ”carry on 
regardless”. 
The International Federation of Information Processing1 (IFIP WG 8.6) ask 
‘Is the fault one of theory and inadequate understanding? Or is the problem one 
of knowledge transfer, the failure to embed research knowledge in the working 
practices of managers and policy-makers?’ (Dwivedi, Wastell et al. 2015,p.v)  
                                               
1 The International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) is a global organisation, 
established in 1960 under the auspices of UNESCO, for researchers and professionals 
working in the field of information and communication technologies (ICT) to conduct 
research, develop standards and promote information sharing. 
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In this research the main question can be restated in IFIP terms as “if 
transference is the problem, why is that a problem?”. It remains unclear why there 
would be a problem with knowledge transfer. The basic principles of project 
management: time, cost and output, have been known for millennia and refined 
substantially in the industrial and technological revolution that has occurred 
subsequent to World War Two, and the digital revolution that has introduced 
modern methods such as agile, scrum and cloud computing. 
Why are managements ignoring the lessons learned, and the advice that is 
being presented before, during and after projects have started and failed? There 
is nothing in the literature to answer this conundrum. 
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Chapter Three - Research Methodology 
The following chapter outlines how this research was undertaken. It sets 
out the rationale for undertaking inductive case-based research and is followed by 
a description of the method and the steps undertaken. It explains how the data 
was analysed and how topics and themes emerged from the data to inform the 
study.  
3.1 Introduction 
That Information technology projects continue to exhibit very poor rates of 
success, suggest that the research and education with respect to project failure 
has: 
1. Failed to identify the main contributory factors of IT project failure; 
and/or 
2. That at least a large majority of organisations involved in IT project 
developments have ignored the lessons learned and the published 
research; and/or 
3. That while the main causes of IT project failure have been identified 
and many organisations do attempt to address those contributory 
factors, the implementation of solutions to these problems is both 
very difficult and/or in conflict with other more powerful business 
drivers. 
The corpus of published literature on the subject of failed IT projects lacks 
evidence based research drawn from comprehensive case studies (Dwivedi, 
Wastell et al. 2015). This research contributes to addressing that gap, and aims to 
identify what occurred in a specific, very large project, and what led to failure in 
that instance. From this case study it is hoped that confirmation of previously 
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identified contributory factors may emerge, or else that a new theory may be 
constructed leading to further research that might confirm these findings as being 
generally applicable. A single case study, even one as complex as the Queensland 
Health Payroll project, is still only a singular event and cannot produce outcomes 
which are generalisable. But this case is of ‘very special interest … and the study 
of (it’s) particularity and complexity … to understand its activity within important 
circumstances’ (Stake 1995,p xi) is worthy of being undertaken. 
Thus, this research needs to follow an approach that will lead to formative 
‘theory building’ rather than the more common ‘theory testing’ (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007). Theory building is more suited to a comprehensive case study 
approach, which would subsequently lead to future research opportunities to test 
any emergent or confirmatory hypothesis. The goal of this research is to 
“understand more about the reasons why (project failure) occurs” (Keil 1995,p.423) 
and has therefore employed an inductive case study approach. 
The process of ‘theory building’ is undertaken by examining a case in detail 
by starting with little or no preconceived notion of the theory that will ultimately 
emerge from the data (Eisenhardt 1989). ‘Induction is viewed as the key process, 
with the researcher moving from the data to empirical generalisation and on to 
theory’ (Heath and Cowley 2004,p.144). Eisenhardt (1989) refers to this method as 
‘Inductive Case Oriented Research’. 
In explaining inductive case oriented research Eisenhardt (1989 p.532) 
draws heavily upon the work of Glaser, Strauss and Corbin (Glaser and Strauss 
1967) and (Strauss and Corbin 1975) in describing grounded theory. ‘Building 
theory from case studies is a research strategy that involves using one or more 
cases to create theoretical constructs, propositions and/or midrange theory from 
case-based, empirical evidence’.   
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‘Grounded theory is predicated on an emergent logic. This method starts 
with a systematic, inductive approach to collecting and analyzing data to develop 
theoretical analyses. The method also includes checking emergent categories that 
emerge from successive levels of analysis through hypothetical and deductive 
reasoning’ (Charmaz 2008,p.155). 
While there are a great many similarities between inductive case oriented 
research and grounded theory (Charmaz 2008, Glaser 2004, Eisenhardt 1989, 
Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007), there are also some differences in methodologies 
commonly employed. Inductive case oriented research proposes the use of 
historical and archived data as foundations for data analysis (Eisenhardt 1989), 
while grounded theory proposes the use of interviews and observation, and the 
collection of field notes (Glaser 2004, Heath and Cowley 2004, Bertero 2012, 
Charmaz 2008a, Charmaz 2008b, Hallberg 2006). Inductive case oriented research 
is more of an “archeological dig”, with attributes akin to action research (Hinchey 
2008,p.4) where the essential characteristics of this type of research are: 
• It is conducted by those inside a community rather than by outside 
experts. 
• It pursues improvement or better understanding in some area the 
researcher considers important. 
• It involves systematic inquiry, which includes information gathering, 
analysis and reflection. 
• It leads to an action plan, which frequently generates a new cycle of 
the process 
Multi-Grounded Theory (Goldkuhl and Cronholm 2003, Goldkuhl and 
Cronholm 2010, Goldkuhl and Lind 2010, Axelsson and Goldkuhl 2015, Cronholm 
12 December 2018 
Situational Incompetence: an investigation into the causes of failure of a large-scale IT project  
Darryl Carlton  page  54 of 219 
2004) and Informed Grounded Theory (Thornberg 2012) seek to integrate 
established research and theory into the data collection and analysis approach of 
Grounded Theory in order to provide a more informed view of the domain being 
investigated. 
Multi-Grounded Theory takes a more comprehensive approach to 
grounding the theory in three constructs, using prior theory as data informing the 
inductive process, as well as the observed data: 
• ‘Empirical data (preferably collected in mainly an inductive way) – 
empirical grounding;  
• Pre-existing theories (well selected for the theorised phenomena) – 
theoretical grounding;  
• An explicit congruence within the theory itself (between elements in 
the theory) – internal grounding.’ (Axelsson & Goldkuhl, 2015, p. 2) 
Both, inductive case oriented research and grounded theory, form part of 
the larger body of qualitative data analysis (QDA) approaches, and both have as 
their objective an emphasis on the development of a theory to explain observed 
phenomena, rather than testing a theory through hypothesis testing applied to 
observed data. 
3.2 Research Approach 
For this study the observed phenomenon (the main concern) is the ongoing 
and continual failure of information technology projects, as was discussed in 
Chapter 2. For the purposes of this research, failure has been defined by the 
inability to deliver on time, to an agreed budget, and to meet the value and quality 
objectives of the enterprises that the systems are meant to serve. 
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The methodology being utilised to examine this case is inductive case 
study, informed by grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Grounded theory 
was designed with the intent of ensuring that ‘theories systematically emerge 
directly from data’ (Martin and Gynnild 2011, p20). The term ‘grounded’ is intended 
to imply that the emergent theories are grounded in the data and not generated a 
priori and then applied to surveys or examples in an effort to prove the theories. 
In grounded theory the core problem is called the ‘main concern’ (Bertero 
2012), and is the central focus of the grounded theory inquiry. By investigating the 
social constructs that exist in and around the main concern, inductive case-oriented 
research is looking to tease out answers to the question ‘why?’ (Charmaz, 2008). 
‘The grounded theory method begins with inductive strategies for 
collecting and analyzing qualitative data for the purpose of developing theories’ 
(Charmaz, 2008, p.1). For this case study that has meant collecting the project data 
and interview transcripts for examination, and for the data within those documents 
to “emerge” an appropriate theory as to the contributory factors for project failure. 
The reason that inductive and grounded approaches to qualitative 
research have grown in prominence (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) is because the 
development of theory by ‘combining observations from previous literature, 
common sense, and experience’ (Eisenhardt 1989,p532) was thought to have a 
tenuous connection to the data using other qualitative research methods.  
The method typically used in inductive and grounded approaches is 
described as ‘the data are analysed and coded, ideas and potential insights will 
begin to develop which are recorded in theoretical memos; it is the data that 
develops theoretical sensitivity. The imagination and creativity are used in memo 
writing and are essential if a theory which enhances knowledge and understanding 
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is to be achieved; however, the data are allowed to speak for themselves and 
encompass all other considerations’ (Heath and Cowley 2004,p.144). 
Seeking to use this kind of method in the present research, all of the 
available data (archival material) on a significant failed project was gathered and 
examined for clues and trends perceived in the data which may then be examined 
for their potential causal effect on the projects’ outcomes.  These observations and 
inferences are the empirical data, from which theory has been induced. 
3.3 Inductive Case Study Methods 
Inductive case study methods, start with collecting and analysing data for 
the purposes of developing theories (Charmaz 2008). And while data analysis may 
be influenced by the beliefs, prior experiences, and readings of the researcher 
(Heath and Cowley 2004), any researcher held preconceptions as to the prevailing 
theories or contributory factors should be consciously suspended until theories 
emerge from the data (Baker, Wuest et al. 1992). This does not mean that the 
researcher should ignore, forget, or deliberately exclude all prior knowledge and 
research. Ignoring everything that has gone before may lead the researcher to 
develop theories that are already fully exposed, or, worse, to trivialise the problem 
being addressed (Thornberg 2012). 
The inductive approach is the method of knowledge development 
proposed by grounded theory and central to any grounded and inductive case 
study methodologies undertaken (Eisenhardt 1989, Eisenhardt and Graebner 
2007). 
The methodological steps for this research project are as follows (adapted 
from (Sbaraini, Carter et al. 2011) (see figure 7 for a graphical representation): 
1. Data Collection and Cataloguing 
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2. Coding and Comparing 
3. Analysis 
4. Comparison with established theory and existing literature 
5. Theoretical Saturation 
6. Production of a Substantive Theory. 
As is to be expected in an inductive case study research project the 
literature review will emerge in stages as hypotheses are identified and explored. 
‘Induction moves from the particular to the general: it develops new theories or 
hypotheses from many observations. This means that grounded theory studies 
tend to take a very open approach to the process being studied’ (Sbaraini, Carter 
et al. 2011). 
Data Collection and Cataloguing is undertaken simultaneously. As data is 
collected the inductive researcher commences analysis. Sometimes the analysis will 
lead to other streams of investigation. Data Collection, Coding and Analysis are 
parallel and recursive activities.  
For this project, the initial set of data was archival and drawn from the 
public records of the Queensland Royal Commission of Inquiry, supplemented by 
additional material requested through the Freedom-of-Information (FOI) process. 
Should additional clarification be required, various options exist for sourcing 
additional data, including: vendor records, additional FOI requests, and direct 
interviews. 
Coding and Comparing is the process of coding the data as it is collected 
and analysed. Coding and codes should emerge from the data and not from an a 
priori model created from pre-existing research external to the project or case 
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being examined. Having a ‘preconceived model’, against which coding and 
classification occurs, would risk influencing the findings and not allowing 
explanations/theoretical constructs/themes to emerge inductively from the data. 
Analysis incorporates collation of the coded data and memo-writing as the 
researcher gathers their thoughts throughout the project, with the researcher 
constantly analysing the data and thinking about the consequences of what has 
emerged so far. Often this will require the researcher to delve into the extant 
literature as it relates to the emerging coded themes (Cronholm 2004, Axelsson 
and Goldkuhl 2015). Wading through the project documents and interviews leads 
the researcher to go in and out of an ongoing literature search to make sense of 
the data that is emerging. Unlike a more linear approach to developing a thesis, 
inductive case study utilising multi-grounded theory is a constant iteration of 
emerging concepts, testing those concepts, examining the literature, discarding 
concepts and continuing to question the data. 
‘Analysis raises questions, suggests relationships, highlights gaps in the 
existing data set and reveals what the researchers do not yet know’ (Sbaraini et al., 
2011.p.3). The circular iterations continue until nothing new is emerging from the 
data, and saturation has been achieved. According to Sbaraini et al., (2011), 
theoretical saturation is where the researcher has reached the (subjective) point in 
data collection, analysis, and coding where nothing new appears to be emerging. 
The data has been saturated. It is thought that any further analysis will only confirm 
the findings already established and will not reveal anything new. 
Production of a Substantive Theory occurs as a result of the concepts 
emerging and coalescing. Of particular note in grounded theory: the emergent 
theory is considered to be applicable only to the case being examined and should 
be amended or disproved by ongoing and further research. 
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Testing and grounding of the emergent theory, or theories, will need to be 
undertaken following the principles of multi-grounded theory. Namely, all 
emergent theories will need to be grounded explicitly using theoretical matching, 
explicit empirical validation, and internal validity (Cronholm, 2004). 
The task of induction requires the researcher to understand the decision 
making that was being made at the time that those decisions were made, with the 
information that was available to members of the project at that time (Vaughan 
2016 and Dekker 2014).  
3.4 What, When, How and Why 
To understand the contributory factors of project failure it becomes 
necessary to not only observe and document WHAT happened, but crucially to 
understand WHY certain events or decisions were taken at the time that they were 
taken. It is necessary to reconstruct, as far as possible, the circumstances that 
existed at the time that crucial decisions were taken so that the researcher may 
understand the forces at play and crucially what was known, by whom, and when 
they knew what they knew. 
Vaughan (2016) investigated the Challenger space shuttle disaster and 
developed new theories to explain how an organisation of experienced, qualified 
and concerned individuals could make what in retrospect appeared to be ill-
informed and careless decisions. Exploring ‘the why’ of what happened Vaughan 
identified a phenomenon which she labelled as “The Normalisation of Deviance”. 
The significant departure in Vaughan’s work from other investigations was her 
insistence on reconstructing the events and data flows surrounding the incident as 
it unfolded, “To understand decision making in any organisation, we must look at 
individual action within its layered context: individual, organisation, and 
environment as a system of action” (Vaughan, 2016, ch.2). 
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Vaughan (2016, ch. 2) further opined that ‘individual choice is constrained 
by institutional and organisational forces’, undermining the notion of ‘amoral 
calculations’ - project participants attempt to make the best decisions given the 
data available at the time, and within the known or experienced constraints of the 
institutional and organisational forces. With this as a guiding principle of the 
research, it was imperative to maintain the view that executives and managers were 
‘doing the best that they could' and were not acting in an amoral manner. Deeper 
insights were needed, and the researcher was required to go beyond the surface 
level of the data to identify theories that might explain the observed phenomena. 
3.5 Primary Data Collection 
A Commission of Inquiry was established under an Act of the Queensland 
Parliament to conduct ‘full and careful inquiry, in an open and independent 
manner, into the implementation of the Queensland Health payroll system’ 
(Chesterman, 2013, S.3.1). This Commission was led by a former Justice of the 
Supreme Court and was empowered with the ability to compel testimony 
equivalent to any Court of Law. 
The commission compiled witness statements from 181 individuals 
involved in the project, and recorded testimony from each person over a three 
month period. The complete set of documents pertaining to this enquiry are 
available at http://www.healthpayrollinquiry.qld.gov.au. These documents formed 
a core component of the data set which was utilised by this research and comprised 
a total of 3,850 pages. 
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Additionally, there were many documents that were not published by the 
Commission of Inquiry. A series of Freedom-of-Information requests was made to 
several Government departments and agencies to obtain project documentation 
specific to the Queensland Health payroll project. These documents totalled some 
5,000 pages of material. 
The primary case study documents comprising the raw data collection were  
drawn from two sources: 
1. the published files of the Queensland Commission of Inquiry 
(http://www.healthpayrollinquiry.qld.gov.au, 2013) into the 
Queensland Health Payroll Project (refer Appendix one); and 
2.  documents obtained under freedom of information (FOI) requests to 
the Department of Health Queensland, and to the Queensland Treasury 
Department (refer Appendix two) 
In total, approximately 200 source files were obtained. The documents 
were initially in the form of concatenated PDF files and were separated into 
individual documents. Once disaggregated, there were 355 files, of which 116 files 
were witness statements from the Commission of Inquiry, and the balance of 239 
files which have been sourced by FOI. The documents sourced by FOI contain 
multiple records in each file, bringing the sum total number of individual files and 
documents to be examined to approximately 1,000. 
The total number of pages of witness statements amounted to 3,850. In 
addition there was the collection of project documentation that exceeded 5,000 
pages of emails, reports, project plans and other data. 
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Figure 6: data collection process 
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To examine the case from the perspective of a timeline of events, of data 
and advice that was available at the time, to the participants, the researcher must 
endeavour to reconstruct the project from the available information. Dekker (2014)  
refers to this method of investigation as being ‘inside the tunnel’.  
Inside the tunnel ‘is the point of view of people in the unfolding situation. 
To them, the outcome was not known (or they would have done something else). 
They contributed to the direction of the sequence of events on the basis of what 
they saw on the inside of the unfolding situation. To understand human error, you 
need to attain this perspective’ (Dekker, 2014, p.18). Understanding the 
Queensland Health payroll project from a perspective that is reflective of the 
experience of the project executives and team members as events unfolded is 
critical to the inductive case study process. In order to emerge a theory or theories 
that may potentially be applied to working projects it is imperative that the actions 
and decisions that were taken throughout Queensland Health payroll project are 
understood in the context within which they were experienced at the time. 
Figure 7 illustrates the research process and procedural steps. 
• Step 1: Capture the data from the project documents and witness 
statements and map these into a timeline, represented by a 
Gantt Chart. 
• Step 2: Capture the issues from the project documents and witness 
statements into NVivo, recording memos’, searching the 
literature and identifying themes. Constantly refine as new 
themes emerge. 
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• Step 3: Validate findings utilising the Stanford Topic Modelling Toolkit, 
map keyword findings back to major themes for consistency 
verification. 
• Step 4: Test concepts by submitting essays into the public sphere 
• Step 5: Return to Step 2 and keep repeating until theoretical saturation 
is achieved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Research Process 
The approach that was taken in this research was to examine a single, very 
large and complex project and to extract from the data the identifiable contributory 
factors of failure for this specific project. Described next is the process of how every 
artefact, every document was examined and tagged with observable behaviour. 
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Extensive memo writing yielded a large volume of observations about the topics, 
issues and ideas which were tagged. 
STEP 1: 
Firstly, each file was mapped into a Gantt chart using OmniPlan Project 
Management software (version 2.4.1). The purpose of this exercise was to map the 
origin, the source, and the date that each file was created. This mapping allowed 
the researcher to construct a view of the timeline of the data and the interactions 
between the individuals, identifying what was communicated between them, and 
when that communication took place. The objective of this mapping was to 
determine ‘what was known by whom, and when’. 
All of the available data from the project files (refer Appendix two) was 
entered into the project Gantt chart to map out the flow of information as it actually 
occurred (refer to timeline in chapter 4). This allowed the researcher to ‘observe’ 
the project as if the researcher were involved.  
STEP 2: 
In the next step, attention was turned to witness statements from the 
Governments Commission of Inquiry. The files (Appendix one) were loaded into 
NVivo software (version 12 for Mac) for qualitative analysis, allowing the researcher 
to identify nodes of interest, and to collate and identify common behaviours 
occurring throughout the projects life. Every document was scanned into NVivo 
where it was examined and tagged with topics. The process of doing this in NVivo 
is to “stripe” a passage of interest and “tag” that passage with a descriptor. This 
descriptor is referred to as a “node”. NVivo then highlights all the nodes in 
coloured stripes to allow easy identification of common topics. NVivo also 
provided the main repository for memos. Some documents were unable to be 
scanned into NVivo and these were analysed manually, with memo’s maintained 
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using the same coding system as that used in NVivo. NVivo was used to code each 
document and to collate memo’s about what was observed. 
The topics with references (links) back to their source documents was used 
to understand and to highlight common topics, and then to aid in collating topics 
into themes. 
STEP 3: 
The initial analysis utilised human interrogation (ie: the researcher) to 
document and capture themes, memos, and other information. One of the 
principles of inductive case study is for the researcher to set aside their own 
prejudices and experiences (Charmaz, 2008b, p.156). Being completely open is 
very difficult, therefore to ensure as far as possible that no bias was introduced 
during the previous analysis steps, all of the data (Appendix one and Appendix 
two) was converted into scanned text images and fed into an automated context 
analysis software, the Stanford Topic Modelling Toolbox 
(https://nlp.stanford.edu/software/tmt/tmt-0.4/). This software is based on Mallet 
(Machine Learning for Language) from the University of Massachusetts 
(http://mallet.cs.umass.edu). The purpose of utilising a software toolkit to 
undertake a secondary examination of the data is to perform independent analysis 
of the files that have a substantial textual component.  
The Stanford Topic Modelling toolbox has the following features: 
• Import and manipulate text; 
• Train topic models (LDA, Labeled LDA, and PLDA new) to create 
summaries of the text; 
• Select parameters (such as the number of topics) to sort the text; 
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• Generate rich-data outputs for tracking word usage across topics, time, 
and other groupings of data. 
Figure 8: Stanford Topic Modelling network relationship diagram2 
The Stanford Topic Modelling Toolbox was utilised as a secondary tool to 
provide ‘checks and balances’ against the researcher unduly influencing the 
outcomes based on their own experiences and biases. 
                                               
2 This image of the network diagram is for illustrative purposes only. Its inclusion here is 
to demonstrate the research method used for secondary confirmation of the findings. 
The use of the Stanford Topic Modelling Toolkit was not intended to replace the research 
which was undertaken, rather it was supplemental and was intended to ensure that the 
researcher had not lost objectivity with the sheer volume of source data which was 
analysed. 
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Using the Stanford Topic Modelling Toolbox, the ‘nodes and edges’ were 
mapped to an 'adjacency matrix’ which allowed the resulting data to be fed into 
the Gephi software (http://gephi.org) to produce a series of network graphs for 
data visualisations. Using keywords by ‘rate of mention’ connections are made 
between these ‘key words’ and the source documents within which they appear. 
Figure 9: Network Diagram themes mapped to topics 
In total 50 topics were generated by the Stanford Topic Modelling Toolbox 
against 136 nodes. The fifty topics were then mapped back to the key themes 
identified from NVivo, referring to the source documents to ensure consistency. 
When ‘connected’ using the adjacency matrix there was a total of some 2.5 million 
(2,515,456) connections between the source documents and the key themes. This 
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exercise ensured that every keyword or key phrase mentioned through the source 
documents (Appendix one and Appendix two) was linked to a theme which had 
been identified in the first phase of the research. The automated text analysis 
provided a consistency check to the themes developed throughout the manual 
stages of research and investigation and provided a degree of confidence in the 
findings. 
In the network relationship diagrams (figures 8 and 9), Witness Testimony 
and Project Documents are represented by the green dot, topics by the red dot 
and themes by the blue dot. The network relationship diagram could be examined 
for themes and topics, and to drill down into source documents. 
STEP 4: 
A series of short essays (attachment three) was published on the industry 
social network platform, Linkedin.com, between February 2016 and September 
2016. These essays described the research and intermediate findings and sought 
comment and feedback. In total some two thousand two hundred and sixty-four 
reads were registered with sixty-two detailed comments, (several hundred referrals 
were also recorded where readers passed the essays along to their own networks). 
The purpose of publishing essays on an industry social media site can be 
likened to prototyping of an IT solution. It allowed the researcher to obtain 
unfiltered feedback from the industry on ideas that were still forming. The 
publication and feedback is immediate, and may lead to fields of inquiry that would 
not otherwise have been considered.  
Feedback on a social media platform has the potential to range wildly from 
vitriol to enthusiasm, however, the comments which were received were almost 
exclusively positive, and many provided additional information to research and 
added content to the findings. This method was used to ensure that the findings  
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would be aligned with the industry and would be of potential benefit in practice. 
This feedback led to further research and findings, and thus added to the emergent 
and circular nature of the research methodology. 
STEP 5: 
Step 5 is recursive. As themes emerge from the data (which were 
abstracted from the analysis of key words), theory is investigated to support the 
observations and to explain what was observed in the data. This recursive analysis; 
data -> theory -> data, continues until saturation has been achieved (Sbaraini et 
al., 2011). 
3.6  Issues of Reliability and Validity 
The two broad concepts of reliability and validity of measurement were 
developed in the context of quantitative research (Golafshani 2003), and have been 
‘recast’ when applied to qualitative research (Charmaz 2008). Fundamentally, what 
is being measured by reliability and validity is the degree of error introduced into 
the research findings (Brink 1993,p.35). Brink (1993) argues that the very nature of 
qualitative research is that it is ‘subjective’, and results in ‘formal theory 
construction, through the researcher’s interpretation of results’ (Gasson 2004,p.81). 
 Quantitative research on the other hand is measured by formulae and 
metrics with explicit measures of reliability and validity that can be compared to 
other research findings (Charmaz 2006, Charmaz 2008, Charmaz 2008). No such 
metric exists in qualitative research, yet the concepts of reliability and validity can 
still be examined. In grounded theory the criteria of sound qualitative research is; 
validity of data, reliability of method and generalisability of analyses (Bong 
2002,p.2). 
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The data and its collection were independent of the researcher and have 
been drawn directly from the project and from a Government led inquiry into the 
project. Witness Statements were taken under Oath by representatives of a Court.  
The data collection was rigorous and extensive, with thousands of pages 
of material to be examined thus supporting ‘triangulation and sampling’ (Bong 
2002). The large amount of data collected allows the researcher to minimise 
influences that might occur in a small data-set. The large volume of both project 
data and witness testimony ensures that bias has been removed from the source 
data, and that subsequent observations could be compared and contrasted across 
the multiple statements and project records providing, as far as possible, a 
balanced perspective to emerge. 
Inductive case based research is increasingly being adopted in the field of 
Information Systems (IS) research (Sikolia, Biros et al. 2013), and four metrics have 
been proposed to ensure that IS research following a grounded theory approach 
is acceptable: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. 
Credibility, claim Sikolia, Biros et al. (2013, p.4) ‘refers to how much the 
data collected accurately reflects the realities of the phenomenon’. The set of data 
underlying this research has been collected to a standard where those statements 
were legally binding and formed part of the record of a Government led 
commission of inquiry, with the ability to compel testimony under Oath. With more 
181 witness statements examined, no individual witness testimony was able to 
influence findings and this therefore provides a solid and credible statement of 
what happened on the project being examined. The case study method of research 
provides results from real-world projects that would be difficult to obtain utilising 
any other method (Verner and Abdullah 2012). In attempting to determine why IT 
projects continue to fail in the real-world, the approach needed was to undertake 
a detailed case study. To understand why prior research had apparently not had 
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any impact on the success of IT projects it was imperative to set aside any 
preconceived theories and allow the data to inform the research. The credibility of 
this research and the results is derived from the method (case study) and the 
approach to data analysis, theory emergence and testing (grounded theory). 
‘Transferability refers to the applicability of one set of findings to another 
setting’ (Sikolia, Biros et al., 2005). It is generally regarded that ‘the degree of 
generalisability or transferability is a direct function of the similarity between 
situations’ (Fifngeld-Connett 2006). In order to ensure transferability by the reader, 
it is incumbent upon the researcher to ‘provide sufficient detail of the context’ 
(Shenton 2004), to allow the researcher to infer whether or not the prevailing 
environment is similar enough to establish context. Chapter 4 in particular sets the 
context of the case study examined and Chapter 5 puts in context the findings. 
Effective transferability will depend upon the readers ability to relate these 
chapters to their own situation. 
‘Dependability refers to the confirmation that the data represents the 
changing conditions of the phenomenon under study and should be consistent 
across time, researchers and analysis techniques’ (Sikolia, Biros et al., 2013, p. 3). 
While the results of a inductive case study rely upon the interpretation of the 
researcher (Gasson 2004,p.81) they may never be exactly the same as a peer’s. 
However, using the same techniques and tools it should be possible for the peer 
to reconstruct similar findings and how the researcher’s theories were derived. This 
is achieved by the researcher providing a detailed description of methods 
employed so that another researcher, if accessing the same data, would produce 
the same findings. As of the date of this thesis it does not appear that any other 
researcher has undertaken a similarly detailed analysis of the data generated by 
this project, and the commission of inquiry that followed. Another researcher may 
find other criteria in the data, but it would be this researchers observation that the 
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compelling nature of the data found in this examination would be exposed under 
any similarly detailed examination. 
‘Confirmability tests the objectivity of the research’ (Sikolia, Biros et al 
2013, p.3) and relies upon the ability of another researcher to examine the methods 
and work products to attest that the data was examined with reasonable 
objectivity. Objectivity was of significant concern to this researcher. The sheer 
volume of material being examined led to concerns by this researcher that they 
were at risk of being swamped by the data and would lose objectivity. In order to 
ensure that the findings were at least separable from the interpretations of the 
researcher,  independent analysis was undertaken to verify confirmability by testing 
the research findings through the use of an independent text analysis software. 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the research methodology used in this study - 
inductive case study informed by grounded theory. It further elaborates upon the 
data collection methods, and the methods employed to ensure the validity and 
reliability of the data and findings. 
Inductive case study relies upon existing data sources, which in this 
research were the documents available as a result of a Commission of Inquiry 
(Chesterman 2013), established by the Queensland Government in Australia into 
the failure of the government’s Queensland Health Payroll Project and by 
additional requests for information, utilising a number of Freedom-of-Information 
(FOI) requests3. The data was collected from 239 project files, and from witness 
statements of more than 116 persons involved in the project, totalling more than 
5,000 pages of primary data. 
                                               
3 in Queensland FoI requests are known as Right-to-Information 
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An inductive case study method was employed, and the data of the case 
was examined guided using a Grounded Theory approach. What makes this 
research grounded theory is that as the data was examined, it was tagged with 
codes directly extracted from the data being observed. These codes were then 
collated into categories and ultimately into themes as theory was explored to 
comprehend and make sense of those categories. 
Ethics approval was not required for this research as it dealt exclusively 
with data that was in the public domain and previously published. However, ethics 
approval was sought for the publication of essays on social media and for the 
inclusion of commentary from those essays. 
The next Chapter provides an overview of the case study at the heart of 
this research. 
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Chapter Four - The Case Study 
In this chapter, the challenges facing the Queensland Health Payroll Project 
(the Project) and how they arose from the data and analyses are identified and 
discussed. The key themes that emerged are described. 
The case study which is the basis of this research is the Queensland Health 
payroll project. Queensland is a state of Australia, located on the north-east cost. 
Queensland has a population approaching five million persons and covers an area 
of almost two million square-kilometres. The income for Queensland is agricultural, 
mining and tourism. The most famous tourist attraction is the Great Barrier Reef. 
Queensland Health employs 65,000 persons, and has an operating budget 
of AUD$11 Billion annually. Queensland has more than two hundred hospitals and 
health care facilities. 
4.1 Background to the QH Payroll Project 
In 2002, the Queensland Government (Chesterman, 2013) decided to 
establish a ‘Shared Services Initiative’ (SSI) to provide IT services as a shared 
electronic payroll resource amongst most Queensland Government departments 
and other statutory government agencies. As part of this initiative the SSI 
undertook the management of the existing Lattice Payroll System in independent 
use by several departments, Queensland Health (QH) amongst them. 
By 1st of July 2003 (Chesterman, 2013, p.10) the SSI was underway and 
was called CorpTech. In August 2005 CorpTech was granted A$125 million to build 
and operate a whole-of-government human resources and finance IT software 
solution. Multiple vendors were commissioned to implement the solution and 
support CorpTech; Accenture Australia Holdings Pty Ltd, (Accenture) with respect 
to human resource and payroll programs, and Logica CMG Pty Ltd (Logica), for the 
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delivery of finance solutions. There were smaller numbers of contractors, from SAP 
Australia and IBM Australia to build a integration between SAP ECC5 to WorkBrain 
for payroll (with Accenture) rostering and time and attendance recording. These 
multiple related system developments by different vendors were intended to be 
inter-operable with no discernible separation to the end user. 
In March of 2006 QH had transferred responsibility for the maintenance of 
human resource software and hardware to CorpTech. At this time, the provision of 
a new computerised payroll system for its employees was thought to be urgent 
because the existing system, known as LATTICE, was nearing the end of its useful 
life (WS122, p.11). 
By 2007, an independent review known as the ‘Kelliher Report’ (PD015) 
found that the new system was significantly behind schedule. At about the same 
time QH was advised by the vendor that support for the ageing Lattice System 
would cease in 2008. 
A series of reviews and tenders were undertaken to determine a different 
approach built around the idea of a ‘Prime Contractor’. IBM subsequently won that 
tender and was awarded the contract, as Prime Contractor, to proceed in  
December 2007.  ‘By October 2008 IBM had not achieved any of the contracted 
performance criteria; but it had been paid about $32 million of the contract price 
of $98 million; and it forecast that to complete what it had contracted to undertake 
would cost the State of Queensland $181 million. Accordingly the Shared Services 
Solution across the whole-of-government was abandoned and IBM’s contract was 
reduced in scope to providing a new payroll system for Queensland 
Health’.(Chesterman, 2013,p.12) 
On 14th of March 2010 the system finally “went live” (operational) after ten 
failed prior attempts. The resulting system was reported to have 35,000 payroll 
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anomalies or processing errors (WS053) and consequently required 1,000 clerical 
staff to manually process fortnightly pays that otherwise was intended as the most 
basic core function of the new system. 
After the “go live” was achieved, the Queensland Government was facing 
a total expenditure in the range of $1.2 billion for total cost of ownership of the 
immediate life of the project. The Executive Council of the Queensland 
Government ordered a Commission of Inquiry into the project on the 13th of 
December 2012. 
The commission of inquiry has published an exhaustive list of transcripts, 
witness interviews and project documents (the list is provided at appendix two and 
appendix three, and the interview transcripts can be viewed online at 
www.healthpayrollinquiry.qld.gov.au). This archival material forms the primary data 
resource of this study. In addition, the researcher has requested and received by 
way of Freedom-of-Information requests from the Queensland Government 
thousands of pages of project documentation (appendix two) that were not 
available from the Royal Commission archives. The Terms of Reference that 
directed what Commission of Inquiry sought to understand were: 
• the adequacy and integrity of the procurement, contract management, 
project management, governance and implementation process;  
• whether any laws, contractual provisions, codes of conduct or other 
government standards may have been breached during the 
procurement and/or implementation process and who may be 
accountable;  
• the contractual arrangements between the State of Queensland and 
IBM Australia Ltd, and why and to what extent the contract price for 
the Queensland Health payroll system increased over time;  
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• any recommended changes to existing procurement, contract and 
project management (including governance) policies, processes, 
standards and contractual arrangements for major Queensland 
government information and communication technology projects 
initiated in the future to ensure the delivery of high quality and cost 
effective products and systems; and  
• any other matter relevant to this review  
(Queensland Government Gazette, 2012) 
The 36 summary points of the Commission of Inquiry (WS122,pp. 215-216) 
deal principally with matters of contract, negotiation and settlement. Errors of 
judgement and behaviour are highlighted in this summary, but it provides little 
information as to how the project became so encumbered or why it was unable to 
deliver the outcomes promised. 
The Commissioner noted in his findings (Chesterman, 2013,p.217): 
‘I have identified two principal contributory factors of the 
inadequacies which led to the increase in contract price, the serious 
shortcomings in contract and project management, and in the 
State’s decision to settle with IBM. Those contributory factors were: 
unwarranted urgency and a lack of diligence on the part of State 
officials. That lack of diligence manifested itself in the poor decisions 
which those officials made in scoping the Interim Solution; in their 
governance of the Project; and in failing to hold IBM to account to 
deliver a functional payroll system.’ 
The Commission of Inquiry report (Chesterman, 2013) did not explicitly 
draw-out how the scope of the solution, governance and vendor management 
could have been undertaken in a manner which would have increased the 
likelihood of future project success, or how the learnings from this project and the 
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inquiry might inform future IT undertakings beyond consideration of the 
procurement and contracting phases of the project. 
4.2 The Players in the project 
The Executive Director of CorpTech from its establishment was Mr Geoff 
Waite, until he took long service leave in July 2007, whereupon, the management 
of CorpTech passed to Ms Barbara Perrott (WS024, p.1). From February 2009 until 
August 2011 the Executive Director of CorpTech was Ms Margaret Berenyi (WS059, 
p. 2). 
‘CorpTech delivered up to ten implementations in the period up to June 
2007. CorpTech at that stage was delivering, but was behind schedule and over 
budget’ (WS024,p.4), but the Deputy-Secretary noted that ‘Geoff Waite and his 
team told me that they were unsure of the ‘way ahead’ and that they were 
concerned about the ability to continue with their systems implementations’ 
(WS026,p.3). CorpTech, as the shared services provider, had previously had a track 
record of successful completion of projects, but by their own admission they were 
concerned about the HR/Payroll solution which by June 2007 was having serious 
delivery problems, and was about to be separated from a Whole-of-Government 
implementation. CorpTech was a challenged and challenging environment in June 
of 2007 ahead of the appointment of a new Executive Director who would have 
responsibility for the Health Department HR and Payroll system. Into this unclear 
and confusing environment came a senior manager with no exposure to 
information systems projects. 
In June of 2003, Barbara Perrott was appointed as Executive Director of 
one of the shared services functions of the Queensland Government. Ms Perrott 
was a long serving member of the Queensland public service with 40 years of 
service at her retirement in 2011. She had a Bachelors degree in Commerce 
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majoring in Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations. Ms Perrott had 
additional qualifications in Social Welfare (WS008, p.1). Following the resignation 
of the ‘Executive Director of Corptech (April 2007) and the amalgamation of the 
PPO with CorpTech, (Ms Perrot) was invited to transfer to the position of ED 
CorpTech’ (WS008, p2). Mr. Bradley, the Deputy-Secretary agreed for Mr Waite to 
step down from CorpTech, and looked for a ‘suitable candidate from other Shared 
Services senior executives. Ms Perrot had strong experience in the Shared Services 
implementation, but she was not an IT expert’ (WS026, p.7). 
Ms. Perrott was the executive in charge of the shared services (CorpTech) 
when the decision was taken to appoint IBM, through most of the project and just 
prior to the go-live. From early 2009 through to eventual go-live in March of 2010, 
directorship was the responsibility of Ms. Berenyi who was appointed as a 
replacement for Ms Perrot who was retiring from public service. 
Ms. Berenyi has a Bachelor of Business (computing), a Masters’ Degree in 
Administration and a Masters’ Degree in Technology Management. Throughout 
her 30-year career in the Queensland Government she held a number of executive 
roles most of which involved management of information technology. She had 
commenced her career as a computer programmer in the State Government 
Insurance Office and had a strong, hands-on technical background to information 
technology. 
The initial stages of the Queensland Health Payroll project were 
commenced while the State was pursuing a single solution for whole-of-
government. Under the directorship of Mr Waite, some of the critical design 
choices were made during this period. The 2007 tender and contract phases of the 
project were managed under the directorship of Ms Perrott, who then had 
accountability through the majority of the programme of work. Whereas Mr Waite’s 
tenure covered the preceding phases of the project comprising and mostly 
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concerned the Whole-of-Government initiative, and not the Queensland Health 
project. 
Ms. Perrott was the Executive in effective control of the payroll project. As 
the responsible executive she had ultimate accountability for governance and 
oversight, as her deposition to the Commission of Inquiry makes clear: 
‘As Chair of the Evaluation Panel, my role involved over sighting the 
process from design to the signing of the Contract, ensuring that the probity of the 
procurement process was maintained, receiving regular briefings from Team 
Leads, attending information sessions from applicants as appropriate, and 
endorsement of the final recommendation’ (WS008,p.6). Ms. Perrott, as Chair of 
the Executive Panel was in charge of every aspect of the project.  
Michael Kalimnios (WS065, WS066) has stated that his qualifications are a 
Bachelors Degree in Commerce, and membership of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants and the Institute of Company Directors. He has stated that he was the 
‘Chairman of the Project Steering Committee, and later the QHIC project board 
between 2007 until the termination of my employment in 2010’ (WS065, p.2). 
Kalimnios has further stated that ‘around mid-2006 I was given direct line 
responsibility for the Queensland Health Shared Services Provider’ which put him 
in a position where he was ‘more aware of the manner in which CorpTech 
interacted with IBM’ (WS065, p.3). The statements of Perrott and Kalimnios indicate 
that between them, these two individuals had effective control of the payroll 
project. Mr Kalimnios was with the project from its inception through to its 
conclusion. 
Michael Lewis was the manager in charge of operations at the Queensland 
Shared Services (CSA), where he had been employed since 2009 (WS022 pp.2). Mr 
Lewis has stated that at this time he was one of three people in management and 
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was a peer to Ms Perrott. Mr Lewis has stated his qualifications as a Bachelor of 
Accounting. He has further stated that during the tender for the payroll project, he 
was the team lead for the governance evaluation team, reporting to Ms Perrott 
who was chair of the evaluation panel ‘as team lead for the governance section of 
the ITO, the team carried out an assessment  of which of the tender submissions 
presented the best governance model in terms of how the project would be 
managed’ (WS022 pp5). 
James Brown was the program director at CorpTech reporting to Ms 
Perrott. Mr Brown, while having no formal qualifications, had worked in IT since 
1971 (WS027 pp.1).  He states that his responsibility was for the ‘roll-out of the 
program of work by IBM across Government for HR and finance’ and that he also 
had ‘accountability for the Solution Design Authority whose principal purpose was, 
to ensure the IBM solution conformed to the Government’s preferred direction for 
it’ (WS027 pp2). 
Terry Burns was an independent contractor on the payroll project, and was 
extensively involved in the tender and evaluation process. Prior to joining the 
project he had worked in South Africa, the UK and New Zealand. In South Africa 
he had been an employee of IBM, and in the UK and New Zealand had worked on 
several projects with IBM and SAP. Mr Burns was initially engaged as part of the 
Arena Consulting team to do a “snapshot review” of the shared services project 
(WS040 pp.8). Subsequent to this review Mr Burns was engaged directly by 
CorpTech and was part of a ‘triumverate with Mr Waite, Ms Perrott and me working 
out the terms of reference, agreeing, and then me setting up a daily briefing and 
weekly briefing back to Mr Waite and Ms Perrott’ (WS040 pp.11). 
Arena Consulting was represented by their founder and managing director, 
Mr Gary Uhlmann (WS039) who states his qualifications and experience as having 
‘worked for the Public Service Board between the years 1981 - 1985. While I was 
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in the Public Service Board I was given the task of computerising State stores which 
involved the replacement of a public service wide manual accounting machine 
based stores ordering system with a computerised system. The supplier (Sperry Pty 
Ltd) who won that bid offered me a job, so in 1985 I left the public service and 
worked in the IT industry for 10 years’ (WS039 pp1). 
Legal services were provided to the Queensland Government by Mr John 
Swinson (WS014) of the law firm King & Wood Mallesons. In his statement to the 
commission Mr Swinson identified himself as being a partner of the firm since 1999, 
and had ‘carried out legal work for Queensland Treasury on a variety of information 
technology projects since at least 1998’ (WS014. pp2). He further stated that he 
had been involved in at least two contract negotiations between the State and IBM. 
The first in 2005 and then in 2007. It was during the second engagement, in 2007, 
that Mr Swinson ‘advised that the proposals received in response to the RFI were 
varied, vague on key elements and had many carve-outs, and could not be treated 
as offers capable of acceptance by the State’. (WS014 pp.6) 
SAP, the German multi-national provider of HR and ERP Software, was 
represented on the payroll project by Mr Robert Pedler who at that time was the 
‘Sales Management Leader for SAP in Queensland’ (WS061 pp.1). 
For IBM, Mr Lochlan Bloomfield ran the consulting and systems integration 
arm called GBS (Global Business Services). Mr Bloomfield worked for Accenture for 
16 years prior to joining IBM, and held degrees in electrical engineering and 
computer science (WS045 pp.1). IBM was also represented by Ms Cheryl Jensen 
who ‘focussed upon business development and product sales’ (WS064 pp.2). Mr 
Paul Hickey as Program Director and ‘was the IBM person responsible for the 
overall delivery of the SSSP. Later, as Project Director, I was responsible for 
managing the IBM team working on the delivery of an interim replacement for the 
Lattice payroll system used by Queensland Health. In this latter role, I reported to 
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Mr Doak, who took over from me as Program Director in a staged transition in June 
2008’ (WS078 pp.1). In his statements to the Commission of Inquiry (WS078) Mr 
Hickey makes clear that even with the benefit of hindsight, he is of the opinion that 
he and IBM ran the project with a disciplined and proven approach ‘I had each IBM 
team develop a schedule based on all deliverables identified in each of the SOWs 
and these were used for reporting purposes’ (WS078 pp.4). Mr Doak took on 
responsibility for program management, and ‘was ultimately responsible for the 
overall management of the blended team made up of roughly 200 to 300 IBM 
employees, IBM contractors, CorpTech, Queensland Health and other government 
employees working on the SSP. I reported to Peter Munro, who was the head of 
Public Sector for IBM Australia’ (WS079 pp.2). Mr Doak maintained his position 
throughout his testimony to the Commission that IBM’s work was beyond reproach 
‘The implementation of project management methodology was a matter for the 
Project Directors of each stream of work. Paul Hickey and John Gower managed 
the QHIC Project during the vast majority of my time as Program Director. They 
enjoyed my confidence in their management of the QHIC Project and I had no 
reason to doubt their implementation of IBM's Ascendant project management 
methodology. IBM uses a proprietary version of the Ascendant methodology, 
which it has developed at significant cost and which is closely tied to IBM's 
processes (WS079 pp.14). In an extraordinary statement, Mr Doak states ‘I was not 
at the time, and have never since been made aware of any system error, defect or 
work-around, whether identified before or after go-live, which was responsible for 
any significant number of persons being incorrectly paid’ (WS079 pp.17).  
Mr Doak’s comments are in stark contrast to the observations of the 
Commissioner ‘On 14 March 2010 after ten aborted attempts to deliver the new 
payroll system, it “went live”. It was a catastrophic failure as all Queenslanders 
know. The system did not perform adequately with terrible consequences for the 
employees of QH and equally serious financial consequences for the State. After 
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many months of anguished activity during which employees of QH endured 
hardship and uncertainty, a functioning payroll system was developed, but it is very 
costly. It required about 1,000 employees to process data in order to deliver 
fortnightly pays11. It is estimated that it will cost about $1.2B over the next eight 
years (WS122 para 2.14). Newspapers reported that ‘thousands of health workers 
being underpaid, overpaid or not paid at all’ (brisbanetimes.com.au 2013) 
4.3 Timeline of Events 
The Queensland Health Payroll Project had its foundations in another 
project by the Queensland State Government - the creation of a shared service 
initiative (SSI). The SSI was a business unit of Queensland Treasury and was named 
CorpTech. The idea behind the SSI was that all of the administration and back-
office services required by each Department could be more efficiently undertaken 
by a single agency. The following services are potentially shared services within 
scope of the SSI (http://qld.gov.au) provided to Queensland Government agencies 
and statutory authorities: 
1. finance, 
2. procurement, 
3. human resources management, 
4. telecommunications, 
5. mail support. 
‘QSS (Queensland Support Services) is also responsible for the 
management and support of the majority of the sector’s finance and human 
resource systems and processes’ (http://qld.gov.au). The name QSS replaced the 
name SSI. At the time of the payroll project the name for the shared service of the 
Queensland Government was SSI. 
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With this as the foundation, it was the charter of the shared services to 
deliver a human resources and payroll capability to several government 
departments, including the Departments of Education and Health. 
In about 2005, the SSI commenced work on implementing a universal 
payroll solution for all Queensland Government Departments and agencies, 
starting with the largest two, the Department of Education and the Department of 
Health. ‘After the whole-of-government decision around 2005 to implement 
(software from) SAP (corporation), Queensland Treasury decided that they were 
going to be the systems implementation lead’ (WS032, p.3).  Accenture, as an 
external party, were engaged on a time and materials basis to provide resources 
to this SSI project (WS032). 
By mid-2007, there were multiple parties involved in providing resources 
to the whole-of-government project, including Accenture, IBM and Logica. By 
March of 2007, it had become apparent to senior Department officers that the SSI 
was facing significant challenges. The Service Delivery and Performance 
Commission had reported (WS122) that organisational change was necessary as 
the project was behind schedule and over budget. The under-Treasurer’ of the 
Department commissioned a review to identify potential courses of action’ (WS122, 
p.11). The report was delivered to the Department on the 18th of April 2007. What 
evolved from this was the idea of engaging a ‘Prime Contractor’ that would take 
responsibility for the ongoing project. Subsequently a Request for Information (RFI) 
was issued on the 2nd of July 2007, with initial responses received by the 12th of 
July 2007. Of the ten companies invited to respond only four did so: IBM, Logica, 
Accenture and SAP. 
A more detailed Request for Proposal (RFP) was sent to these four 
companies on the 25th of July 2007. An Invitation to Offer (ITO) was issued on 12th 
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of September 2007. Responses were received from IBM, Logica and Accenture. 
SAP had withdrawn from the procurement process. 
IBM was the successful tenderer and a contract was entered into on the 5th 
of December 2007. The Queensland Health payroll project was seen as the priority, 
and the 5th of December contract between IBM and the State Government 
included a ‘fixed contract’ to be completed by 31st of July 2008 at a cost of 
A$6.194 million. 
By October 2008 (three years after the anticipated completion date) it was 
reported that ‘IBM had not achieved any of the contracted performance criteria’ 
(WS122, p. 12). By this stage IBM had been paid A$32 million of a revised A$98 
million contract and was forecasting completion would cost A$181 million (WS122, 
p.12). The A$6.194 million dollar contract that had been entered into less than one 
year previously had now grown in magnitude to an estimated A$181 million. 
On the 14th of March 2010 ‘after ten aborted attempts to deliver the new 
payroll system it went live’ (WS122, p.12). The project, originally scheduled for 
completion on the 31st of July 2008, was now two years late. 
The ‘go-live’ was ‘catastrophic’ (WS122,p.12), requiring 1,000 additional 
manual staff to enter pay adjustments. The project costs by this time had been 
estimated at $1.2 billion over the next 8 years of operation. On the next page, 
Figure 10, is a timeline of the project and major events throughout its life. In an 
ideal world this reconstruction might have highlighted an ‘inflection point’ – the 
point at which this project ‘went off the rails’. No such inflection was observed. 
Errors and problems appeared to commence immediately. One might cynically 
suggest that the project was never ‘on the rails’ in the first instance, and this is why 
there was no observable event that tipped the project into a failure state.  
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Figure 10: Project Timeline  
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4.4 Chaos in the Queensland Government 
With the failure of the Whole-of-Government HR and payroll solution, the 
unanticipated end-of-life of the LATTICE system, and the clearly identified failings 
of the Queensland Health payroll project it would seem that the Queensland State 
Government did not have a consistent IT plan for HR, payroll, rostering and 
recruitment. Different technologies were being deployed across different 
Departments at the same time, utilising the services of multiple vendors. Some 
vendors were operating as parts of a single project (on occasion), independently 
on other projects, and competing against each other for additional business. The 
overall environment appears to have been chaotic. 
CorpTech initially went to market ‘to seek products which could be 
delivered across Government and meet government-wide needs for HR and 
Payroll’ (WS024, p.2). IBM was awarded the contract after proposing a ‘consortium 
of products - SAP was used as the core, and included WorkBrain for rostering 
arrangements, Recruit ASP for recruitment solutions and SABA for knowledge 
management’ (WS024, p.3) 
The contract with IBM was ‘preceded by a tender process which took about 
six months. As part of another tender process, the Implementation Partners for 
Human Resources/Payroll appointed was Accenture. Accenture was the 
implementation partner used, in conjunction with the CorpTech team, to roll out 
the HR/Payroll solution in the then Department of Housing’ (WS024, p.3). 
Prior to the commencement of the Queensland Health payroll project there 
are what appear to be conflicting projects awarded to different vendors. One 
contract, to IBM, to implement four software products to provide a statewide HR 
and Payroll solution, and a second contract, awarded to Accenture, to implement 
HR and Payroll for the Department of Housing. 
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The IBM proposal (WS024) included four solution components: SAP ECC5, 
Recruit ASP, Workbrain and SABA. From the witness statements it is apparent that 
contention arose  as to the transparency and appropriateness of the selection 
process for these products. For example, Mr Waite, the head of the government 
agency tasked with implementing these solutions, stated that ‘to the best of my 
recollection, no choice about WorkBrain had been made by the State before the 
November 2005 contract’ (WS024, p.3). In the memorandum (PD010) dated 28th 
May 2007, it was noted that Workbrain was going to be implemented in 2008 as 
the replacement rostering solution. It is therefore clear that the intended use of 
WorkBrain predates the IBM proposal and ultimate contract in December 2007. 
The choice of solutions architecture for the Queensland Health Payroll 
project does not appear to have been determined with consideration of the  
business or technical needs to the Department. According KPMG (2012), ‘as of 
2005, the Whole-of-Government system for payroll had been identified as SAP 
ECC5 and Workbrain. As a result, it was decided that QH would replace the 
Lattice/ESP system with SAP ECC5/Workbrain as part of the Whole-of-Government 
Shared Services Initiative (KPMG, 2012)’. Other eyewitness accounts placed the 
decision to adopt a combination of SAP ECC5 and Workbrain at a much later date 
(during the 2007 proposals and presentations). ‘The presentation provided by IBM 
indicated that the Workbrain system would become the award interpreter (in lieu 
of SAP) …. the presentation was potentially a game changer’ (WS017, p.1). The 
issue of product selection would become a significant issue as the project 
progressed. Integration between SAP and WorkBrain became a significant 
constraint on the project (WS122, p.155). As these two accounts indicate, even on 
what should have been a clear and uncontroversial issue; who made the choice of 
products and when that decision was made is open to many interpretations. One 
that does not seem to have been resolved by the end of the Commission of Inquiry, 
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but one that will become important as this researcher investigates identifiable 
contributory factors of project failure. 
Towards the end of 2008 the ‘IBM team, working in collaboration with the 
CorpTech Enterprise Architect, obtained and reviewed the documentation for 
relevance to clarifying the business drivers underpinning the SSI’ (PD063, p.7). This 
document, created more than one year after the commencement of the project, 
appears to be the first and only document to address the business drivers and 
explicit requirements of the project. As has been discussed in Chapter Three, no 
project can be successful without a clear plan (Jones 2004), and this project does 
not appear to have a plan, it does not appear to have a solutions design, or an 
architecture, and the product selection appears to be completely arbitrary.  
Annexure 6 (PD014) to the 2007 invitation to offer, which was reported as 
forming part of the contract (WS012), is shown below (Figure 11). Of significance 
in this Gantt chart is that the period from October 2007 to April 2008 is time boxed 
as ‘Initial Statement of Work’, a deliverable that was never completed to form part 
of the contract. The Initial Statement of Work was a contracted deliverable. The 
Initial Statement of Work sets out what was expected to be delivered. Without this 
document there is no clear definition of what work will be done, how that work will 
be tested or measured, and no timeframe against which the vendor can be held to 
account. Without this document the senior management of the project, with 
responsibility for the projects outcomes, have no possible mechanism to oversee 
the project, monitor progress, report variance, provide checks and balances. This 
is the most basic of project requirements and it was not done. 
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Figure 11 -  Annexure 6, program of work 
At the point of issuing the invitation to offer, having already been to market 
with a request for information and a request for proposal, the Queensland 
Health/CorpTech team did not have an ‘Initial Statement of Work’!. The 
Government sought (Chesterman, 2013, p.58, WS043), and the vendors responded 
with, fixed price commitments to a project that was devoid of even the most basic 
of project components, a statement of requirements. In essence, IBM had agreed 
to undertake a project, at a fixed price, for which no statement of work existed and 
no detailed planning of any description had been undertaken. 
Three ‘go-to-market’ phases had been undertaken and the vendors were 
bidding aggressively to be awarded the contract (WS032). However, no design or 
clear statement of requirements existed, as discussed above. Nor were they 
planned to come into existence for another four months according to the ‘Initial 
Statement of Work’ displayed in Annexure 6 (Figure 11 above). 
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While no explicit business case appears to exist for the project, and none 
could be sourced either from the Witness Statements or via Freedom of 
Information Requests, various memoranda (WS120, WS118, WS116, WS107, 
WS104) collectively cite various rationales that could be retrospectively viewed as 
business case-like rationales, such as the risks facing the existing LATTICE system, 
and the need to replace it (PD010). In May of 2007, the Manager of HR Operations 
wrote to the Executive Director of Queensland Health Shared Services (PD010, 
pp.1-6) to outline these risks and make recommendation as to what actions should 
be pursued. The overriding reasons stated in this communication for a replacement 
of the LATTICE system with the new SAP/Workbrain solution was the ‘prohibitive 
costs of maintaining the LATTICE system and its cessation of support in June 2008’ 
(WS122.p61). In essence then, the business case for the new system was that the 
old system was about to lose its maintenance and support from the vendor. No 
evidence has been sighted to suggest that any greater understanding of costs and 
benefits was undertaken before the contract was awarded to IBM for what became 
a one billion dollar disaster. 
The solutions design and architecture appears to have been set by some 
sort of default when the tender responses confirmed the solutions architecture. The 
time scale was set by virtue of a fixed price quote for work to be completed by the 
30th of July 2008, but the tasks and activities were unknown when the contract was 
signed. The winning tenderer had committed to meet the time and budget using 
the products preferred by the Queensland Government (Chesterman, 2013. p.34). 
Mr. Salouk of Accenture responded that he ‘observed that price and scheduling 
were key drivers in the decision to award the tender to IBM’ (WS032, p.15). 
Commenting further, Mr Salouk could not ‘determine what price IBM was 
suggesting in terms of the fixed price or the total expected price’ (WS032, p.22). 
Accenture had proposed an initial scope of work and pricing much more in line 
with IBM’s amend quotation some months later of A$180 million. In meetings with 
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senior Department executives Accenture made it clear that they thought IBM’s 
price would escalate dramatically once they understood the scope of work required 
(WS032). 
The externally engaged legal firm Mallesons Stephen Jacques (WS014), in 
preparing their advice with respect to each of the proposals from Accenture, IBM 
and Logica, stated that ‘we believe on balance that IBM’s Offer gives rise to a 
greater number of material issues and less thought has gone into IBM’s Offer 
regarding contractual mechanisms that will assist the customer or enhance the 
working relationship between the parties’ (WS014, p. 39). This shows further 
evidence that the experts engaged by the Department were highlighting the risks 
of the IBM proposal, but these concerns were being ignored. 
At this stage of the Queensland Health Payroll project, the Queensland 
Government had accepted a contract to implement an IT project to a business 
problems for which no business case existed and no technical solutions architecture 
had been provided. The IT project was shown by the evidence tabled at the 
Commission (Chesterman, 2013) and by the analysis of documents, to be a solution 
to to fulfil an unknown set of requirements for a fixed price and timescale, and 
oddly one already in government use on an existing challenged project. 
Furthermore, senior management was acting against the advice of their technical 
experts (WS085) and external legal advisors (WS014). 
4.5 Themes to Emerge from the Data 
Source documents were annotated with codes, either using NVivo or 
manually depending upon the quality of the digitised versions of the documents, 
as described in Chapter 3. The initial set of codification produced topics, which 
were then collated into themes. This process was undertaken in two passes. The 
initial pass was by the researcher and used both NVivo and manual coding 
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methods. The second pass was to utilise a topic modelling software that could read 
the digitised text and extract topics. The computerised modelling was used as a 
check to ensure that the researcher had not become so immersed in the data that 
he was “unable to see the wood for the trees”. Fifty topics were collated from more 
thousands of data points and annotations. These were then raised to identify 
themes. 
 The first theme to emerge from 
the data was the lack of apparent domain 
expertise. This was mentioned in many of 
the witness statements and correlated to 
almost all of the key topics. 
The second theme identified was 
that the various parties to the project were 
in conflict, almost from the beginning, and 
exhibited motives which at best could be 
described as ‘tangential’ to the success of 
the project. 
The final theme that recurs and 
aggregates many topics was the issue of 
accountability for actions and decisions. 
 
Figure 12: data collection  
These three themes emerged strongly from the data, but upon 
investigation they failed to answer one important and fundamental question - why. 
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Why was there a lack of senior executive competence when it came to IT 
projects. It could not be conceivable that the Government would deliberately 
undermine the performance of the project by appointing individuals that lacked 
domain expertise, that encouraged conflict between stakeholders both internal 
and external, that deliberately ignored warnings from their own team, and failed to 
hold vendors and staff accountable for their actions. 
From the research, what emerged was the notion of ‘Normalisation of 
Deviance’ (Vaughan, 2016) as a unifying theme to bind together the three key 
contributory factors of project failure – in other words the conditions that led to this 
specific instance of project failure grew over time based upon an accumulation of 
previous decisions - “poor management” was the norm and it had not only become 
expected, it was “business-as-usual”. Poor management of IT projects had been 
allowed to become “business-as-usual” because abject failure had not been 
perceived to previously occur, and specific competence in IT project delivery was 
not seen as a requirement for running IT projects. 
4.5.1  A Lack of Apparent Domain Expertise 
In 2009, Ms. Perrott handed over the role of Executive Director to Ms 
Berenyi who immediately undertook a stocktake of the current state of the project 
and made several observations (WS085):  
• IBM was engaged as Contractor to the State with the responsibility to 
direct, manage and control defined work packages; 
• CorpTech had primary responsibility to manage the contract on behalf 
of the State; 
• a decision had been made which redefined the scope of work for IBM 
and their subsequent obligations under the contract. Specifically that 
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IBM would be responsible for the delivery of the Queensland Health 
LATTICE replacement project; 
1. the contract obliged IBM to perform the following work (WS085,p.6) 
1.1. Statement of Work (SoW7) LATTICE’ Interim Solution Scoping 
and Planning, 
1.2. Statement of Work (SoW8A) LATTICE Replacement Design, 
Implement and Deploy, 
1.3. Statement of Work (SoW8) LATTICE Replacement Design, 
Implement and Deploy Version 2.0 (updated version); 
Ms. Berenyi was taking control, identifying the obligations that the vendor 
were accountable for, and had ‘formed the view that the governance arrangements 
for the Project were not working effectively’ (WS085, p. 10) and set about making 
changes.  
Those changes included: 
• The QHIC Implementation Steering Committee was the ‘pinnacle 
governance body for the project established by QH from February 
2008 to oversee the Project, did not have adequate representation’ 
(WS085, p.11)., and 
• The Board as it was operating at the time ‘did not conform to the 
Government’s project management methodology’ (WS085,p.11). 
A new Board was established in April 2009. The various Boards operating 
across the project had a significant level of overlap, as can be seen by Figure 13 
below. This resulted in the committees writing memos to other committees of 
which many members were the same. For example, a Briefing Note in 2008 
(PD086) was sent from the QHIC Project Board to the QHIC Project Directorate. 
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Five members of the Project Board (more than half the full complement of eight) 
were also represented on the Project Directorate that were receiving the 
memorandum.  
Figure 13 -  The Governance Boards of the Payroll Project  
Governance and Oversight of the project was ineffective, and extremely 
top-heavy. Furthermore, it is unclear how the functions of the Project Board 
differed from those of the Project Directorate.  
Governance was unnecessarily complicated and convoluted. These 
arrangements can only have contributed to confusion and miscommunication and 
delays in obtaining decisions and approvals. 
According to the Contract and the Agreement between IBM and the State 
Government the principal role of CorpTech was to manage the contract (WS014). 
Mr Bird was recruited into CorpTech in March 2008 with the responsibility to 
manage the contract on behalf of CorpTech acting for the Queensland 
Government.  
Mr Bird remained with the project until July 2010. He was a lawyer, with 
additional qualifications and experience in public sector administration, as well as 
in computer programming. He earned a Masters in IT from Queensland University 
of Technology. Mr. Birds qualifications and experience made him an ideal 
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candidate for the role of contract manager. His training as a computer programmer 
meant that he was familiar with the technical tasks being performed, and his legal 
training allowed him effective oversight of the contracts and legal agreements that 
existed between the various parties. 
Commencing work in late March 2008, Mr Bird notes in evidence to the 
Commission that the 2007 contract with IBM was ‘an agreement to agree’ (WS012, 
p. 3) and that key statements of work had not been developed or agreed; that the 
scope was missing, and ‘critical terms relating to the Prime Contractor role’ were 
yet to be agreed. The contract, the instrument that provides the client with the 
ability to manage the project and vendor, was in essence incomplete and lacking 
key components for more than one year after the commencement of the project 
(WS012).  
It was the view of the Contract Manager (Mr Bird) that IBM was ‘in default 
of the contract early on’ (WS012,p.4) and ‘a large number of contract deliverables 
were late and of poor quality’ as determined by the Solutions Design Authority 
(SDA). The SDA was set up with a process involving IBM submitting a piece of work 
to the SDA for approval, and, if rejected, to be resubmitted according to the 
timeframe set down by the process and the manner set down by the process. ‘The 
acceptance process prescribed in the contract gave SDA five days after IBM’s 
submission to review the deliverables and either accept or reject the deliverable’ 
(WS012, p. 4). IBM’s contract non-compliance (or non-complaince with agreed SDA 
process) was further illustrated by an independent testing and quality review which 
was conducted by KJ Ross & Associates (PD103) where the independent audit 
found that approximately 30% of all work submitted by IBM was failing User 
Acceptance Testing (UAT) (PD013, p.3). 
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The KJ Ross audit (PD103) found that: 
• non-functional requirements were not adequately defined; 
• the exit criteria did not define the criteria for determining outstanding 
defect priority; 
• test objectives and pass/fail criteria were not stated in measurable 
terms; 
• there was insufficient test rigour around payroll performance validation 
and parallel payroll testing. 
The CorpTech contract management team attempted to hold IBM to the 
contract, despite its deficiencies. IBM responded by bypassing the Contract 
Management group and went directly  to the Director-General of the Department, 
and demanded the removal of ‘problematic employees’ performing the Contract 
Management function on behalf of the Queensland Government. The Director-
General then directed Ms Perrott to remove personnel from the contract 
management team (WS012,p.6). This turn of events is staggering, and almost 
beyond belief. The vendor, IBM, had committed to a project that had no 
specification, scope or terms of reference. They had committed to deliver a 
working product in a fixed time. Their first deliverable on this journey was, 
according to the contract, the creation of a Statement of Work. When IBM failed 
to deliver this statement of work, or any other contracted component of the 
project, the Queensland Governments contract management team attempted to 
hold the vendor to account only to have senior management of the Department 
agree with the vendor to remove these personnel from the project. At this very 
early stage of the project it would appear that the Governance arrangements, 
including the involvement of senior executives, is functioning in a counter-
productive fashion to undermine internal project controls at the behest of a vendor 
which appears to be demanding complete autonomy. It is unfathomable what the 
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thinking of the Steering Committee or the Departments senior executives was at 
this time. There is no precedent for a client abdicating all responsibility and 
acquiescing to the whims and demands of a vendor in this fashion, and still having 
a reasonable expectation of delivery of a project outcome within time, budget and 
scope.   
The capitulation to IBM continued, and by the end of December 2008, the 
change requests being submitted by IBM for approval (and which were accepted) 
‘effectively rewrote history by amending past agreed scope’ (WS012,p.10), and it 
was determined that IBM were working to ‘a technical and functional specification 
that Queensland Health had never agreed to or signed off’ (WS012,p.10). 
The evidence of the witness statements cited above show that governance 
and oversight of this project was not just ineffective, it had been effectively 
abandoned. A contract had been let for an unspecified outcome at a fixed price 
(WS012.p.4). The first deliverable was a scoping document (Figure 11), which after 
eighteen months had not been delivered and subsequently did not form part of 
the contractual terms (WS018). Without an agreed scope and without agreed 
accountabilities assigned to the vendor, the Steering Committee governance and 
oversight effectiveness was reduced as it had no point of reference for determining 
if the work was being done as agreed and within the agreed timeframe. The 
Governance structures both from CorpTech and from Queensland Health appear 
to be completely unaware of their responsibilities in ensuring this project is 
delivered. In addition ‘Queensland Health didn’t have a program management 
office to provide assistance or advice’ (WS018, p. 2). This meant that the 
management of the project was reliant upon IBM to provide them with project 
performance updates and reports. In the best case governance and project 
oversight was absent on this project, allowing the vendor to control all aspects of 
the project activities without any oversight. 
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4.5.2  Parties in Conflict Throughout the Project 
The relationship between CorpTech/Queensland Health and IBM has been 
described as having ‘tension between IBM and QH in terms of the Project 
Directorate governance’ (WS059, p.12). Ms Perrott observed that as the Executive 
Director she was ‘frequently called upon to mediate situations between 
QH/IBM/CorpTech’ and this was especially prevalent ‘where IBM may have been 
suggesting a particular design feature and the Department or CorpTech may have 
had different views’ (WS008, p. 13). As has been discussed in the previous section, 
the vendor (IBM) was accorded unfathomable discretion and authority over the 
project, and even over the Governments own personnel. The Executive Director of 
the project, an individual who was appointed to role despite her lack of information 
technology experience (WS008), appears to treat “design differences” as 
personality clashes that require mediation. Again, as has been noted in the 
previous discussion, most of these differences appear to have been resolved in 
IBM’s favour even if that meant IBM appealing to the senior leadership of the 
Department to have “problematic” personnel removed from the project. 
In early 2008, IBM had tendered its best pricing, which included a ‘figure 
not to be exceeded’ (WS122, p.77). This initial stage of work was to complete the 
scoping exercise and to undertake detailed planning (WS027, p.1). Negotiations 
for this work were not completed until November 2008, by which time ‘IBM’s 
proposal suggested a set of additional services equating to an additional $28 
million which it (IBM) considered to be outside its contracted scope’ (WS027, p1). 
The cost of the ‘revised proposal was in the order of between $35 million and $80 
million greater than that proposed by IBM in its original tender response’ (WS051, 
p.3). There is little evidence of IBM demonstrating any commitment to their 
proposal or initial plan of work. The proposal at this stage is little more than a 
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promise that allowed IBM to secure a contract with the Government which could 
be exploited. 
Mr Brown, a CorpTech employee in the role of Program Director observed 
(WS027, p.3) that Mr Doak of IBM was of the opinion that ‘if the program could 
demonstrate significant benefit to the State (i.e. cost savings) that the Government 
would provide additional funding’. IBM was demonstrating contempt for their 
initial proposal from the earliest stages of the project, and appear to be treating 
this project as a bottomless pit from which they can draw at will. There would 
appear to be an underlying strategy of avoidance of contracted performance 
delivery and vendor initiated leverage to create scope-creep which was facilitated 
by compliant senior management of the Department. 
Several participants expressed their concern that IBM was more focused 
on maximizing income for itself than on delivering and completing the project 
(WS012, WS021, WS030). The lack of effective project governance and contract 
management, as demonstrated by the evidence of the witness statements, 
provided by its absence (of effectiveness),  seems to encourage a strategy that may 
explain IBM’s behaviour and the evidence provided about it. This lack of effective 
control by the Department allowed IBM to apply influence to reduce their 
accountability to deliver and to both increase their income but reduce their 
expenditure on delivery and hence the potential profitability. 
When QH and CorpTech personnel raised concerns about IBM’s 
performance, and about their contract compliance, IBM responded aggressively to 
those concerns. On at least one occasion, a representative of IBM stated ‘Do not 
tell us how to deliver this. This is a fixed price, guaranteed result. We will do it 
however we see fit. It is not up to the customer to tell us how to do it’ (WS013, p. 
12).  
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As they had done before, rather than implement Contract Management –
related directions, and potentially to reduce their project expenditure to 
implement those directions, instead, IBM escalated issues about project personnel 
to senior executives in Queensland Health. ‘IBM had prepared a list of people that 
they didn't want on the project … apparently anyone who had put up any objection 
to what IBM were doing or raised any issues, their name was on that list’ (WS013, 
p. 13). The witness statements provide evidence that instead of rectifying or 
addressing what the client perceived as project performance deficits brought to 
their attention, IBM sought to silence those critics, and senior Departmental 
executives appear to be willing to take any measure to mollify IBM. 
By way of further illustration of IBM’s approach to expenditure reduction, 
the CorpTech Procurement Manager (WS012) observed that ‘around late 2009 and 
early 2010 … IBM tried to vary the terms in the Contract so that the milestone 
could be accepted with severity 2 defects. The contract deliverable acceptance 
criteria required that there were no severity one’s and two’s, but a management 
plan for severity three’s and four’s’ (WS012, p. 14). During user acceptance testing 
(UAT) the QH team ‘detected 1,700 errors’ and ‘forty percent of the system 
functionality had not been tested’ (WS013, p. 15). This amendment would allow 
IBM to avoid contractual accountability for the most severe error in the system. 
The CorpTech contract management team attempted to hold IBM to the 
contract, despite its deficiencies. IBM responded by going to the Director-General 
of the Department and demanding the removal of ‘problematic employees’. The 
Director-General then advised the Executive Director to remove personnel from 
the contract management team (WS012, p. 6), and was illustrated by several 
witness statements in evidence to the Commission of Inquiry: ‘IBM had prepared a 
list of people that they didn't want on the project … apparently anyone who had 
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put up any objection to what IBM were doing or raised any issues, their name was 
on that list’ (WS013, p. 13). 
The evidence found in this investigation showed that Keil and Mahring’s 
“mum effect” (2010) was occurring on the Queensland Health Payroll project. A 
possible reason for why the “mum effect” is allowed to operate on a project is what 
Vaughan (2016) describes as the ‘Normalisation of Deviance’. It was found that in 
the case of Queensland Health the project executive saw the role as “managing 
conflicts” rather than managing the project. 
It would appear, based on the witness statements and findings of the 
Commission of Inquiry that IBM’s actions were motivated by an attempt to avoid 
accountability, to obtain additional funding, and to gain the support of the 
Departments’ senior executives in doing so. No effective vendor management can 
be seen to be undertaken by the various witness statements. Vaughan (2016), 
observed on the NASA Challenger disaster that ‘the decision was not explained by 
amoral, calculating managers who violated rules in pursuit of organisational goals, 
but was a mistake based on conformity - conformity to cultural beliefs, 
organisational rules and norms, and NASA’s bureaucratic, political and technical 
culture’ (ch.1). In discounting amoral behaviour, this researcher prefers an 
explanation for these observed behaviours as being consistent with what Vaughan 
observed at NASA. The culture of the Department was to support the vendor. It 
was IBM after all that were the experts and were being paid to do a job. The 
‘normalisation of deviance’ (Vaughan, 2016) on display at Queensland Health was 
driven by the belief that no previous IT project had been a disaster by allowing the 
vendor the freedom to do their job, so it was not anticipated that a disaster would 
befall this project either. 
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4.5.3  Accountability of the Parties 
The main difference between the IBM contract of 2005 for a whole-of-
government solution and the 2007 contract for Queensland Health alone, was that 
in 2007 IBM was retained as the prime contractor (WS014, p.1), with greater 
authority and control. IBM was calling the shots on this new arrangement. 
As was discussed in Chapter 4.3 (above) the technical architecture that 
appeared in the proposal from IBM was a carry-over from the Whole-of-
Government project (which had floundered), and was not specifically considered 
for the Queensland Health project. The two final proposals, one from IBM and one 
from Accenture, had a divergence with respect to the technical solution.  A critical 
component of the payroll solution was how the pay awards would be calculated for 
each individual each pay period. An “awards engine” was required to translate the 
hours worked and compare those to award pay schedules for input into the payroll 
system. Accenture proposed SAP as the awards engine, where this functionality 
would be processed within this one package. IBM, on the other hand, adopted the 
alternative approach of processing the awards data external to SAP utilising the 
WorkBrain solution that the Queensland Government had previously committed to 
for the whole of government solution (WS014,p.11), but which had not yet been 
successfully integrated into an overall SAP payroll solution. IBM was introducing an 
unproven technology into the mix, introducing an additional element of risk for the 
project. 
It was perceived by Queensland Health that the use of WorkBrain to 
process awards was ‘a breakthrough’ and a ‘game changer’ that would allow the 
project to be implemented much faster than using SAP (WS017, p. 7). This 
perspective seemed to be important to the decision making process about the 
adoption. However, the witness statements suggest that no evidence was ever 
provided to show that the perception of QH was valid. This was also shown by 
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another witness where IBM had failed to demonstrate a working solution or to meet 
the performance criteria expected of the system (WS014, p. 17) in respect of 
awards information processing . 
Despite both SAP and WorkBrain being off-the-shelf or packaged solutions 
a significant number of ‘customisations were made to both WorkBrain (1,029) and 
SAP (1,507) to tailor them to QH’s requirement and context’ (WS003, p. 14). 
Given the large number of customisation changes that these pre-designed 
packages were going through, in addition to a potentially forseeable new award 
needing to be implemented arising from the Enterprise Bargaining Agreement, 
management of change was ‘a key governance requirement of the Contract’ 
(WS008, p. 10). ‘There were several layers of multi-agency committees that 
managed various aspects of the program. Committees to manage change request 
decisions, scope, solution design, budget, resourcing to name but a few’ (WS008, 
p. 10). These kinds of changes were explicitly (WS012) within the scope of the 
project and potential vendors would have been expected to have budgeted for 
contingency to cover their implementation in the agreed contract price. 
Prior to signing a change request, the project Director, Ms. Perrott, ‘would 
be briefed by CorpTech officers regarding the reasons for the Change Request, 
the consequences of agreeing to the change and other relevant matters. The 
officers briefing me were in my view competent and had a thorough working 
knowledge of the Contract and the Project as well as the circumstances 
surrounding the change’ (WS008, p. 6). These statements appear to be in contrast 
to the Executive Directors comments that she was often called upon to mediate 
between CorpTech and IBM ‘especially on technical matters’ (WS008,p.13), and at 
odds with the actions taken to remove QH personnel that had responsibility for the 
oversight and enforcement of the contract (WS012. p.6) 
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In addition to the conflict that existed between the Queensland 
Government agencies involved in the project and IBM, there was conflict between 
the agencies themselves. In one email ‘Queensland Health was complaining that 
there’s some lawyer down at CorpTech killing our project. He’s refusing to sign 
change requests’ (WS012, p. 12). According to the witness statement (WS012), the 
lawyer in question was attempting to hold IBM accountable to the project, but the 
‘customer’ (Queensland Health) just wanted the project delivered - at any cost it 
would seem. 
The urgency for timely project completion was something of a recurring 
theme in the witness statements, where in one instance a staff member ‘grabbed 
it off the printer, ran down to the Hilton (hotel) and had Barbara (Perrott) sign it off’ 
(WS008, p. 13) thereby bypassing all process, and failing to seek the advice of the 
professional staff at CorpTech. 
CorpTech staff continued to raise concerns about the manner in which the 
process was being run, in particular the approach to the change requests. One 
individual stated to their manager that ‘if you keep going the way you are going, 
you're going to spend hundreds of millions on this thing’ (WS013, p.3). The stress 
of ‘fighting a losing battle’ forced more than one state government employee to 
seek medical advice and take extended leave (WS013, p.4). 
In relation to the contract, when IBM started work the document 
‘Statement of Work 7 (was) to define the scope of Queensland Health 
Implementation of Continuity’ (WS013, p.9) for which IBM would be paid as having 
achieved a contracted deliverable. Despite IBM drafting the Scope of Work that 
included the requirements of the project ‘IBM had put together a change request 
because, supposedly, there had been a change in approach on how to do the HR 
financial integration’ (WS013, p.10). To be clear, IBM drafted the statement of work 
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and was paid to do so. IBM then raised a change request because that statement 
of work did not reflect the work that needed to be undertaken.  
In 2005, when the project was still being conducted as a Whole-of-
Government solution, an independent review (WS039) was undertaken by Arena 
Consulting Pty Ltd at the request of the Executive Director of CorpTech (WS039, 
p.4) and their findings at that time indicated (WS039, p.4): 
• slippage was appearing in sub-projects; 
• a harder-edged project management approach was needed especially 
on timelines and deliverables; 
• there was a lack of integrated project planning; 
• there was no integrated critical path with clear timelines and 
deliverables; 
• there was a lack of clarity about the role of some governance 
committees; 
• there was a lack of single project accountability. 
There can be no doubt that senior management across the various state 
government agencies involved in both the Whole-of-Government payroll project 
and the subsequent Queensland Health project were well aware and fully informed 
of project management problems, and were apprised of the actions required to 
mitigate these. In 2007 the same consulting firm was engaged (WS039, p.7) to 
conduct a follow-up review, and found that these same issues persisted from the 
whole-of-government project through to the Queensland Health Project. As the 
project progressed ‘IBM struggled to produce the agreed deliverables’ and then 
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withdrawing them when it was demonstrated that the deliverables were 
substantially lacking (WS041, p.6). 
When technical and performance issues arose on the project ‘Ms Perrott’s 
response was to suggest she facilitate a meeting’ (WS041, p.8) between the parties 
but the ‘problem was not one of an issue between (individuals) (as) it was that 
functions were not being performed’. 
No matter how bad project performance became, it appeared that the 
State Government had no interest in terminating the contract with IBM or of 
holding them accountable for their performance (WS041, WS012). This lack of 
accountability empowered IBM to continue working in their existing manner. ‘It 
proved impossible to sight a useful schedule that IBM was using for the work which 
it was undertaking for Queensland Health’ (WS041, p.14). When pressed to 
perform IBM continued to refer to senior executives of the Department and 
demand concessions or that individuals be removed. 
In their defence to criticism at the Commission IBM characterised the 
project as a ‘like for like replacement’ from the old LATTICE system (WS079, p.3). 
However, the number of change requests suggests that this was not the case with 
significant additional functionality and integrations being performed.  Also, the 
absence of effectively clear and concise statement of project requirements in the 
contract shows that IBM could not have had that presumed sense of clarity about 
the project. 
In August 2009, as the project was nearing its conclusion, the QH Project 
Manager was asked to maintain a ‘holistic view’ (WS085) of the Project’s schedule 
of work. This request was in response to IBM being unable, at the June 2009 Board 
Meeting, ‘to deliver a base-lined schedule and critical path for the Project’ (WS085, 
p. 13). 
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4.6 Summary and Conclusions 
There are clear and obvious factors which can be identified as having either 
not occurred or had been executed poorly which could be considered the causes 
of project failure; any objective measure would conclude that project management 
failed, there was a lack of requirements definition even though it was the first 
contracted deliverable, management was in conflict. All of the issues which appear 
in the literature on failed projects. 
Of potential significance is that the evidence provided by witness 
statements mapped to the project chronology showed that issues related to the 
identified themes were raised by staff and consultants throughout the project 
phases, and yet they still they remained as issues that were not resolved nor 
remediated at the time they were raised. The evidence is that management was 
made aware of these failures. So it was not a lack of awareness of the failure risks, 
and therefore highlighting these as the only contributory factors of project failure 
lacks explanatory completeness, as the issue related to the inability to act on the 
issues suggests other contributing factors to project failure. 
In fact the incoming Executive Director who oversaw the commencement 
of the project and managed the first few years had the exit report from the whole 
of government project produced by the external consultants that provided stark 
warnings of how that project had failed and what was required to ensure the next 
project would not fail. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that this report was 
ignored in its totality. 
The researcher refers to these as the “underlying drivers of project failure”, 
and the next chapter (chapter five) will attempt to explain why management failed 
to act in the face of mounting and seeming incontrovertible evidence that they 
needed to act, as was reported in the findings of the Commission of Inquiry. As 
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was discussed in this chapter (chapter 4), the researcher accepts the observation 
by Vaughan (2016) that managements are not amoral actors and that there must 
be a deeper, more nuanced answer, to why problems were allowed to persist until 
they created a billion dollar failed project. 
To paraphrase Cobb’s Paradox (Bourne 2011), the management of the 
Queensland Health payroll project new why their project was certain to end in 
failure, yet they failed to act appropriately thereby ensuring that the project did in 
fact fail, and spectacularly. As was evident from the analysis of the witness 
statements in the conduct of the Queensland Health Payroll project - the 
management was regularly informed of what was going on with their project by 
both staff and external consultants (WS013). Management knew that the project 
was facing problems (or at least should have known). The reports on the 2005 
Whole-of-Government initiative (WS039), the KPMG Report (WS003), the KJ Ross 
report on testing (PD103), the IBM and CorpTech report to ‘reconstruct’ the 
business requirements (PD063) and the 2009 Queensland Audit Office report 
(PD108) all provided clear statements identifying where the project was failing and 
what needed to be done to remedy the situation. Yet the problems persisted until 
the total project costs had blown out to beyond A$1 billion. Faced with the clear 
and certain statement that the project was performing badly, and with specific 
statements of where the project was failing, successive managements failed to act 
appropriately to stem the problems. The conclusion that can be drawn from this 
failure to act is that senior executives of the Department, the Governance and 
steering committees, the Executive Director did not know what specific actions 
were available to them, or what they specifically needed to do in order to be 
effective. The Management and oversight of this project were at a complete loss 
as to how to effectively manage an information technology project. 
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This research proposes that the following are the contributory factors that 
led to the Queensland Health Payroll project becoming a failure: 
• a lack of domain expertise by senior management responsible for the 
project as evidenced by the inability or unwillingness to adopt 
appropriate governance processes; 
• stakeholders remained in conflict throughout the life of the project; 
• there was a complete lack of accountability for failure evident 
throughout the project and especially when it came to vendor and 
contract management. 
To examine the case study from the perspective of a timeline of events, of 
data and advice that was available at the time, to the participants, the researcher 
has reconstructed the project from the available information. Dekker (2014) refers 
to this method of investigation as being ‘inside the tunnel’. “This is the point of 
view of people in the unfolding situation. To them, the outcome was not known (or 
they would have done something else). They contributed to the direction of the 
sequence of events on the basis of what they saw on the inside of the unfolding 
situation. To understand human error, you need to attain this perspective” (Dekker, 
2014, p.18). In examining this case, and in identifying the contributory factors to 
project failure the researcher has set aside any preconceived notions or ideas as to 
why the project failed. The contributory factors explained in greater detail below 
are drawn from the perspective of what was occurring in the project at the time. 
What did the management of the project know, and why they were motivated to 
pursue the decisions that ultimately led this project to a disastrous outcome 
There are questions which were not answered during the Commission of 
Inquiry, and answers to these have not been found in the literature; 
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• Why did senior management of the Department appear to simply ignore 
the findings of the report(s) that they had commissioned?  
• Did senior management not believe the findings, or did they simply not 
read the reports? 
• Did senior management trust the promises of the vendor to produce an 
outcome despite what they were being told by the external review(s)?  
It is not immediately obvious why this situation was allowed to unfold in 
the manner in which it did. The project appeared to comply with all the appropriate 
governance structures and reporting requirements, yet an historical or 
retrospective view would allow that the project was never managed effectively.  
Indeed, the findings of the Commission of Inquiry (WS122) state that ‘Its 
(Queensland Health payroll) failure, attended by enormous cost, damage to 
government and impact on workforce, may be the most spectacular example of all 
the unsuccessful attempts to impose a uniform solution on a highly complicated 
and individualised agency’ (WS122. p.10). The Commissions conclusion was that 
there were two primary causes for the failure of the payroll project (1) ‘unwarranted 
urgency’ and (2) a ‘lack of diligence on behalf of State officials’. (WS122. p.217). 
The Commissions Report elaborated further on lack of diligence, describing it as 
‘poor decisions made in scoping the Interim Solution, in their Governance of the 
project, and in failing to hold IBM to account’ (WS122.p.217). The Commissioner 
further reported that ‘the problems are systemic to government and to the natural 
commercial self-interest of vendors’ (WS122.p.218) which supports the observation 
that Normalisation of Deviance was at play throughout the conduct of this project. 
However, these findings by the Commission do not explain what motivated senior 
management to ignore the lessons learned from immediately preceding projects, 
to ignore the warnings and advice of their own personnel. It is unclear, from the 
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Commissions report, what specific steps a subsequent project might implement to 
ensure that they too did not all into these traps. 
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Chapter Five - The Contributory Factors of Project 
Failure 
This chapter explores the main themes to emerge from the research, and 
examines theories in order to shed light on why these themes are important, and 
what can be learned about how and why they have impacted project outcomes in 
the case study being examined. The theories which underpin these themes is 
explored in this chapter, and following the hermeneutic circle represents an open-
ended process through which an increased understanding of the themes leads to 
a better understanding of the research problem. 
The grounded theory nature of inductive research led to a process 
(described in Chapter 3) where theories were explored to interpret and understand 
the data that emerged. This was an ongoing, recursive practice. As more data was 
unearthed and encoded, more research was required to understand what was 
being observed on the Queensland Health payroll project. Described as the 
‘Hermeneutic Circle’ (Boell and Cecez-Kecmanovic 2010) the literature requires a 
FIGURE 14 -  THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE 
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‘constant re-interpretation leading to deeper and more comprehensive 
understanding of relevant publications’.  
The data collection and review process became a ‘continuing, open-ended 
process through which increased understanding of the research area and better 
understanding of the research problem inform each other’ (Boell & Cecez-
Kecmanovic, 2010 p130). 
Three key themes emerged from the data: 
1. a lack of domain competence, 
2. stakeholder conflict, 
3. lack of accountability. 
Identifying these themes was the initial step, and has been described in 
Chapter 4 (preceeding). These themes were abstracted from the keyword analysis 
that was undertaken in Chapter 4. However, identifying these themes does not 
explain why domain competence, stakeholder conflict, and accountability are 
issues which could undermine a project’s success. 
In this analysis, the first theme; domain competence has been separated 
into two fields of inquiry; (1) lacking domain expertise, to discuss how this arises 
and affects a project, and (2) the need for competence, and why specific 
capabilities are required to effectively lead a complex task. An analysis of the 
underpinnings of stakeholder conflict in the public sector and lack of accountability 
follows. 
5.1 Lacking Domain Expertise 
An IT project employing dozens or hundreds of people from different 
stakeholder groups, with different training, experience and motivations is a 
microcosm of society - it is its own unique social construct, existing within a larger 
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organisation. Examining how a project is executed, how individuals interact within 
and without that project pushes the researcher towards a consideration of ‘actors-
working-in-organisations’ (Manning 2008,p.678) and in particular looking at 
individual interactions, decisions and consequences. Goffman (1959), investigating 
the microsociology of face-to-face interactions developed a theory referred to as 
‘dramaturgy’ that states ‘we are all performers in the interest of order’ (Manning, 
2008, p.679). Dramaturgy refers to the manner in which individuals ‘perform’ in 
social situations in order to produce a result. Performance ‘comes and goes as 
required’ and ‘selectively presented, selectively responded to, and selectively 
adequate to sustaining the working consensus on which interaction depends’ 
(Manning, 2008) 
To manage a project, any project, in such a challenging communication 
environment as Queensland Health would take exceptional skills. Essentially the 
question that this research examines is: what skills were required to manage the 
QHP project to success, and were they evident in QHP leadership? 
In the Queensland Health Payroll project there was a range of people, with 
different backgrounds and experiences interacting in an organisational setting. The 
manner in which they responded to events or problems depended upon a range 
of influences including their personal experiences, education and training, the 
availability of explicit knowledge in the form of documented and available 
materials, and the use of tacit knowledge. Vo-Tran (2014, p.15) found that 
‘stakeholders who possessed greater amounts of experience tended to rely upon 
the use of their tacit knowledge to manage and share information. Whereas 
stakeholders who possessed lesser amounts of experience had a tendency towards 
the use of explicit forms of documentation’.  
The actors in the Queensland Health Payroll project came from many 
different organisations including IBM, CorpTech, Queensland Health, Department 
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of Works, KJ Ross & Associates, independent contractors, and several senior 
executives with no discernible experience or content knowledge of information 
technology projects specifically, being tasked to run a large and complex IT project 
interacting with other individuals all ‘acting their parts’. 
In a ‘Goffmanesque’ environment (Manning, 2008; Vo-Tran, 2014, p.131) 
individuals will behave differently depending upon whether or not they are ‘acting’ 
front-stage or back-stage: 
• Front Stage – where the actors’ actions are visible to the audience 
and form a part of the performance. The person knows that they are 
being watched and acts accordingly. 
 
FIGURE 15 - Enhanced Goffman Dramaturgy Model  
(adapted from Manning, 2008) 
• Back Stage – where the actors are present and the audience is not, 
performers are able to step out of character without fear of disrupting 
the performance. It is where the facts that are suppressed in the front 
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stage or various kinds of formal actions may appear. No members of 
the audience can appear in the back stage and performers draw on 
many methods to ensure this.  
• Intermediate Stage – the nature of a complex project such as 
Queensland Health has many players engaged on many stages 
simultaneously, playing many parts. Exposing different truths to 
different players depending upon which stage they are appearing 
upon at any point in time. 
Within the context of the Queensland Health Payroll project there was not 
a single front-stage or back-stage. There were ‘multiple shows’ happening on the 
Queensland Health payroll project, where multiple stakeholders were taking on 
multiple roles. Researchers might characterise the Project as ‘the main stage’, each 
stakeholder group then had their own back-stage, which in a micro-sociological 
perspective was a front-stage for that team. 
Information that flows between the back-stage and (multiple) front-stage(s) 
is going to be compromised, not unlike what happens in the children's party game 
of ‘chinese whispers’ where information passed on between players becomes 
changed with no resemblance to the original information and where the meaning 
has been lost, as each player imposes their own interpretation of what was heard. 
Mintzberg (1994) provides several examples of both unintentional as well as 
intentional distortion of the flow of information as it moves between parties. With 
such a complicated organisational structure as that exhibited in the Queensland 
Health Payroll project, and with multiple stakeholders acting upon different stages, 
the reliability and transparency of information would have been compromised - 
both intentionally and unintentionally. 
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‘A fundamental problem in software projects is the presence of unreliable 
information. In initial information as well as in subsequent status reports’ (Sengupta 
and Abdel-Hamid 1996,p.1; Carpenter, Bauer et al. 2016,ch.14) report that 
communication between individuals is challenged by a range of factors including 
‘filtering, selective perception, information overload, emotional disconnects, lack 
of source familiarity or credibility, workplace gossip, semantics, gender differences, 
differences in meaning between sender and receiver, and biased language’, 
potentially contributing to the projects eventual failure. 
All work is about interaction between individuals and ‘organizational 
artefacts such as mission statements, goals and objectives, strategic plans and the 
like, function as tools to reduce choice, not to guide it’ (Manning, 2008, p. 681). In 
the same manner, the specification of requirements, the business case, the 
architecture and solution design of the Project are all intended to constrain choice 
to deliver ‘order’. In this project ‘order’ is represented by a defined scope of work, 
a defined project plan which sets out not only what work will be done, but also 
what work will not be done, and by an agreed contract. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
none of these things existed on the QH payroll project, and any efforts to enforce 
them were resisted by IBM with the support (tacit or otherwise) of Departmental 
executives. 
Intra-project Communication is critical to avoid the risks of IT project 
failure, ‘managers don’t leave meetings or hang up the telephone to get back to 
work. In large part, communication is their work’ (Mintzberg, 1990). Information 
that flows between the back-stage and front-stage, between actors and 
stakeholders is compromised both intentionally and unintentionally. The recipient 
of information needs to be able to assess the data provided and be able to judge 
its value, veracity and completeness.  
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Experienced stakeholders ‘tended to have greater back stage presence’ 
(Vo-Tran, 2014, p.132) through the use of tacit knowledge built-up by experience. 
In contrast less experienced actors were ‘thrust onto the front stage where they 
relied upon ‘the script’ (explicit forms of documentation) to complete their 
performance’ (Vo-Tran, 2014, p.132). On a project as complex as the QH payroll 
project, with multiple vendors and stakeholders, actors would be holding one set 
of conversations back at the home organisation office, another with their project 
colleagues and a third with the QH commissioning client. When the conversations 
finally presented themselves to executive management in the State Government, 
without skills and personal experience to fall back upon, the only resources at their 
disposal were the formal procedures, committees and documentation. 
This issue of transparent flows of information between parties, of experts 
being able to make informed decisions utilising tacit information compared to less 
experienced people needing to ‘follow the script’ (Vo-Tran, 2014, p.135), of actors 
controlling the release of information, and of stakeholders presenting different 
versions of themselves across multiple stages becomes critical when one considers 
both the makeup of the governance and management of the Project and the 
individuals involved. “The involvement of non-IT stakeholders can actually work 
detrimentally and confound and confuse proceedings, even causing error” 
(Engelbrecht, Johnston et al. 2017,p.1003). Non-IT experienced management, 
placed in a position of authority “may be influenced by some suppliers or 
colleagues to whose IT knowledge they had access, and insist on a certain course 
of action” which may result in confusion, delay or inappropriate decision making, 
and contribute to the risk of IT project failure. 
An appropriate lens through which to view this performance construct has 
been described by Kruger and Dunning (2009) and is referred to as the Dunning-
Kruger Effect. This effect (Kruger & Dunning 1999, 2009), is where the less 
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competent an individual is with respect to a particular domain then the more they 
are likely to overstate their perceived knowledge and ability. This may be referred 
to as a ‘confidence/competence dissonance’ (Ryvkin, Kraic et al. 2012). Individuals 
that lack competence in a particular domain (incompetent) but are not self-aware 
of their lack of competence, generally perceive their performance to be not 
significantly inferior to those who possess significant competence, training and 
ability (the experts). 
This phenomenon has also been described as the Unskilled and Unaware 
Problem (UUP) (Ryvkin, Kraic et al, 2012). Essentially UUP argues that individuals 
that are unskilled in a particular domain overestimate their own competence in 
both absolute terms and relative terms. In contrast, top performers underestimate 
their absolute and relative performance, seeing themselves as not performing as 
well as they actually do. Kruger and Dunning (2009) found that an unskilled person 
was more likely to dramatically misstate their absolute and relative competence. 
This research (Ehrlinger, Johnson et al. 2008, Ehrlinger, Mitchum et al. 
2016) argues that UUP is a persistent feature of decision making. Furthermore, and 
potentially much more concerning for complex IT projects, Kruger and Dunning 
(2009) determined that the skills necessary to do the job, are the same skills 
necessary to identify competence in others. This facet of the UUP research is 
particularly important when an unskilled individual is placed in a position of 
decision making authority, in this case with respect to an IT Project. Where an 
unskilled individual possesses neither the skills necessary to do the job, nor the 
skills necessary to identify competence in others they are not in a position to make 
informed decisions on complex issues. The application of this principle to the 
Queensland Health Payroll project would suggest that the Executive Director, the 
Department Secretary, and the governance boards lacked the skills needed to 
12 December 2018 
Situational Incompetence: an investigation into the causes of failure of a large-scale IT project  
Darryl Carlton  page  124 of 219 
identify competence in others, and to comprehend informed advice when it was 
provided. 
Engelbrecht et al (2017 p.998) aimed to “identify whether a causal 
relationship exists between the various components of business managers’ IT 
competence and IT success”. What they found was that a “business managers’ IT 
competence can, and does, exert a substantial influence on project success” 
(Engelbrecht et al ,2017, p. 1001). They reported a ‘surprising’ finding where a lack 
of knowledge or competence was likely to have a negative impact on project 
outcomes, “although one would have expected a positive relationship and a 
positive impact” (Engelbrecht et al ,2017. p. 1002) the findings emphasised the 
negative outcomes associated with a lack of competence, and a lack of awareness 
that failing produces. 
Engelbrecht et al (2017 p.1002) also found that ‘business managers may 
be influenced by some suppliers or colleagues to whose IT knowledge they had 
access, and insist on a certain course of action. If that business manager is 
particularly influential in an organisation, then there could be similar confusions, 
delays, and even inappropriate decisions’. This finding is reflective of the 
behaviours referred to in the Witness Statements. The senior executives of 
Queensland Health deferred to the advice of the vendor, rather than their own 
staff. Having chosen to discount the concept of “amoral actors”, it is this lack of 
knowledge of information technology, and the executive’s inability to parse the 
information being presented that builds the foundations of a theory to explain how 
the Queensland Health payroll project became so dysfunctional and ended in 
failure. 
Given the importance of information technologies to business success, and 
their presence in almost every endeavour, one would expect to see an increase in 
technically literate, skilled or experienced managements to provide effective 
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oversight and governance. It has been found that (Coertze and vonSolms 2013,p. 
3362) only 10 percent of organisations had Chief Information Officer (CIO) or 
equivalent representation at board or executive level of organisational governing 
management. Only 15 percent of organisations had board members with any IT-
related qualifications, and in their United Kingdom (UK) sample, no organisation 
exhibited board level oversight of organisational IT through qualified 
representation directly as a board member. A focus on general business 
competence over specific IT competence continues at the CIO level where less 
than 50 percent of CIOs in the United States of America (US) public sector had 
primary qualifications from technical or engineering backgrounds (Ionescu 2017). 
Narcissism, in modern terms has been defined as ‘a person who possesses 
an extreme love of the self, a grandiose sense of self-importance, and a powerful 
sense of entitlement’ (Duchon and Drake 2013), and while generally applied to 
individuals, the concept of narcissistic personalities has also been applied to 
groups and organisations brown (Brown 1997). Of significance in this research is 
that ‘the narcissistic personality is characterised by the denial of a difference 
between the ideal and the actual self’ which segues directly into the studies of 
competence versus confidence by Kruger and Dunning  (2009) and Ryvkin, Krajc 
and Ortmann (2012). The narcissistic leader that holds ‘very inflated self-views and 
(is) preoccupied with having those self-views continuously reinforced (Campbell, 
Goodie et al. 2004), was a behaviour which was evident on the Queensland Health 
payroll project, where the evidence suggested that the project was in trouble this 
was discounted or ignored because it did not fit the “self-image” of the project 
leader that everything was under control. 
Narcissistic leaders in organisations are more likely to engage in behaviour 
which might lead to failing standards and reduced ethical and moral behaviour 
(Alvinius, Johansson et al. 2016) which could be seen to be an antecedent for the 
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‘normalisation of deviance’. As standards fall, decision by decision, what is 
considered normal behaviour slowly erodes until a ‘new normal’ gradually and 
almost imperceptibly emerges. 
Narcissism is growing and becoming more prevalent and we can expect to 
see an increase in organisational narcissism as a direct consequence. It has been 
reported (Twenge and Foster 2010) that ‘there has been a 30% tilt towards 
narcissistic attitudes in US students since 1979’, and that ‘The Narcissism Epidemic’ 
(Twenge and Campbell 2010) breeds ‘the idea that being highly self-confident is 
the key to success’. Twenge and Campbell (2010) were at pains to point out that 
there is no correlation between confidence and successful outcomes. Kremer  
reported that ‘over 15,000 journal articles have examined the links between high 
self-esteem and measurable outcomes in real life, such as educational 
achievement, job opportunities, popularity, health, happiness and adherence to 
laws and social codes’ and found no correlation or causation (Kremer 2013,p4). 
Twenge and Foster (2010) noted, over the last 30 years confidence has 
replaced competence. Positive thinking has replaced knowledge. An increase in 
narcissism correlates with the unskilled and unaware problem (UUP) in that 
‘individuals become so self-obsessed they cannot identify their own weaknesses or 
learn from others’ (Kruger & Dunning, 1999. p.38).  
Leadership of the payroll project exhibited this misplaced thinking even 
after the project was declared as the worst failure in the history of the public service 
and a commission of inquiry called. At this stage, presenting to the commission of 
inquiry one would expect the project executives to be expressing contrition, or at 
least qualifying their statements. Ms Perrot has referred to the tender evaluation 
process as being ‘tightly managed’ (WS008 pp.5) and comment in hindsight that 
appears to be naïve at best, and certainly consistent with the expression of 
narcissistic behavior where an individual cannot identify their own weaknesses. Ms 
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Perrott blithely states that ‘teams were made-up of subject experts’ and yet the 
performance of the project and with the benefit of being able to reflect one would 
clearly question how expert these individuals were. Her comments that ‘Mallesons 
had been appointed in August 2007 to advise on the procurement process and 
contractual arrangements’ (WS008 pp.5) appears to ignore the fact that Mallesons 
had in fact advised the State that ‘we believe on balance that IBM’s Offer gives rise 
to a greater number of material issues and less thought has gone into IBM’s Offer 
regarding contractual mechanisms that will assist the customer or enhance the 
working relationship between the parties’ (WS014, p. 39). Reading her statement 
to the commission on face value it appears that Ms Perrott is almost delusional 
about what actually transpired on the project. To read these comments, which were 
made to the commission of inquiry investigating the failure of the project for which 
she was responsible and accountable, has the appearance of operating in an 
alternative reality. 
The IBM Program Director (Mr Doak) and the CorpTech Executive Director 
have made statements that defy any rational explanation. Mr Doak claimed that he 
was never made aware of any person not being paid properly or of any fault with 
the system. A statement that simply defies rational explanation and can only be 
understood in the context of being so absorbed in one’s own self-interest that they 
have can ignore what is going on around them.  
Ms Perrott states that ‘appropriate Governance arrangements were 
implemented within CorpTech, IBM, SSP’s and Agencies’ (WS008 pp.7). Again, at 
the time that this statement was made Ms Perrott was facing a commission of 
inquiry. Had this statement been made at the beginning of the project, or even 
during its execution an observer might be able to accept it. But to read this 
statement in the context of the historical “train-wreck” that this project had 
become is to question how an experienced senior executive could have such a 
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deluded view of the conduct of the project and her own role in the ultimate 
outcome. 
This narcissistic self-belief and confidence may go some way to explain why 
an executive with little knowledge of information technology and no formal training 
or experience in information technology would agree to take on the responsibility 
of running ‘the largest organisational reform undertaken within the State 
Government‘ (WS122, p.9). When it comes to the QHP project, it was stated very 
clearly by the Deputy-Secretary of the Department that the Executive-Director was 
not skilled in information technology but was a very experienced people manager 
with greater than 30 years in the public sector (WS026, 2013). The Executive-
Director described her education and work experience as mostly being in the 
human resources domain (WS024, 2013).  
The potential risk that this lack of (Information Technology) domain 
expertise potentially causes for Information Technology projects generally, and the 
Queensland Health project as a specific example is encapsulated by the Dunning-
Kruger Effect (2009), ‘that incompetent individuals lack the metacognitive skills that 
enable them to tell how poorly they are performing, and as a result, they come to 
hold inflated views of their performance and ability’ (Kruger & Dunning; 1999, p. 
38). They are therefore potentially prone to ignore mounting evidence of their 
contribution to project related issues, to over-estimate their own ability to diagnose 
and resolve issues, and to listen to and take advice from unreliable sources. All of 
which were evident in the witness statements. 
Of even greater concern is the UUP findings (Ryvkin et al, 2012) that not 
only do the domain illiterate individuals tend to overestimate their own ability 
relative to their actual performance, they are also at risk of being deficient in 
identifying relevant domain competence in others, ‘participants who scored in the 
bottom quartile were less able to gauge the competence of others than were their 
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top-quartile counterparts’ (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p.37). Furthermore, they 
found that ‘incompetent individuals fail to gain insight into their own incompetence 
by observing the behaviour of other people. Despite seeing the superior 
performances of their peers, bottom-quartile participants continued to hold the 
mistaken impression that they had performed just fine’ (Kruger & Dunning, 1999. 
p.38). 
A possible explanation contributing to the Queensland Health Payroll 
project failure is that where managers are not technically competent, but perceive 
themselves as managerially capable, not only are they potentially at risk of 
overestimating their own ability and underestimating the relative competence of 
the skilled workers on the project, they do not have the skills to discern the quality 
of advice being given to them. Essentially, the evidence suggests that they are at 
high risk of not being able to assess the difference between the veracity of a 
confident but incompetent colleague or vendor providing advice, in comparison 
to a competent but less-confident colleague. 
These managerial perceptions about domain expertise, confidence and 
competence carry the risk of significant contribution to poor project management 
descision-making and governance with implications for overall project failure and 
success. The analysis of the case study data show (Chapter 4) that different parties 
to the payroll project, from different vendor and stakeholder groups, were ‘acting’ 
in back-stage and front-stage scenarios, and that they withheld information in order 
to manipulate outcomes (PD017, PD018, PD019, PD065).  
The decision-making senior project manager with accountability, 
responsibility and authority needs to be able to assess the information provided to 
them in order to make well-informed decisions. It is contended in the interpretation 
of the QLD project data in this study that the consequences of placing domain-
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challenged persons in positions of project-critical authority will result in 
unsatisfactory outcomes where: 
(1) managers who lack domain expertise will irrespectively act the part that 
they perceive they need to adopt; 
(2) these managers tend to be incapable of identifying the skilled and 
competent individuals that can be trusted for expert advice; 
(3) these managers will not have the cognitive or experiential tools to 
determine an appropriate course of action when faced with a project 
stimuli; and 
(4) these managers are likely to confuse confidence with competence and 
may be subject to undue influence by other incompetent actors. 
In summary, the Queensland Health Payroll project was potentially placed 
at significant risk by failing to appoint management, governance and oversight that 
comprised sufficient domain expertise appropriately matched to the size, 
complexity and nature of the project. The interpretation of the case study data 
provides explanations for project failure from the literature, that together provide 
a feasible set of reasons for project failure that were not explicitly addressed by the 
Commission of Inquiry report.  
5.2 The Need for Competence 
The research into the Dunning-Kruger Effect (Kruger & Dunning, 2009) and 
the UUP (Ryvkin, Kraic et al. 2012) show that lack of managerial domain expertise 
also leads to a lack in the ability to identify competence in others. Research into 
the UUP problem also found that if competence is improved through training, the 
ability to identify competence in others also becomes more accurate (Ehrlinger, 
Johnson et al. 2008, Ehrlinger, Mitchum et al. 2016; Kruger & Dunning, 2009).  
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The Kruger-Dunning research also demonstrated that those individuals 
lacking in domain expertise were least likely to benefit from ‘social comparison’ 
(Kruger and Dunning, 1999, p.1131).  This is where they are unable to modify their 
own performance simply by observing the performance of others. To achieve this, 
intervention is required through education about the domain (Kruger & Dunning, 
2009, p.1128). 
The June 15th, 2015 issue of Businessweek (Ford 2015)4, was a special 
edition about computer coding. The essay which outlined the importance of 
coding stated: 
‘Software has been around since the 1940s. Which means 
that people have been faking their way through meetings 
about software, and the code that builds it, for generations. 
Now that software lives in our pockets, runs our cars and 
homes, and dominates our waking lives, ignorance is no 
longer acceptable. The world belongs to people who code. 
Those who don’t understand will be left behind’. 
Horowitz (Horowitz 2014, p.81) argued that ‘engineering managers should 
code 30% of their time’. Horowitz (2014) related his own experiences and noted 
that when he lost coding skills he faced issues such as an increasing ‘technical debt’ 
and a loss of ‘continuity of understanding’ inhibiting his effectiveness as a leader. 
While there appears to be little in the academic literature on the benefits, 
or even the experience, of senior executives learning to code, it is a topic regularly 
discussed in the professional literature. (Bassellier, Benbasat et al. 2003) 
emphasized the importance of specific IT project management knowledge and 
experience as two of their seven dimensions of IT competence. Engelbrecht et al 
                                               
4 The BusinessWeek special on coding does not have page numbers 
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(2017) “call for attention to be paid to the contribution of individual business 
managers' IT competence, and involvement, in IT project success”. 
Reinforcing the lessons learned from Ehrlinger et al. (2008) and Kruger and 
Dunning (2009) the benefit that comes from being trained in the domain specific 
area is to increase the ability of the manager to identify informed opinion, and to 
make informed decisions. The executives and senior management of the 
Queensland Government were shown by the case study (Chapter 4) to be not 
potentially equipped to understand the information being presented to them, 
much less to evaluate the veracity of the actors presenting the data. Senior 
management ‘acting’ their part uncritically accepted instruction from vendors 
(WS012, p.10) that bypassed their own staff (WS008, p.13) reflecting the scenarios 
described by both Ryvkin, Kraic et al (2012) with respect to the UUP problem, and 
Kruger and Dunning (2009) with respect to competence versus confidence. 
Complex issues arising between the internal project team and the vendors 
were potentially inappropriately treated as ‘personality issues’ (WS008. p13) when 
they were issues which required domain aware decision making. Instead, the 
executive director would ‘suggest she facilitate a meeting’ (WS041, p.8) rather than 
critically examine the issues being presented. Individuals that expressed concern 
about the direction the project was taking (WS013, p.3) were placed on ‘a list of 
people that (IBM) didn't want on the project … apparently, anyone who had put 
up any objection to what IBM were doing or raised any issues, their name was on 
that list’ (WS013,p.13). Thereby demonstrating the UUP effects of a lack of 
managerial competence in a specific and complex domain. 
When the CorpTech contract management team attempted to hold IBM to 
the contract, despite its deficiencies, ‘IBM responded by going to the Director-
General of the Department and demanding the removal of “problematic 
employees” (WS013, p.12). The Director-General then advised Ms Perrott to 
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remove personnel from the contract management team’ (WS012, p.6). Thereby 
showing the lack of competency impacts up the line of command, where domain 
expertise would not be expected, but appropriate delegation of decision making 
by referring the IBM complaint back down the line, where the Director General 
perhaps could have perceived (without the need for knowing anything about IT – 
but understanding procurement and contract management processes) the 
motivation for the IBM play in bypassing project governance. These concerns by 
IBM should not have been actioned at the Director-General’s level of authority, but 
rather they should have been passed back to the authorised domain experts to 
resolve according to project rules. It would appear that in these specific cases, even 
the Director-General was subject to both the UUP problem of over-confidence in 
the face of an unknown problem, and also being subject to the Goffman-esque 
effects of playing the part that was expected of a senior bureaucrat despite not 
being equipped to do so. 
Executives that lack knowledge of information technology, and essentially 
the challenges inherent in developing a large complex body of software, are ill-
equipped to take on the role of lead project manager of a complex IT project. 
Those that do not possess awareness of the importance of their lack of domain 
specific knowledge but perceive themselves as role capable, risk not being able to 
differentiate between good advice and poor advice. They can neither identify self-
serving advice nor understand the consequential impact of poor decisions on the 
project for which they are accountable. Without explicit training, the lead project 
manager or executive is at risk of being potentially easily influenced by others that 
exhibit strong confidence, but lack technical competence. 
As indicated by Kruger and Dunning (2009), this managerial risk can be 
remediated by training in the skills specifically relevant to the domain. The goal of 
this training should not be to create a technical professional out of the executive, 
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rather it should be to provide the skills and literacy necessary to understand what 
is happening on the project, provide the requisite knowledge to evaluate 
information presented to them, and how to weigh that information using objective 
analysis. 
5.3 Stakeholder Conflict 
The stakeholders to an IT project, and to the Queensland Health Payroll 
project specifically are many and varied. In the case study project, the stakeholders 
are comprised of the Department of Public Works, The Queensland Premier, The 
Department of Health, CorpTech (the Government shared services initiative), IBM, 
Accenture, KJ Ross Pty Ltd, Arena Consulting, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
independent contractors, hospitals, and many more. In addition there are 
independent contractors engaged by the Departments and agencies, and the 
vendors and solutions providers. 
Both Vaughan (2016) and Dekker (2014) found in their research into large 
scale disasters, such as the Deepwater Horizon oil platform rupture or the 
Challenger Shuttle explosion, that these disasters are not the result of one or a 
handful of sudden mistakes. ‘Mistake, mishap, and disaster are socially organized 
and systematically produced by social structures’ (Vaughan, 2016 ch.1). ‘Accidents 
can happen without anything breaking, without anybody erring, without anybody 
violating the rules they consider relevant’ (Dekker, 2014 p.5). The conditions that 
come together to result in the final disaster had been cemented into the psycho-
social structure of the organisation probably since the beginning of the project and 
while perhaps unexpected and appear sudden at the time, the contributory factors 
can be viewed as potentially foreseeable and even avoidable. 
Dekker (2014, p.679) noted that most probes into failure or accidents 
appear to assume that project participants ‘decision making is driven by rational, 
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fully informed choices, (thus) concluding that they either must have been amoral 
calculators, who prioritised production or personal goals, or slackers, who 
somehow failed to invest in their own full rationality, leading to reduced situation 
awareness or shortcuts’. Vaughan (2016. p.1996) dismissed the notion of ‘amoral 
actors’ in the Challenger disaster, and found that failures, and disasters, are not 
incidents where stakeholders have broken the rules, rather they are a product of 
the social structure of the organisation that had existed from the very outset of the 
project, and probably long before. 
The social structure of an organisation undertaking information systems 
projects is influenced by the various players. Game Theory (Aumann and 
Brandenburger 1995), analyses games ‘in terms of what the players know or believe 
about themselves and the other players in the game’, and whether or not they will 
each act rationally according to 'what they know or believe about the game and 
about each other’s rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. (Aumann 1995. 
p.1). Viewing a project such as the Queensland Health Payroll project, which had 
multiple stakeholders from multiple groups (or types of organisation), through the 
lens of game theory provides a theoretical construct to examine how the parties 
interact, and what might have contributed to the project outcomes. 
When considering the conditions under which each party entered the 
‘game’ (project), they would each have had some perspective of what they wanted 
to achieve as an outcome, their “payoff function”. To be considered rational, a 
player must “know his own payoff function, and knows the strategy choices of the 
others. Then the players’ choices constitute a Nash equilibrium in the game being 
played” (Bach and Tsakas 2014). Each player would also be assumed to have at 
least a general understanding of what payoff each other party is seeking by 
entering the game, and what strategies they might adopt to achieve their payoff. 
It might be assumed that IBM had a payoff of function of making a profit and having 
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a client reference to win further work. It might be further assumed that the 
Queensland Government, incorporating all of its agencies and Departments, had 
a payoff function of a working and successful payroll solution for the Department 
of Health. Every other participant would have their own payoff function and 
strategy for achieving that, according to game theory. Should a payoff function be 
absent the party would not be considered a ‘rational actor’ (Bach & Tsakas, 2014, 
p.51). 
In game theory there are two types of knowledge – Mutual Knowledge and 
Common Knowledge (Lo 1996, p.471). Mutual Knowledge is where the actions and 
strategies of other players are known. This does not need to be “common 
knowledge” where all information is open, transparent and shared as opposed to 
mutual knowledge which may be hidden but understood by all parties. Lanzi (2012) 
states that “according to Goffman, game theory is flawed because it applies a 
single-level model to two-leveled situations”. Goffman (Lanzi 2012), in this 
circumstance is suggesting that the situation is more complicated and complex 
than is represented by a one-dimensional game. It is suggested that the challenge 
in games where there are greater than three players is that because the variable is 
mutual knowledge rather than common knowledge, if each player gets different 
information about an individual players’ payoff conditions or actions then this 
results in a lack of equilibrium (Bach & Tsakas, 2013).  
Essentially, by considering Game Theory through the lens of 
Goffmanesque-behaviour (Vo-Tran, 2014) researchers can identify a highly 
complex game involving n-players, where information is obfuscated, and 
transparent decision making is non-existent. 
Conflict was highlighted throughout the witness statements. IBM 
demanding that “uncooperative” employees be removed from the project 
(WS012), Queensland Health complaining about ‘someone in contract 
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management’ (WS012. p.12) interfering in the delivery of the solution. The conflicts 
existed intra-Governmental between the Departments and Agencies and inter-
project between the Government and vendors. It would appear, from the witness 
statements and project records that there was no clear and agreed shared goal. 
That the various stakeholders were unaware of what constituted a successful 
outcome for each party, and therefore had no insight into the strategies that the 
others parties would adopt to achieve a “payoff”. 
According to the Agreement between IBM (as Prime Contractor) and the 
Queeensland Government (WS012), the principal role of CorpTech was to manage 
the contract between the government and the vendor. Mr Bird was recruited into 
CorpTech (WS012) in March 2008 with the responsibility for managing that 
agreement. Mr Bird remained with the project until July 2010. He was a lawyer, 
with additional qualifications and experience in public sector administration, as well 
as in computer programming (WS012). He earned a Masters in IT from Queensland 
University of Technology. Mr Bird appeared to have appropriate domain expertise, 
qualifications and experience to undertake this role. 
Commencing work in late March 2008, Mr Bird notes that the 2007 contract 
with IBM was ‘an agreement to agree’ (WS012, p. 3) and that unlike what would 
normally be expected for an executed contract, key statements of work had not 
yet been developed or agreed, that the scope was missing, and ‘critical terms 
relating to the Prime Contractor role’ were yet to be agreed. The contract is the 
instrument that provides the client with the ability to manage the project 
effectively. However, it was incomplete and lacked key components more than one 
year into the project (WS012, WS014). 
It was the view of the Contract Manager (Mr Bird) that IBM was ‘in default 
of the contract early on’ (WS012, p.4) because ‘a large number of contract 
deliverables were late and of poor quality’ as determined by the Solutions Design 
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Authority (SDA). The SDA was set up with a process involving IBM submitting a 
piece of work to the SDA for approval, and, if rejected, to be resubmitted 
according to the timeframe set down by the process and the manner set down by 
the process. ‘The acceptance process prescribed in the contract gave SDA five 
days after IBM’s submission to review the deliverables and either accept or reject 
the deliverable’ (WS012, p.4). 
The relationship between CorpTech/Queensland Health and IBM has been 
described as having ‘tension between IBM and QH in terms of the Project 
Directorate governance’ (WS059, p.12). Following the arrival of Ms Berenyi as the 
new Executive Director, and the introduction of change to the management of the 
Project Directorate ‘the personality-related tensions between IBM and QH eased’ 
(WS059, p.13). 
In addition to the conflict that existed between the State Government 
agencies involved in the project and IBM, there was conflict between the agencies 
themselves. In one email ‘Queensland Health was complaining that there’s some 
lawyer down at CorpTech killing our project. He’s refusing to sign change requests’ 
(WS012, p.12). 
Game Theory (Lo, 1996) and Goffman (Vo-Tran, 2014) go some way to 
explaining the actions, behaviours and outcomes of the various stakeholders 
engaged on the Queensland Health payroll project. That conflict existed between 
and within each of the stakeholder groups is apparent from the witness statements. 
Goffman suggests (Dougherty and olsen 2014 p.191) that the individual payoff’s in 
a game involving so many players need to be explicit and transparent otherwise 
‘equilibrium’ will never exist on that game (project). The evidence from this project 
suggests that players acted the parts as they perceived them (in a Goffmanesque 
manner) without any real knowledge of what was required or any idea of how to 
respond to events as they occurred. Without adequate insight borne of 
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competence the actors in this project relied upon structure and procedure to guide 
them.  Senior executives of the Department acted in manner which would suggest 
that they were unable to comprehend the payoff strategy of the other players, 
while vendors appear to have acted in a manner suggesting that they were 
unconcerned with the payoff for the Department and never set out to achieve 
equilibrium. 
5.4 Lack of Accountability 
’Principal-Agent theory has been the dominant theory at the heart of public 
sector accountability research” (Schillemans and Busuioc 2014, p.191) and has 
become standard fare in economics, social science, law and business schools since 
the 1970’s (Shapiro 2005, p.269). In its most basic form Principal-Agent Theory 
(Shapiro, 2005) observes that the principal agent such as a Government 
Department “is in the driver’s seat – specifying preferences, creating incentives, 
and making contracts that agents must follow” (Shapiro, 2005. p267). The “agent” 
in the context of the Queensland Health Payroll project is IBM and the other 
suppliers and vendors. 
The relationship between the Queensland Government and the various 
vendors delivering product and service as part of the QH Payroll Project might be 
assumed to be a standard case of principal-agent. The agent in this context is seen 
to be bound by the principal’s requirements, and the contract provides the terms 
under which that relationship will be conducted. In order for this framework to be 
effective the relationship between the parties must presume that the principal and 
the agent ‘are both rational utility maximizers’ (Vinnari and Nasi 2013, p491), where 
this means they both will be motivated to act to maximise their self-interest. As 
discussed in previously with respect to game theory, it might be reasonable to 
assume that IBM is motivated by earning a profit and generating a reference client 
from which they might win additional projects. The Queensland Government, 
12 December 2018 
Situational Incompetence: an investigation into the causes of failure of a large-scale IT project  
Darryl Carlton  page  140 of 219 
being a rational utility maximizer’ would seek to maximise their ‘payoff’ (Vinnari & 
Nasi, 2013) by achieving a successful project completion. 
New research emerged to challenge this seemingly clear-cut perspective 
of the principal-agent theory during the late 1990’s and early 2000’s when agency 
problems ‘were identified as a primary cause of failure in the governance of a slate 
of well-publicised corporate scandals’ (Tihanyi, Graffin et al. 2014,p.1536). 
From the perspective of an information technology project the researcher 
is concerned with the interplay between governance and accountability. 
Governance in the most general sense deals with the steering and co-ordination of 
various actors’ (Almqvist, Catasu et al. 2011). Governance is the work of steering 
an organisation and 'involves setting goals and using power to monitor their 
implementation’ (Mutiganda 2013,p520). Accountability, on the other hand, 
‘means that the agent or civil servant has a responsibility to be accountable for 
their actions’ (Mohamed, Youssef et al. 2016, p.440),  Furthermore, ‘such 
accountability should show how the administration has fulfilled its mission and 
demonstrate that public funds were used efficiently and effectively to assess their 
performance (Mohamed, Youssef et al, 2016, p.442). It has been argued (Romzek, 
LeRoux et al. 2012, p443) that there are three basic facets of accountability: 
(1) ‘the sources of authority to which the organisation or individual is 
answerable for performance,  
(2) those authorities’ expectations for the accountable entity’s 
performance, and  
(3) the mechanisms by which the accountable entity is held answerable for 
performance and faces appropriate consequences’  
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It is proposed (Christensen and Laegreid 2014) that an accountability 
framework should comprise; political accountability, administrative accountability 
and managerial accountability (ibid:p.209). In this accountability framework there 
is a ‘chain of principal-agent relationships’ where voters ‘have delegated their 
sovereignty to representatives’, who in turn delegate to the public service and 
authorised officers. Those authorised officers are then accountable within their 
hierarchy (administraive accountability) to their superiors and for monitoring the 
outputs and results that have been delegated to them (managerial accountability). 
It would appear that public sector governance arrangements are 
established, at least in part, to protect the principal from loss, and to effectively 
transfer this risk to the agent. Transferring the risk has resulted in an increase in 
outsourced arrangements which has had the effect of creating in public sector 
administrations a permanent role of procurement and contract management which 
in turn has had the effect of creating a 'hollowed out public sector’ (Schillemans 
and Busuioc 2014, p.192).  A ‘hollowed out’ public sector is where the public sector 
has lost the capability to deliver outputs themselves and must rely on the delivery 
of work product from a contracted private sector. This has led to a large body of 
research (Dubnick & Frederickson, 2010; Olsen, 2013; Klingner, Nalbandian & 
Romzek, 2002; Koppell, 2005) in the domain of public sector accountability, which 
has identified a phenomenon called ‘drifting agents – where executive agents are 
prone to withhold information, serve their own bureaucratic interests and generally 
eschew accountability’ (Schillemans and Busuioc, 2014, p.192). The principal-agent 
chain has, in these circumstances, broken. 
Schillemans and Busuioc (2014, p.193) extend the concept of drifting 
agents to discuss what they refer to as drifting forums “which mysteriously choose 
not to hold their agents accountable, disregard apparent wrongdoings and are 
sometimes surprisingly uninterested in what their agents actually do”. Forums, as 
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opposed to agents, represent where a task has been delegated down the chain of 
accountability not to an individual but to a group where there is a loss of direct 
accountability amongst the members of the group, and that the forum has become 
so far removed from the ultimate recipient to whom they owe accountability that 
the accountability ‘drifts’ away from its intended objective. In the case of 
Queensland Health it might be seen that the forum perceives their responsibility 
as issuing a tender, and measures their success by the fact that the tender was 
issued. Whether the tender is fit for purpose, or whether it will result in the intended 
outcome is of secondary concern. 
Applying this concept to the Queensland Health project, Schillemens and 
Busuoic (2014) describe a scenario in which principal-agent, or forum-actor, takes 
place: 
1. The principal delegates a task to an agent for a variety of reasons. 
In the case of QH Payroll the principal, Queensland Government,  
required an external party or parties to implement a complex IT 
program which the principal did not have the skills to undertake 
2. Conflict arises between the principal (QG) and agent (IBM) where 
each party has different goals and where, as is explained from a 
Goffman-esque perspective, (Vo-Tran, 2014) substantial information 
asymmetry  exists. These conditions certainly became prevalent in 
the QH Payroll Project and have been described in preceding 
sections. Schillemans and Busuoic (2014,p.195) describe the actions 
of the agent as being “self-centered and opportunistic”. 
3. The problems of “agency drift” become exacerbated by the quasi-
autonomous nature of the agent (IBM), making its own choices, 
deciding risk, and prioritising work. 
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4. ‘Rational actors may be expected to nurture the advantages that 
follow from their superior knowledge and informational advantage 
and exploit the possibilities offered by the conventional information 
asymmetry. They will therefore, with some exaggeration, naturally 
prefer secrecy and they will duck and shy away whenever possible’ 
(Schillemans & Busuoic, 2014, pp198) as can be seen at Queensland 
Health with the agent (IBM) refusing to be accountable to the 
principals’ (Queensland Government) contract manager (WS012) 
who was endeavouring to ensure that the principal-agent 
relationship was maintained and that the agent met their 
accountability obligations.  
5. Principals are expected to actually care about the outcomes that 
have been delegated, but this is not always the case (Auel 2007; 
(Muller 2009,p.327; (Whitaker, Altman-Sauer et al. 2004), and may 
determine that the cost of implementing controls and oversight is 
greater than the benefits that they would derive from such action. 
6. ‘Assuming principals actually care about the delegated task, 
assuming they want to hold their agents accountable to some 
degree, and assuming principals have preferences and want their 
agents to act accordingly, it is also logical to hypothesize that 
principals will redress undesirable actions of their agents’ 
(Schillemans & Busuoic, 2014.p198). 
7. The kernel of the principal-agent problem in the public sector 
therefore becomes “containing agency loss and bureaucratic drift” 
(Schillemans & Busuoic, 2014, p199).  
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Informed by this principal-agent theory perspective, the question can be 
asked; “was outsourcing the development of QH Payroll intended to ensure that 
the objectives of the project were more easily met, or was there an alternate goal 
being pursued by the forum. Schillerman and Busuoic (2014.p.201) argue that 
‘where principal-agent theory would forecast (potential) agency drift, empirical 
findings rather suggest forum drift: the forum drifting away from agreed upon goals 
and measures’. 
It would appear therefore that a “forum” is not equivalent to a principal 
and does not embody the same sense of accountability and therefore the 
assumptions of principal-agent theory may not hold. There is an information 
asymmetry between actors and forums, as identified by Goffman (Vo-Tran, 2014) 
and expanded upon by Schillerman and Busuoic (2014) when discussing public 
sector accountability. This has significant implications for the contract between 
parties, and how that is managed. 
When applying forum-actor principles to the relationship between a 
Government agency contracting the services of a commercial vendor, the 
assumption appears to be that the actor (agent) will by its very nature become 
recalcitrant as it pursues actions that maximise its own self-interest and will not 
willingly disclose its actions or render an account to the forum (principal) without 
being compelled to do so. The witness statements and findings of the Commission 
of Inquiry would certainly bear this out.  
5.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be seen that an individual appointed with authority 
over a complex and technically demanding activity will not have the skills to 
perform the task, or to exhibit the ability to identify from whom they should be 
seeking advice. A domain challenged individual lacks a range of competencies that 
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make them unsuitable when tasks become complicated or problematic. As projects 
become larger and more complex, the parties to a project need to more explicitly 
state their outcome objectives for the project. Without this transparency divergent 
goals will lead to constant challenges, disruptions and complications. In the public 
sector, at least, principal-agent theory is being replaced by forum-actor theory 
where forum drift is dragging the contracting party away from their expected role 
as principal. Forum drift may go some way to explaining why CorpTech, as the 
contract manager, never demonstrated accountability for the contract with IBM. It 
should be noted that issues such as stakeholder conflict and lack of accountability 
are not alternative causes of failure to the three key themes but are largely 
consequences of the themes.  
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Chapter Six - A Theory Emerges 
The question of most concern to this researcher has been to uncover why, 
despite all of the preceding research, publications, education, training and 
certification that is available to individuals and organisations undertaking project 
management of an information technology solution, a project could still display all 
of the mistakes, errors and failings that have been identified in the literature. 
This chapter sets out to understand why mistakes keep happening, why the 
same observed failings continue to be reported and to wrap these into a theory 
that explains, at least with respect to Queensland Health, why large projects fail. 
The theme that was the most consistent throughout the project was that 
senior management was repeatably made aware of project risks and failings. 
Reports had been written about the whole-of-government project prior to the 
creation of the Queensland Health project that specifically enumerated the 
challenges and risks that needed to be kept ‘front of mind’ to the QH project team 
(WS003, WS004). The literature on failed IT projects provided no plausible 
explanation to describe the fact that senior executives responsible for the direct 
execution of the project, and departmental executives with governance and 
oversight accountability apparently ignored all of the advice that they were 
presented with. 
Following the practice outlined by both Dekker (2014) and Vaughan (2016) 
the concept of an ‘amoral calculator’ was not entertained. This theory was rejected 
for two reasons; the first being that the researcher is not qualified to assess ‘amoral 
behaviour’ and make recommendations on that, and secondly, it is improbable that 
every executive engaged on the project was acting with ill will towards the project. 
It was assumed that some other factor was at play. 
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What emerged from the data was that the executives in charge of the 
project operating above the hands-on technical level, were manifestly incompetent 
when it came to issues of information systems project management. The executives 
simply did not understand the information that was being presented to them, and 
interpreted professional concerns raised by Queensland Health team members as 
“personality conflicts”. These executives were presented with several formal 
reports outlining risks and issues, and acted in a manner that under conventional 
wisdom, would defy rational explanation - the witness statements and project 
documents provide no evidence of any action being taken to address the issues 
raised. On more than one occasion IBM complained that employees of Queensland 
Health were trying to hold IBM to its contract and make IBM meet its obligations. 
IBM convinced senior department management that these staff were interfering in 
the project and senior management subsequently ordered their removal from the 
project. 
Engelbrecht et al (2017) suggest that inexperienced managers will seek 
advice and guidance from inappropriate sources. Kruger and Dunning (2009) offer 
the observation that the Unskilled and Unware (Ryvkin, Kraic et al, 2012) are 
incapable of identifying their own failings, incapable of independently observing 
and learning from the competence of others, and incapable of identifying 
competence in others. 
These findings have led this researcher to postulate a new theory: 
Situational Incompetence. 
Situational Incompetence applies when an otherwise experienced 
executive is placed in a position of authority or accountability for which they lack 
experience, training or specific skills. In this new role they are effectively 
incompetent and incapable of providing or recognising reasoned advice, guidance 
or suggestions. 
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Situational Incompetence has implications for how leaders are selected for 
complex tasks requiring specialist IT domain knowledge and technical 
competence, it may also apply to the disciplines requiring specific knowledge of 
the technology in that domain (eg: accounting, medicine, engineering, science).  
6.1  Testing Situational Competence 
It has been argued in this paper that situational incompetence is allowed 
to persist because of normalisation of deviance (Vaughan, 2009). Normalisation of 
deviance implies that incompetence is tolerated because it has not previously 
caused significant failures. It is known that smaller projects have much higher rates 
of success than larger projects (Johnson, 2015), and as a consequence the skills 
needed to effectively manage very large projects are rarely put to the test and 
competence deficiencies escape detection. 
This research has postulated the theory of Situational Incompetence. It is 
necessary therefore to provide a method of measuring the competence of 
leadership as it applies to a range of IT project situations. The situations being 
tested are those of increasing complexity and size, and the competence of leaders 
relative to those constructs. 
Creating a measurement instrument requires the identification and 
creation of an effective scale. Scale development is well established in the literature 
and the ‘rules’ for creating an effective scale are well articulated (for example: 
(Churchill 1979; Flynn, Schroeder et al. 1994; Subba-Rao, Solis et al. 1999, 
Kimberlin and Winterstein 2008) (see Figure 16). 
The ‘key indicators of the quality of a measuring instrument are the 
reliability and validity of the measures’ (Kimberlin & Winterstein, 2008, p.2276). A 
measure is considered ‘valid’ when the differences in observed scores accurately 
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reflect differences in the construct being examined (Churchill, 1979, p.64). ‘Validity 
is often defined as the extent to which an instrument measures what it purports to 
measure’ (Kimberlin & Winterstein, 2008. p.2278), but an instrument can be reliable 
without being valid. Reliability ensures that the instrument always generates a 
reproducible outcome, while validity ensures that the instrument measures what it 
is intended to measure. In this specific instance the instrument must validly test 
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leadership competence in a given situation, and it must do so reliably under 
different inputs. 
The first step in creating a measurement instrument (scale development) is 
to create an ‘item pool’. The goal is to develop a set of measures which might 
sample ‘all possible contents which might comprise the putative trait according to 
all knows theories of the trait’ (Flynn, Schroeder & Sakakibara, 1993, p.310). 
The domain of construct is determined by a literature search. This research 
has determined that the domain of construct is leadership competence in a given 
project situation. The instrument will be developed following the procedure 
outlined below by Churchill (1979). 
The two main constructs being tested are (see figure 17): 
1. Leadership Competence, and 
2. Project Size and Complexity 
The factors which will be used for the initial version of the scale have been 
taken from prior research into project failure which focussed on factor analysis. In 
particular the leadership competence construct is been drawn from the work of 
Englebrecht, Johnston and Hooper (2017), while the software project complexity 
measures are being informed, principally, by the work of (Fitsilis and Damasiotis 
2015). 
The item pool has been drawn from prior work as identified in the literature. 
However, the response format has been modified to ensure validity and reliability 
in the responses provided. The two dominant response types are dichotomous 
responses and scale responses based on some for a Likert-type measurement 
(Clark and Watson 1995,p.312). 
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Figure 17 - measurement instrument 
Responses incorporating a Likert-type scale require interpretation, and the 
researcher cannot possibly know the assumptions being made by the respondent 
when they choose their response variable. It has been argued that a dichotomous 
(binary) response is more accurate and reliable (Clark & Watson, 1995, p.312). For 
this reason, the factors being measured have been changed from the originals. 
Where a Likert-type variable response may have been sought the wording of the 
factor question has been amended to require a dichotomous response (for 
example: yes/no). 
While some of the factors presented are of a general or generic nature, 
many are specific. Where the respondent is asked about their experience with and 
knowledge of technologies, these factors should be modified to reflect the specific 
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project be examined. For the purposes of the initial presentation of the scale, the 
factors used have been framed in a generic style. 
The framing of the questions has also been structured to be ‘forward 
looking’, with the intent of being able to predict how a project might be affected 
rather than looking backwards and analysing a previous project that has been 
completed. 
The model being suggested is a simple X/Y plot. The ‘X’ scale refers to 
project complexity and the ‘Y’ scale to leadership competence in a technical 
domain. 
Leadership Competence factors and measures: 
Item Construct Factor 
A Knowledge of Technologies - what is your personal and direct 
experience with the following: 
A1  do you use a personal computer in your daily work life? 
A2  do you have knowledge of how to setup personal 
computers, desktops, laptops, and personal devices? 
(updating the software, installing or re-installing the 
operating system, etc) 
A3  do you have specific experience with client-server 
technologies and/or web applications 
A4  do you have experience in setting up, modifying or 
managing a computer network 
A5  do you have experience in database technologies? (for 
example: can you write an SQL query statement) 
A6  do you have experience in creating and using multi-
media technologies (web sites, multi-media, making and 
posting video's) 
B Knowledge of Applications - what is your personal and direct 
experience with the following: 
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Item Construct Factor 
B1  have you experience in using email? 
B2  have you every been responsible for setting up and 
managing an email system which was used by multiple 
people? 
B3  do you have experience with using the internet in a 
business setting? 
B4  have you engaged in e-Commerce (buying and selling 
over the internet)? 
B5  do you utilise collaborative and/or social software in your 
work environment? (eg: shared calendaring, text chat, 
wiki, social media)? 
B6  are you required to personally use ERP Systems in your 
day-to-day work (eg: SAP, Oracle)? 
B7  are you required to personally use office productivity 
software in your day-to-day work (eg: Microsoft Office)? 
C Knowledge of Systems Development 
C1  do you have a first degree in STEM (science, technology, 
engineering, math)? 
C2  do you have training or experience in computer 
programming (in any language)? 
C3  have you worked on a project that employed the 
traditional waterfall PM methodolology for systems 
development? 
C4  have you worked on a project utilising an agile 
methodology? 
C5  do you have experience with end-user computing? 
C6  have you been involved in prototyping? 
C7  have you worked on a project where at least a part of the 
work was outsourced to an external vendor/partner? 
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Item Construct Factor 
C8  have you worked on a project where at least a part of the 
work was undertaken offshore with an external 
vendor/partner? 
C9  have you been involved in evaluating, selecting and 
procuring a software package for use in your 
organisation? 
C10  have you been responsible for preparing project 
performance reports, tracking project performance, 
and/or reporting project performance to a governance 
committee? 
C11  have you calculated the business value of an IT project? 
D Knowledge of the Management of IT 
D1  do you know which hardware, networks, communications 
and database technologies are currently in use in your 
business? 
D2  do you know which software and applications technology 
is currently in use in your business? 
D3  do you know about the IT budget in your business, 
beyond the specific project you are working on? 
D4  do you know what the IT Strategy and Plan is for your 
business? 
D5  do you know the IT Policies for your business? 
D6  are you aware of the IT Vision and Mission for your 
business, and can you communicate it to others? 
D7  are you aware of the overall IT Strategies and plans for 
other Departments (Government) or your competitors 
(Corporate)? 
E Knowledge of Access to Information 
E1  do you know who in your organisation are the trusted IT 
experts and specialists upon whom you can rely? 
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Item Construct Factor 
E2  do you know who are the trusted IT experts and 
specialists outside your organisation upon whom you can 
rely? 
F Experience in IT Projects 
F1  have you been a participant (non-managerial) in an IT 
project? 
F2  have you had a direct role in generating or leading the 
development of the costs and benefits of an IT project? 
F3  have you had a direct role in the preparation of an IT 
business case? 
F4  have you had hands-on responsibility for managing the 
day-to-day activities of an IT project? 
F5  have you been involved in, or led a software 
development team? 
F6  have you been involved in, or led an IT project to 
successful implementation? 
G Experience in IT Leadership & Management 
G1  have you led the development of an IT Strategy? 
G2  have you led the creation of IT policies? 
G3  have you led the creation of IT budgets? 
G4  have you led an IT Procurement project? 
G5  have you led the recruitment of an IT Project Leader and 
project team? 
H Scale of IT Project Experience 
H1 small have you been in an IT project under $1million in 
productive labour costs or less than 10,000 hours of 
productive labour 
H2 moderate have you been involved in an IT project of up to $3million 
in productive labour or between 10,000 and 30,000 hours 
of productive labour 
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Item Construct Factor 
H3 medium have you been involved in an IT project of up to $6 
million in productive labour or between 30,000 and 
60,000 hours of productive labour 
H4 large have you been involved in an IT project of up to $10 
million in productive labour or between 60,000 hours and 
100,000 hours of productive labour 
H5 grand have you been involved in an IT project which exceeded 
$10million in productive labour or was greater than 
100,000 hours of productive labour 
H6 mega have you been involved in an IT project which exceeded 
$100million in productive labour or was greater than 
1,000,000 hours of productive labour 
 
 
6.2  Validity and Reliability 
This measurement instrument comprises two separate scales which are 
contrasted to elicit a picture of an individual’s competence in a specific situation. 
Validity of the instrument is determined by the scale testing what it is intended to 
test. In this case the validity would be that the scale accurately tests competency 
in a given situation. The scales have not been tested for reliability at this stage and 
are being offered as a suggested approach which will require follow-up research 
to test the scale, and then the examine the competency of executives with 
oversight of IT projects. 
6.3  Conclusion 
In this chapter a new theory has been proposed to explain the observed 
phenomenon of the Queensland Health payroll project. The failure of senior 
management to follow advice, or to act when the project was clearly facing 
challenges could not be sufficiently explained by the previous findings as reported 
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in the literature on IT project failure. It was observed that many of the previous 
findings were present in this project but were symptoms of some other factor that 
had not been adequately defined. It could not be argued that a lack of senior 
management involvement was a factor in the failure of this project, yet the literature 
continues to position this as the leading cause of IT project failure. It was true that 
the project lacked thorough documentation explaining the requirements of the 
system to be built, but the failure of the vendor to deliver this contracted 
component was highlighted by several internal experts as well as independent 
consultants and was ignored by senior management who sided with the vendor 
and removed ‘problematic’ employees. Communication existed between parties, 
meetings were held, committees formed. In retrospect it could be argued that 
communication was inadequate, or not ‘good’. In the context of examining the 
project in real-time, it could not be argued however that communication was not 
occurring, but it is apparent that despite the extent of the communication that was 
occurring there lacked reasonable understanding of what was being 
communicated. 
The findings of this research suggest that the competence of the most 
senior executive with day-to-day accountability for the project has a direct and 
material impact on project outcomes. It is further suggested that competence 
needs to be specific and not generalised, and that the senior manager with 
accountability and authority for a large and complex IT project needs to have 
specific knowledge and experience of IT project execution. The most damning 
finding was that the ‘skills and experience needed to perform the job are the same 
skills required to identify competence in others’ (Kruger & Dunning, 2009). This 
finding, and the examples highlighted throughout the case study, demonstrate that 
an inexperienced senior executive will be incapable of comprehending the advice 
being provided if they lack the specific experience in the technical domain being 
managed. What this means is that it would not be sufficient to surround the 
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inexperienced manager with experts upon whom they would theoretically turn to 
for advice. The research (for example: Engelbrecht, Johnston & Hooper 2017) and 
the case study demonstrate that an inexperienced senior executive defers to 
inappropriate sources for advice and support, choosing not to trust the advice of 
their internal experts. In the case study, the senior executive treated technical 
disagreements as personality conflicts and chose to characterise critiques of the 
vendors performance as interference. The findings of this research suggest that this 
behaviour is directly attributable to the inability of the senior executive to 
comprehend the information being presented, resulting in that executive failing to 
take appropriate action. 
This research suggests that previous findings, such as; support from senior 
management, clear and realistic goals, a strong detailed plan kept up to date, good 
communication and feedback, user and client involvement, suitably qualified and 
sufficient resources, and effective change management (Fortune & White, 2006) 
are not causes of project failure, rather they are consequences of a poorly run 
project which in the case of Queensland Health Payroll was due to the situational 
incompetence of the senior executive(s) with direct oversight and accountability for 
the day-to-day workings of the project. 
The final word on situational competence comes from the proceedings of 
the IFIP Conference on IT Project Failures: ’Someone implementing IT needs to 
know which levers to pull, in which context, and at what time’ (Dwivedi, Wastell et 
al. 2015, p.149). 
6.4  Implications and Future Work 
The implications for industry of this research is that more attention needs 
to be paid to the skills and competence of the individual that will have direct 
authority over an IT project. Specifically, the larger and more complex the project 
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the more important that the leader be technically skilled and experienced. While 
an unskilled individual may not expose a small project to significant risk, the success 
rate of large and complex projects is so small (Standish Group, 2015) that ensuring 
a positive project outcome for even the most skilled and experienced practitioners 
is challenging. Organisation’s cannot afford the increased risk of management not 
having the competence to provide effective oversight and governance.  
Indeed, the absence of competence can be seen as a significant influence 
in domains far broader, and potentially of far greater consequence than 
information technology. In his latest book, The Fifth Risk, Michael Lewis paints a 
dystopian picture of a US public service being subjected to a White House 
administration devoid of competence but full of ambition and over-confidence. 
Could this happen in Australia? The example being played out in Washington D.C. 
right now could be seen as an interesting laboratory study from which the 
researcher could draw some lessons.  
The fifth risk, the title of the book, is drawn from a conversation the author 
had with an outgoing executive of the previous Obama administration. Lewis asked 
John MacWilliams, the chief risk officer of the US Department of Energy what were 
the top five things he worried about most: “a nuclear weapons-related accident; a 
potential conflict with North Korea; stoked tensions with Iran; an attack on the US 
electrical grid; and finally, the fifth and most subtle risk — project management”5.   
Setting aside political discussions of the Trump administration, ignoring 
(for a moment at least) the twitter wars which characterise Mr Trump’s personal 
style. What is evidenced by Lewis’ new book is the extraordinary levels of 
                                               
5 https://www.news.com.au/world/north-america/how-the-american-government-is-being-compromised-by-
its-own-leaders/news-story/403fd3e24aecad6668c4d778a2a78a0c 
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incompetence and disinterest demonstrated by incoming executives and 
department heads. 
The failure of large scale IT projects in the public sector has identified that 
where an executive lacks training or experience in information technology then 
they are placing the project at serious risk of failure. This research considered the 
work of Justin Kruger and David Dunning (2009) and how that translated into IT 
project performance. What has been observed in this research is that where an 
executive is placed in charge of an IT project, but lacks experience that was gained 
from an actual working knowledge of IT, then they are compromised in several 
critical ways. First of all, these executives who are usually highly skilled and 
knowledgeable in their own fields, do not have the cognitive framework to 
understand the advice that is being given to them. Other research  (Engelbrecht et 
al, 2017) has shown that executives that lack basic competence in IT tend to take 
advice and guidance from the wrong sources, and frequently rely upon 
inappropriate advice on critical matters. What explains this inability to follow good 
advice comes from Kruger and Dunning (2009), who have observed that the skills 
needed to identify competence in others is the same skill needed to do the job. 
Without some basic understanding of the task at hand, the executive that is 
accountable for its execution, will be seriously compromised. 
On a grand scale this scenario is playing out in the corridors of Washington, 
but a focus on competence is critical across all disciplines. The Standish Group 
CHAOS reports have reported some improvement over the decades, with 
significant gains for small projects (less than $1 million) utilising agile techniques. 
But very large and very complex projects still have success rates in the single digits. 
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Critical to the success of public sector projects is competent leadership 
with knowledge, skills and experience of IT projects. 
This research reflects the findings of a single case study, albeit a very large 
case, but still just one instance of a failed project. The findings cannot be 
generalised to apply to all IT projects, however they do provide insight into what 
might be occurring on other projects and why research over the last thirty or more 
years has not resulted in a significant improvement in project outcomes.  
More work is required to confirm these findings on other IT projects, and 
to consider its implications for other disciplines. The instrument needs to be tested 
and applied more broadly to determine its validity to reproduce outcomes. As 
identified (Dwivedi, Wastell et al. 2015) more in-depth and detailed case studies 
are required of both failed and successful projects to identify what actually 
happened on these projects and what can be both avoided in the future, and what 
best practices can be generalised to ensure improved outcomes.  
6.5  Limitations of Future Research 
The implications for future research from this study are that investigations 
need to go beyond factor analysis to look for underlying drivers of project failure. 
It is essential that more in-depth case study analysis be performed so that 
researchers can evaluate actual projects, rather than recollections of projects.  
This researcher was very fortunate in having access to a very large amount 
of data that was captured as a result of a government inquiry. This was not the only 
data source that the research relied upon, and gaining access to that additional 
material was problematic and required determination and persistence. However, 
the bulk of the research materials came from statements that were gathered under 
the force of law, and represent a very clear statement about the project. Had an 
inquiry not been undertaken, the job of examining this case would have been 
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remarkably more difficult and it is doubtful that the research would have produced 
such clear evidence for the phenomenon that occurred. 
If research into project performance is to continue, then researchers must 
demand that governments make available the data on failed projects, and that 
researchers gain access to project audit data. While the current practice is to keep 
settlements confidential, this serves only to protect those that have failed. These 
project settlements, and the data from the projects which failed, is required by 
researchers to develop an understanding of the causes of project failure beyond 
what was identified in this research, with the objective and intent of improving the 
performance of future projects.  
12 December 2018 
Situational Incompetence: an investigation into the causes of failure of a large-scale IT project  
Darryl Carlton  page  163 of 219 
Appendices 
Appendix One: Witness Statements 
WS001_20100712_BOND_Darrin-signed-statement.pdf 
WS002_20100901_Premier releases CorpTech overhaul terms of reference - The 
Queensland Cabinet and Ministerial Direc.pdf 
WS003_20120531_KPMG_Report_dated_31_May_2012.pdf 
WS004_20120531_KPMG_Report.pdf 
WS005_20130201_Written_submissions.pdf 
WS006_20130218-Statement-of-Colleen-Papadopolous.pdf 
WS007_20130218-Statement-of-David-Stone.pdf 
WS008_20130222a_PERROTT,-Barbara-statement.pdf 
WS009_20130222b_PERROTT,-Barbara-Addendum-Statement.pdf 
WS010_20130222c_PERROTT,-Barbara-Jean-further-addendums-signed-
statement.pdf 
WS011_20130222d_Barbara-Perrott-Statement.pdf 
WS012_20130225_BIRD_Christopher-signed-statement.pdf 
WS013_20130225-Statement-of-Craig-Vayo.pdf 
WS014_20130225a_SWINSON,-John-signed-statement.pdf 
WS015_20130225b_SWINSON,-John-signed-addendum-statement.pdf 
WS016_20130226-Statement-of-Jan-Dalton.pdf 
WS017_20130227_MANDER,-Robert-signed-statement.pdf 
WS018_20130227-Statement-of-Nigel-Hey.pdf 
WS019_20130227a-Addendum-Statement-of-Nigel-Hey.pdf 
WS020_20130228_ATZENI,-Damon-signed-statement.pdf 
WS021_20130228_JONES,-Janette.pdf 
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WS022_20130228_LEWIS,-Michael-signed-statement.pdf 
WS023_20130228_Turbit.pdf 
WS024_20130228-Geoffrey-WAITE.pdf 
WS025_20130301_DI-CARLO,-Rose-signed-statement.pdf 
WS026_20130301a_BRADLEY_Gerard_Statement_signed.pdf 
WS027_20130301a_BROWN_James-statement-signed.pdf 
WS028_20130301b-Addendum-Statement-of-Gerard-Patrick-Bradley.pdf 
WS029_20130304_ORANGE,-Colleen-signed-statement.pdf 
WS030_20130305_GODDARD,-Keith-signed-statement.pdf 
WS031_20130305_HOOD,-Philip-signed-statement-1.pdf 
WS032_20130305_SALOUK_witness-statement.pdf 
WS033_20130306_SHAH,-Shaurin-signed-statement.pdf 
WS034_20130306a_BUGDEN,-Joanne-signed-statement.pdf 
WS035_20130306b_BUGDEN,-Joanne-signed-addendum-statement.pdf 
WS036_20130307_DUKE,-Michael-signed-statement.pdf 
WS037_20130307_EKERT,-David-signed-statement.pdf 
WS038_20130307_NICHOLLS,-Mark-signed-statement.pdf 
WS039_20130307_UHLMANN,-Gary-signed-statement.pdf 
WS040_20130308_BURNS,-Terence-signed-statement.pdf 
WS041_20130308_john_beeston.pdf 
WS042_20130315-Statement-of-Malcolm-Campbell.pdf 
WS043_20130317_BLAKENEY,-Maree-signed-statement.pdf 
WS044_20130317_klatt_SAP.pdf 
WS045_20130318_BLOOMFIELD,-Lochlan-signed-statement.pdf 
12 December 2018 
Situational Incompetence: an investigation into the causes of failure of a large-scale IT project  
Darryl Carlton  page  165 of 219 
WS046_20130318_CAMERON,-Jason-signed-statement.pdf 
WS047_20130321-Statement-of-Janine-Griffiths.pdf 
WS048_20130328a_PORTER,-Simon-signed-statement.pdf 
WS049_20130328b_PORTER,-Simon-addendum-signed-statement.pdf 
WS050_20130401_BOND-Darrin.pdf 
WS051_20130401_BROWN_James-statement-signed.pdf 
WS052_20130401_STATE-OF-QUEENSLAND.pdf 
WS053_20130401-Problems-identified-after-Go-Live.pdf 
WS054_20130401a_SCHWARTEN-Robert.pdf 
WS055_20130401b SCHWARTEN-Robert-Witness-Statement-additional.pdf 
WS056_20130403_Statement-of-Natalie-MACDONALD.pdf 
WS057_20130404_BROWN_James-signed-statement.pdf 
WS058_20130404b_BROWN_James-signed-statement.pdf 
WS059_20130408_BERENYI-Margaret-signed-statement_Redacted.pdf 
WS060_20130408_john_gray_experts_report.pdf 
WS061_20130408_PEDLER,-Robert-signed-statement.pdf 
WS062_20130409_PULLEN,-Keith-signed-statement.pdf 
WS063_20130411_Adrian-SHEA-signed-statement.pdf 
WS064_20130412_JENSEN-nee-Bennett,-Cheryl-signed-statement.pdf 
WS065_20130412_KALIMNIOS,-Michael-signed-statement.pdf 
WS066_20130412_KALIMNIOS,-Michael.pdf 
WS067_20130412-Statement-of-Raymond-Brown_Redacted.pdf 
WS068_20130416_COWAN-Brett-signed-statement.pdf 
WS069_20130416_phillip_HOOD.pdf 
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WS070_20130416_PRICE,-Anthony-signed-statement.pdf 
WS071_20130416-Email-from-F-Copley-to-I-Innes.pdf 
WS072_20130418_CAMPBELL_Malcolm-signed-statement_Redacted.pdf 
WS073_20130419_SWINSON_John_statement_signed.pdf 
WS074_20130419_THATCHER-Mal_redacted.pdf 
WS075_20130422_christopher_bird_email.pdf 
WS076_20130422a_dataflow_diagram_as-is.pdf 
WS077_20130423_Michael-REID-signed-statement.pdf 
WS078_20130429-Statement-of-Paul-Hickey.pdf 
WS079_20130429-William-DOAK-signed-statement.pdf 
WS080_20130430_Report-of-David-Manfield_Redacted.pdf 
WS081_20130501-Joseph-Sullivan.pdf 
WS082_20130501-Statement-of-Christopher-Prebble.pdf 
WS083_20130501-Statement-of-Michael-Walsh.pdf 
WS084_20130502-Statement-of-John-Gower.pdf 
WS085_20130507_Margaret-Berenyi.pdf 
WS086_20130509_Email-from-Paula-Dann_Redacted.pdf 
WS087_20130509_STEWART-Jane.pdf 
WS088_20130509-William-Backhouse.pdf 
WS089_20130510_Michael-Reid.pdf 
WS090_20130510_Submission-for-Michael-Reid.pdf 
WS091_20130510-Sally-OCarroll.pdf 
WS092_20130513_Malcom-Griersons-Diaries.pdf 
WS093_20130513-Statement-of-Malcom-GRIERSON.pdf 
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WS094_20130514-Statement-of-Damon-Atzeni-updated-16-May-2013.pdf 
WS095_20130515_Anna-Bligh.pdf 
WS096_20130515_BLIGH-Anna-signed-statement.pdf 
WS097_20130515_REID-Michael.pdf 
WS098_20130517-Report-of-Shane-Parkinson.pdf 
WS099_20130520_CHARLSTON-Jeremy.pdf 
WS100_20130520-Brendan-Pollock.pdf 
WS101_20130521a-Statement-of-James-Brown.pdf 
WS102_20130521b-Statement-of-James-Brown.pdf 
WS103_20130522-Joseph-Sullivan.pdf 
WS104_20130523_LUCAS-Paul.pdf 
WS105_20130523_REID-Michael.pdf 
WS106_20130524-Margaret-Berenyi.pdf 
WS107_20130524a-Malcolm-Grierson.pdf 
WS108_20130524b-Malcolm-Grierson.pdf 
WS109_20130529-Brooke-Freeman.pdf 
WS110_20130529-Ian-Raymond.pdf 
WS111_20130529-Sleiman-Saleeba.pdf 
WS112_20130531-Michael-Walsh.pdf 
WS113_20130531-Natalie-MACDONALD.pdf 
WS114_20130604-Mark-Robert-Dymock.pdf 
WS115_20130604-Nickolas-Kwiatkowski.pdf 
WS116_20130611_Kalimnios-Shea-and-Brown.pdf 
WS117_20130613_Analysis Of The Qld Health Payroll Deba.pdf 
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WS118_20130617-POLLOCK-Brendan.pdf 
WS119_20130624_IBM-Australia.pdf 
WS120_20130624_Submission-for-Contract-IBM-Australia.pdf 
WS121_20130702_J-Stewart-2-July-2013.pdf 
WS122_20130731_royal_commission_report.pdf 
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PD001_20041201-IBM-GOVERNMENT-CLIENT-GUIDELINES-GLOBAL.pdf 
PD002_20051130-Statement-of-Works-3.pdf 
PD003_20060601_CorpTech_Shared_Service_Solution_Directions_Paper.pdf 
PD004_20060824 - Briefing note to Exec Director from Janette Jones with 
attachments.pdf 
PD005_20060824 - Briefing note to Exec Director from Janette Jones.pdf 
PD006_20061001_Agreement-for-the-Provision-of-Services.pdf 
PD007_20061201-IBM-BUSINESS-CONDUCT-GUIDELINES.pdf 
PD008_20070306_Bundle-of-correspondence-regarding-Customer-Reference-
Sites_Redacted.pdf 
PD009_20070403 - Briefing note for approval to Paul Monaghan.pdf 
PD010_20070528 - HR Current System Maintenance and Support - Payroll and Rostering 
Risk Analysis with attachments.pdf 
PD011_20070806 - Briefing note for Information with Risk Assessment attachment.pdf 
PD012_20070816_R14-020 - RTI Release 20112014 copy 
PD013_20070823_Bundle_of_Emails.pdf 
PD014_20070909_Annexure_6_to_the_ITO.pdf 
PD015_20070922_Exhibit-131-Payroll-Systems-Risk-Assessment-Sept-2007.pdf 
PD016_20070922_Payroll-Systems-Risk-Assessment-Sept-2007.pdf 
PD017_20071015a_Email_from_Brett_Tetlow_to_Damon_Atzeni.pdf 
PD018_20071015b_Email_from_Damon_Atzeni_to_Cathy_Sparks.pdf 
PD019_20071212-Email-from-Damon-Atzeni-to-Christopher-Prebble_Redacted.pdf 
PD020_20071212-Emails-between-C-Prebble-and-D-Atzeni_Redacted.pdf 
PD021_20071220_Email-from-D-Atzeni.pdf 
PD022_20080104_Email-from-D-Atzeni.pdf 
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PD023_20080218 - Memorandum - QHIC Implementation Steering Committee 
Meetings.pdf 
PD024_20080218_ QHDL 09.10-046_ Memoranda To Chief Finance Officer .pdf 
PD025_20080218_ QHDL 09.10-046_ Memoranda To District Chief Executive Officers 1 
.pdf 
PD026_20080218_ QHDL 09.10-046_ Memoranda To District Chief Executive Officers 2 
.pdf 
PD027_20080218.pdf 
PD028_20080219_scope_definition_lattice_replacemtn.pdf 
PD029_20080225_Exhibit_72.pdf 
PD030_20080326 - Briefing note for Information to Exec Director from Proj Manager.pdf 
PD031_20080331_Exhibit-87-QHEST-Business-Atrributes.pdf 
PD032_20080331-QHEST-Business-Atrributes.pdf 
PD033_20080502_Workbrain_Scalability_Test_Plan_version_1_1_final.pdf 
PD034_20080508 - Briefing note to Director General.pdf 
PD035_20080513 - Letter from Prof Andrew Wilson to Ms Julie Bignell.pdf 
PD036_20080513_1-3.pdf 
PD037_20080513_4-5.pdf 
PD038_20080513_6-12.pdf 
PD039_20080513_13-16.pdf 
PD040_20080513_17-20.pdf 
PD041_20080513_21-27.pdf 
PD042_20080513_30-31.pdf 
PD043_20080513_32-36.pdf 
PD044_20080513_37-42.pdf 
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PD045_20080513_43-44.pdf 
PD046_20080513.pdf 
PD047_20080717-Process-Design-Report.pdf 
PD048_20080802-Bundle-of-emails.pdf 
PD049_20080812-Workbrain-Scalability-Assessment.pdf 
PD050_20080828_QHDL 10.11-008_ Executive Steering Committee Government 
Members.pdf 
PD051_20080828.pdf 
PD052_20080829 - Briefing Note for Approval.pdf 
PD053_20080829__Briefing Notes Queensland Health Interim Payroll Replacement 
Project.pdf 
PD054_20080829_QHDL 09.10-046 PT 01 copy 
PD055_20080829_Current Issues Faced by QHEST and Recommendations.pdf 
PD056_20080829_QHDL 10.11-008_SOW.pdf 
PD057_20080829_SOW.pdf 
PD058_20080829.pdf 
PD059_20080829b.pdf 
PD060_20080911_Brief Paper.pdf 
PD061_20080911_Exec_Brief.pdf 
PD062_20080911_Fwd_Plan.pdf 
PD063_20080911_Prog_42.pdf 
PD064_20080911_proj_plan.pdf 
PD065_20080911_IBM Report to Executive Steering Committee.pdf 
PD066_20080911_Executive Comitte Brief Paper_Status Report form the Corptech.pdf 
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PD067_20080911_Executive Steering Commitee_Multi Instance Model Phase 3 
Report.pdf 
PD068_20080911_QHDL 10.11-008_Forward Planning From CorpTech.pdf 
PD069_20080911_Program 42_ Option Analysis and Preferred Solution Report.pdf 
PD070_20080911_QHDL 10.11-008_Proposed Project Plan.pdf 
PD072_20080911_Week_36.pdf 
PD073_20080916 - Briefing Note for Information.pdf 
PD074_20080929_Current Issues Faced by QHEST Update.pdf 
PD075_20080930_Configuration-Document.pdf 
PD076_20080930-Subcontractors,-Deliverables-and-Final-Status-Report.pdf 
PD077_20081017_3-emails-from-C-Sparks-and-A-Doughty_Redacted.pdf 
PD078_20081027_Exhibit-100-Deliverable-Acceptance-Sheet-and-Functional-
Specification.pdf 
PD079_20081103-Deliverable-Acceptance-Sheet-and-Functional-Specification.pdf 
PD080_20081108_ RTI Application No157.pdf 
PD081_20081111 - To Mr Paul Hickey from Mr Anthony Price.pdf 
PD082_20081111.pdf 
PD083_20081216 - Summarised Strategy - QHIC Project.pdf 
PD084_20081216_QHIC Project User Acceptance Testing Exit Criteria .pdf 
PD085_20081216_ Papers to QHIC Board.pdf 
PD086_20081216_Escalation Threshold Severity 1 Defects_Briefing Note.pdf 
PD087_Escalation Threshold Severity 2 Defects_Briefing Note.pdf 
PD088_20081216.pdf 
PD089_20081219_exhibit.pdf 
PD090_20081222_Exhibit-141-QHEST-Project-Directorate-Meeting-Minutes.pdf 
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PD091_20081222_QHEST-Project-Directorate-Meeting-Minutes.pdf 
PD092_20090115_Pt1.pdf 
PD093_20090121 - Briefing note for Approval.pdf 
PD094_20090121_28-29.pdf 
PD095_20090222_Pt2.pdf 
PD096_20090303_Pt5.pdf 
PD097_20090310 - Briefing note for Information.pdf 
PD098_20090324_Pt3.pdf 
PD099_20090327a-Deliverable-Acceptance-Sheet.pdf 
PD100_20090330_notice_to_remedy.pdf 
PD101_20090401_minutes_april_july.pdf 
PD102_20090415_Email-from-John-GOWER_Redacted.pdf 
PD103_20090422-KJ-Ross-draft-report.pdf 
PD104_20090427_Exhibit-102a-Deliverable-Acceptance-Sheet.pdf 
PD105_20090427-QHIC-System-Test.pdf 
PD106_20090429 - Brief for Decision.pdf 
PD107_20090501 - Letter to Mr M Reid from Mr Neil Jackson - including Appendix B.pdf 
PD108_20090501_Queensland Audit Office.pdf 
PD109_20090503 - Letter to Mr Neil Jackson From Prof Andrew Wilson.pdf 
PD110_20090503_opposition_leader.pdf 
PD111_20090511-Email-from-J-van-der-Zwan-to-M-Dymock_Redacted.pdf 
PD112_20090519 - Letter to Mr Neil Jackson from Mr Michael Reid - Date ambiguous.pdf 
PD113_20090519_ RTI_Application No157_Correspondence.pdf 
PD114_20090522-Emails-between-William-DOAK-and-others_Redacted.pdf 
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PD115_20090601_opposition_leader_No157.pdf 
PD116_20090601_redacted_multiple_docs.pdf 
PD117_20090618_Pt7.pdf 
PD118_20090630_Exhibit-105-Requirements-Traceability-Matrix.pdf 
PD119_20090630-Requirements-Traceability-Matrix.pdf 
PD120_20090706_Pt8.pdf 
PD121_20090706_Interim Payroll Replacement QHIC.pdf 
PD122_20090706-Brief-to-Deputy-Premier-and-Minister-for-Health.pdf 
PD124_20090811_exhibit.pdf 
PD125_20090820 - Entry Criteria tracking list.pdf 
PD126_20090820 - Meeting Outcomes QHIC Project Directorate.pdf 
PD127_20090820_Deployment System Readiness Criteria.pdf 
PD128_20090820_QHIC Project Directorate Outcomes & Decisions.pdf 
PD129_20090820_User Acceptance Testing Entry Criteria.pdf 
PD130_20090821_Email thread_approvals of UAT4 commencement.pdf 
PD131_20090821 - UAT4 Entry Criteria v 1.3.pdf 
PD132_20090824_DG055231_QCOS2676.pdf 
PD133_20090827 - Time Based Expense Cost Allocation.pdf 
PD134_20090827 - UAT4 Severity 1 defects.pdf 
PD135_20090827 - UAT4 Severity 2 defects.pdf 
PD136_20090914 - UAT4 Exit Criteria v1.4.pdf 
PD137_20090930_Queensland Health Briefing Note for Information.pdf 
PD138_20091005 - Memorandum - Project Update.pdf 
PD139_20091012 - Brief For Approval.pdf 
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PD140_20091012_Chief Information Officer Brief For Approval.pdf 
PD141_20091012_Chief Information Officer_Brief for Approval.pdf 
PD142_20091014 - Briefing note with 2 SAP docs date 14th or 15th.pdf 
PD143_20091014 - Memorandum - System go-live confirmation.pdf 
PD144_20091014_Payroll Project Stress & Volume Testing.pdf 
PD145_20091014_ QHDL 09.10-046_QHIC Board Briefing Notes_QHIC SAP 
Review.pdf 
PD146_20091014_QHDL 09.10-047_QHIC Board Briefing Note_QHIC SAP Review.pdf 
PD147_20091019 - QHIC Board briefing note with IBM doc.pdf 
PD148_20091019_Payroll Project Stress and Volume Testing.pdf 
PD149_20091026 - Brief for Noting.pdf 
PD150_20091026_Brief for Noting_Status of Interim Payroll Replacement.pdf 
PD151_20091026_Status of Interim Payroll Replacement QHIC.pdf 
PD152_20091027 - Memorandum - QHIC Project Update.pdf 
PD153_20091105 - Deployable System Readiness Criteria.pdf 
PD154_20091210_Pt4.pdf 
PD155_20091217-Work-Product-Acceptance-Sheet.pdf 
PD156_20100105_Pt 25.pdf 
PD157_20100105_Pt 27.pdf 
PD158_20100108_Pt 26.pdf 
PD159_20100113_Pt 23.pdf 
PD160_20100113_QHDL 10.11-20 Pt 23 copy 
PD161_20100121_Pt 3.pdf 
PD162_20100128_Pt 10.pdf 
PD163_20100129_Pt 24.pdf 
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PD164_20100205_Pt 17.pdf 
PD165_20100309_Pt14.pdf 
PD166_20100311_Pt 21.pdf 
PD167_20100325-Email-from-M-Kalimnios-to-M-Reid.pdf 
PD168_20100325-Extract-from-Hansard.pdf 
PD169_20100401_health-payroll-review-terms-of-reference 
PD170_20100406_Pt 4.pdf 
PD171_20100406_Pt16.pdf 
PD172_20100408_Pt 5.pdf 
PD173_20100408_Pt 7.pdf 
PD174_20100413_Pt 6.pdf 
PD175_20100413_Pt12.pdf 
PD176_20100423_Pt 1.pdf 
PD177_20100423_Pt9.pdf 
PD178_20100506_Pt22.pdf 
PD179_20100507_exhibit.pdf 
PD180_20100507_Pt 9.pdf 
PD181_20100507_Pt10.pdf 
PD182_20100508_health-payroll-review-status-report.pdf 
PD183_20100517_Exhibit-96-Dashboard-Reports.pdf 
PD184_20100517_Pt 18.pdf 
PD185_20100517_Pt 22.pdf 
PD186_20100517_Pt_13.pdf 
PD187_20100517_Pt18.pdf 
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PD188_20100517-Dashboard-Reports.pdf 
PD189_20100518_health-payroll-review-stage2.pdf 
PD190_20100518-Email-to-all-QLD-Health-staff.pdf 
PD191_20100520_Pt23.pdf 
PD192_20100520-Nathan-Hulse.pdf 
PD193_20100526_Pt19.pdf 
PD194_20100527_Pt21.pdf 
PD195_20100601_Exhibit-95-Bundle-of-Minutes-Payroll-Stabilisation-Project.pdf 
PD196_20100601_parliamentary_Report_No.7.pdf 
PD197_20100601_Report_to_Parliament_No_7.pdf 
PD198_20100601-Bundle-of-Minutes-Payroll-Stabilisation-Project.pdf 
PD199_20100609_Pt 14.pdf 
PD200_20100615_Pt 2.pdf 
PD201_20100615_Pt11.pdf 
PD202_20100628_Pt 12.pdf 
PD203_20100628_Pt 16.pdf 
PD204_20100628_Pt 19.pdf 
PD205_20100628_Pt13.pdf 
PD206_20100706_Pt 11.pdf 
PD207_20100709_Pt 20.pdf 
PD208_20100721_Pt 15.pdf 
PD209_20100721_Pt20.pdf 
PD210_20100818_Pt15.pdf 
PD211_20100823_Email-from-Natalie-MacDonald.pdf 
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PD212_20101028_Pt 8.pdf 
PD213_20130430-QHIC-Solution-and-Defect-Management-Plan.pdf 
PD214_20130516_Exhibit-135a-Fubctional-Specification-Entitlement-Ratios.pdf 
PD215_20130516_Exhibit-135c-Functional-Specification-Workbrain-and-SAP-Interface-
Error-Management.pdf 
PD216_20130516a-Fubctional-Specification-Entitlement-Ratios.pdf 
PD217_20130516b-functional-Specification-Custom-Pay-Rule-Fatigue-Rule.pdf 
PD218_20130516c-Functional-Specification-Workbrain-and-SAP-Interface-Error-
Management.pdf 
PD219_20130523-Deputy-Premier-briefing-presentation.pdf 
PD220_20100901_Government to implement all seven of the Auditor General’s 
recommendations - The Queensland Cabinet .pdf 
Appendix Two: Project Documents 
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Appendix Three: Social Media Essays 
The following essays were published on the Linkedin social media platform 
soliciting industry comment and feedback. 
The Numbers are in - 2:51:47 
Published on March 29, 2017 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/numbers-25147-darryl-
carlton/ 
2% - For Information Technology projects that exceed 
$100 million, the likelihood of success is just 2%. 
51% of these projects will fail to fully realise their 
intended benefits 
47% will be abject failures. 
These figures represent a huge number of public sector 
projects. For many governments they seem to thrive on big 
impressive sounding projects. Bigger seems to be better for 
many ..... and projects that are intended to be done fast and 
cheap, something almost always seems to go wrong and they 
become massive and out of control. 
The causes of massive project failure in the public 
sector are many, and they are complex, but they boil down to 
the following four key challenges: 
#1 - senior executives tasked with the responsibility 
for running IT projects are more often than not entirely 
unskilled in information technology and are incapable of 
understanding the information being presented to them by 
consultants, salespeople, or their internal experts. Kruger & 
Dunning refer to this as the "unskilled and unaware problem" 
(UUP). Donald Rumsfeld was less clear when describing "there 
are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. 
That is to say there are things that we now know we don't 
know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things 
we do not know we don't know". It is this last category that 
is the cause of so many problems, senior executives very often 
do not know what they do not know. When they don't know what 
they don't know, they are unable to effectively evaluate 
incoming information, and particularly in making informed 
judgement calls on difficult subjects. The individuals running 
IT projects need to know how to build and deliver complex IT 
solutions .... this is just too hard, and too important to be 
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left in the hands of uninformed individuals no matter how much 
experience and talent they have in other disciplines. 
#2 - in every large project there are a big number of 
government departments, agencies and vendors involved - 
stakeholders for wont of a better term. When looking at how 
stakeholders interact from the perspective of game theory we 
know that in order for parties to achieve equilibrium each 
party needs to understand what the other parties "end game" 
is likely to be. However, when three or more parties are 
involved then it is not enough to "know", that information 
needs to be transparent. Most IT projects have very convoluted 
end-games. The various parties are not working to achieve the 
same result, and they have hidden agendas. On large projects 
these hidden agendas and deliberately skewed information flows 
will lead to project disaster. 
#3 - project team members, disgruntled with the lack of 
support from senior management that does not understand 
information technology will start to follow orders even when 
those orders will lead to absolute disaster. They will not 
speak up for fear of losing their jobs. They will become 
obedient to authority in the face of clear evidence of wrong 
doing. In fact scientific studies (conducted by Stanley 
Milgram) show conclusively that two-thirds of people will 
follow orders even when they know that they are doing the 
wrong thing. Those that cannot stand this environment will 
leave ... and they are the ones that you most desperately need 
to stay. Obedience to Uninformed and Unaware Authority is 
highly dangerous for a large IT project. 
#4 - the problem with committees is that no-one is 
accountable, no-one is responsible. In every investigation 
into IT project failure there are precious few examples of 
individuals being held accountable. Facebook has a fabulous 
system of individuality its called the "karma score" - every 
developer is measured continuously on the success of their 
piece of code as it is released into production. Any errors 
found and the code is returned to that developer and their 
karma score increases. Facebook can identify which individuals 
contribute most to successful outcomes and to the repeated 
introduction of errors into to the code. There must be 
individual accountability from the top to the bottom of the 
project. Delegations must be clear. Governance must be 
transparent. 
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Way to accept responsibility there IBM! 
Published on October 21, 2016 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/way-accept-
responsibility-ibm-darryl-carlton/ 
IBM was paid a bucket load of money to take full 
responsibility for this project. It was not a difficult 
technical project. When you engage third parties to undertake 
part of the project on your behalf, you do not lose 
responsibility and accountability. 
It is absolutely appalling for IBM to publicly declare 
"it wasn't us .. we hired some other idiots who didn't do 
their job". IBM were paid to be accountable. You cannot pass 
the buck. 
Some poor schmuck IBM salesman right at this very moment 
is telling some other client "trust me, we are in this 
together, we will partner with you and take full 
responsibility" - the problem is the salesman will not be 
there when the shit hits the fan and everyone starts ducking 
for cover. 
When you are paid to take responsibility - you take 
responsibility! 
This is a complete failure of IT Probity & Governance. 
If this is the behaviour of large multi-nationals 
protecting their own backsides instead of doing their jobs, 
then give me the local SME and business owner who will put 
their arse on the line and will not shirk their responsibility. 
The Department of Industry and Science and Australian 
Bureau of Statistics produced a report called "The employment 
dynamics of Australian entrepreneurship" in September 2015. 
This report stated: 
As firms age they contribute less to job creation and 
more to job destruction. Young firms in Australia contribute 
disproportionately to net job creation. Young SMEs generated 
the largest share of total job creation (40 per cent) in the 
economy. 
Over the period 2006–2011 we estimate that 1.04 million 
full time equivalent (FTE) jobs were added to the economy. 
Start-ups (firms aged 0–2 years) added 1.44million FTE jobs 
to the economy whereas older firms (3+ years) shed around 
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400,000 FTE jobs over the same period. 
It's time that the Government started giving these 
projects to local SME's to run. It is a complete nonsense that 
just because the Government is big they can only do business 
with big firms. The history of Government IT projects in every 
State and Federal Department is littered with failed IT 
projects run by big firms failing to take responsibility and 
accountability. 
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A 12 Step Program for IT Leadership 
published on October 17, 2016 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/12-step-program-
leadership-darryl-carlton/ 
Just like addicts, the continued failure of information 
systems projects requires a constant commitment if it is to 
change. Before change can occur however, we need to first of 
all admit that we have a problem. A problem with the current 
state of our IT investments and a really serious problem when 
it comes to how we procure and manage those investments. 
I propose here a set of steps, based on the original 
steps of the AA process; 
1. We admit that we are powerless over IT —that our 
systems have become unmanageable. 
2. We believe that a plan greater than ourselves could 
restore us to sanity. 
3. We have made a decision to turn our plans and our 
architecture over to the care of someone that knows 
what they are doing. 
4. We have made a searching and fearless inventory of 
our current IT assets and their dependencies 
5. We have admitted to our stakeholders, to ourselves, 
and to our staff the exact nature of our wrongs. 
6. We are entirely ready to remove all these defects in 
our systems. 
7. We humbly ask to remove the shortcomings in our 
existing systems 
8. We have made a list of all the damage done by our 
systems, and are willing to make amends 
9. We have made direct amends to our stakeholders 
wherever possible, except when to do so would injure 
our customers. 
10. We will continued to take personal inventory, and when 
we are wrong, will promptly admit it. 
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11. We will seek to improve our knowledge and 
understanding of information systems, striving for 
the skills and ability to carry that out. 
12. Having had an intellectual awakening as a result of 
these steps, we will try to carry this message to 
other IT leaders and information systems 
professionals 
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Understanding Cobb’s Paradox: a deep dive into the causes 
of a billion dollar IT project failure 
Published on September 6, 2016 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/understanding-cobbs-paradox-deep-
dive-causes-billion-dollar-carlton/ 
My PhD research is nearing its conclusion. I have 
completed the data collection and analysis, and have entered 
the write-up phase. Below is the abstract for my thesis as it 
currently stands. 
Cobb’s Paradox asks; “We know why projects fail; we know 
how to prevent their failure—so why do they still fail?” 
In this paper it is argued that either the existing 
research has failed to identify the proximal cause of the 
failure of IT Projects, if not then in the practice of IT 
management the research and lessons are completely ignored. 
In either case there are questions to be asked and answered. 
This paper examines a significant IT project failure which 
occurred in the Australian public sector. Using multi-grounded 
theory the researcher has examined the project documentation, 
meeting minutes and governance reports as well as detailed 
witness statements of more than 160 project participants - 
comprising more than 7,000 pages of documentation. 
This research has culminated in several new and novel 
findings. Firstly, it is opined, that previous research 
efforts have stressed the symptoms of project failure rather 
than the causes. The causes, as identified in this research, 
are drawn from social psychology and highlight the issues of 
project execution as a social undertaking. The main causes of 
failure discussed in this research are; the lack of domain 
expertise by senior management and vendor representatives, the 
opposing priorities and goals of multiple stakeholders 
involved in the project, the inability for project team members 
to have their concerns appropriately dealt with, and the lack 
of accountability at all levels of the project structure. 
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Can The Government Be Trusted With IT Decisions and 
Projects? 
Published on August 12, 2016 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/can-government-trusted-decisions-
projects-darryl-carlton/ 
The Myki project was originally budgeted to cost $521 
million ($494m to Kamco, plus provision for things like banking 
fees, civil works and access payments to transport operators, 
and it made provision for increasing card volumes” (pp. 5 - 
Public Accounts & Estimates Inquiry). This estimate was 
intended to cover capital and operating expenditure for the 
build over four years, including ongoing costs for running met 
card during the transition. 
As has been reported that cost has now blown out to $1.54 
billion - three times its original estimate. I should also 
point out that this is the last known figure of estimate and 
hails from 2012. I for one would love an updated 2016 figure. 
What do we know about the Myki project? 
 • the solution was built by the Kamco consortium 
(Keane Australia Micropayment Consortium Pty Ltd) Keane 
Australia, Ascom, ERG, Headstrong, and Giesecke & Devrient 
Australasia (G&D) 
 • the Business Case document of April 2004 stated 
that Mr. Vivian Miners was appointed as the Chief Executive 
of the Transport Ticketing Agency. 
 • the Business Case document outlined the 
profiles of potential providers of the solution, or parts of 
the solution. These suppliers included; Accenture, Ascom, 
Cubic, EDS, ERG, Fujitsu, IBM, Octopus, Thales, Scheidt & 
Bachman, and Wayfarer. 
 • no mention of Keane, Headstrong or G&D. 
 • Keane won the role as prime contractor. 
 • Mr Miners owned $150,000 worth of shares in 
Headstrong at the time the contract was awarded 
 • The Business Case identifies the cost of 
continuing with the existing system at $1.013 Billion, the 
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cost of enhancing the existing system at $1.076 billion, and 
the cost of replacing the existing system with a smart card 
solution at $494 million. 
 • The business case states “the smart card option 
is substantially lower in cost and lower risk than either of 
the magstripe options” (pp.12) 
 • at the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee 
inquiry in October 2012 the then CEO of PTV stated that “$494 
million was the amount that was contracted with Kamco when the 
contract was initially set in 2005, but that was not the 
totality of TTA’s budget.” (pp.5). The actual budget was stated 
as $998.9 million 
 • The difference therefore between the original 
estimate for Myki Smartcard was just 1% less than continuing 
with an enhanced version of the magstripe solution - that 
could hardly be considered “substantially lower in cost and 
risk”. 
 
So, where was the business case for Myki - and I don’t 
mean the 36 page description with hundreds of pages of 
appendices. The most basic business case for any enterprise 
undertaking a large investment is "Anticipated Income over the 
life of the project/Cost of initial investment plus operating 
cost for the life of the project + Benefits to the State from 
this investment". 
To be fair we know what the estimated benefits were - 
$10m per annum over the life of the project. If I was the VC 
funding this exercise the answer just on that basis would be 
“no way Jose!” - one billion dollars to earn a $10 million 
benefit 
But lets get back to the basic calculation of the 
business case. 
The total estimated income for Myki ticket sales is $312m 
for metro train and tram, and a further $78m for metro buses. 
A total of $390m. That’s what commercial enterprises call 
revenue folks. If this was a supermarket, that would be total 
sales for the year. 
The Stern Business School at New York University has 
reported that in 2015 the pre-tax, unadjusted operating margin 
for rail transport companies to be 33.05% of revenue. What 
this means when we look at the privately operated victorian 
transport system is that it should be generating pretax 
earnings from its revenue (ticket sales) of $128,895,000. This 
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leaves our transport operators with $261 million to cover all 
of their operating and running costs. 
Myki is costing $1.54B over a twelve year period. That 
means that the Myki ticketing system is costing $128,333,333 
each and every year. Just to provide a ticketing service. 
Effectively half of all of their running costs are going to 
the ticketing system. HALF! … then they need to maintain the 
track, the rolling stock, the signalling system, the stations 
and everything else. 
Your $6.30 ticket to the city comprises $2.10 to pay for 
Myki alone. 
On what planet is an estimate of ONE BILLION DOLLARS on 
revenue of $390 million an acceptable business case. The 
reality of more than $1.5 Billion is much much worse. But how 
in the hell did anyone approve an upfront estimate of $1 
Billion - oh, thats right. They didn’t. The business case 
submission was claiming “substantial savings and risk 
reduction” by parties that had a vested interest in the project 
being awarded. 
Keane, now a subsidiary of the Japanese NTT Corporation, 
has very recently been awarded a new contract to continue 
running Myki. 
The Government has an obligation to the Victorian voter 
and taxpayer to be transparent and to release all of the 
information related to this disaster. 
The lack of transparency and obfuscation around the 
Census IT disaster is the final straw in the mismanagement of 
information technology projects. 
There needs to be accountability and transparency when 
billions of dollars are spent. 
The Myki business case suggests that the Department 
investigated the alternative of providing free public 
transport, but decided against that option because of the cost 
of meeting the increased demand. 
Really! 
Would the cost of meeting the increased demand have 
exceeded the cost of Myki? 
On the 15th of March 2016, the current Victorian Premier 
ordered 65 new trains at a cost of $1 billion. On this basis 
the State could have ordered an additional 100 trains instead 
of the stupid and wasteful Myki ticketing system. Everyone 
would travel for free. The roads would become uncongested. 
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Pollution would be reduced. Commuting times would be improved. 
The flow on benefits to the state would be enormous. 
Cancel Myki, make public transport free, use the money 
to buy new infrastructure to make Melbourne a great city. 
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Census - you reap what you sow! 
Published on August 10, 2016 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/census-you-reap-what-sow-darryl-carlton/ 
Its official - the online version of the census was a 
disaster. The Australian Bureau of Statistics suffered a 
denial of service attack (DoS) when 24 million aussies tried 
to log on after dinner on Tuesday the 9th of August. 
I for one am extremely suspicious of the claim that this 
was the result of an external and deliberate hack. The denial 
of service, in my opinion, was because in a very narrow window 
everyone tried to complete their census - and frankly the ABS 
should have been expecting this. 
There were not many questions that were asked. The 
website and its data are not all that complicated. How much 
did it cost for IBM to build the census website? 
The answer can be found in the Governmenrt procurement 
records - $9,606,725 for a contract that ran from October 
2014. 
For that amount of money, for what amounts to a fairly 
simple website from a content perspective should have been 
extremely robust and secure with vast processing capacity. 
Talking about capacity - I wonder how much effort was 
expended on load and stress testing. Oh, look - we have the 
answer from the same procurement records. The ABS spend 
$54,367.50 between 28th June 2017 and 27th September 2016. So, 
basically, they had 6 weeks to do load testing prior to census 
night. Effectively that is two people to do load testing. 
Surely someone anticipated that LOAD in a four hour 
window was going to be the biggest issue that the census faced, 
followed by security. 
Is this yet another example of the wrong priorities from 
a vendor and client? 
The design, development and commissioning of the census 
solution was a "limited tender", while the load testing was 
an "open tender". What this means is that IBM's bid was non-
competitive. They were invited to provide a solution. 
The Australian firm that did the load testing had to bid 
in a competitive tender, and they had only a few weeks to do 
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their work. IBM had two years. This is the same vendor that 
brought us the Queensland Health Payroll solution. 
We can and should expect much better from our ICT 
providers - we can and should expect much better from the 
Government Departments that are spending public money and 
operating in the public trust. 
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Moneyball for I.T. 
Published on May 24, 2016 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/moneyball-darryl-carlton/ 
Spending less than one quarter on player salaries in the 
2002 season than the New York Yankees, Oakland Athletics won 
20 straight games, the "winningest" run in American major 
league baseball history. And they did this with a team that 
was considered inferior. A team that did not include any 
superstars. 
They did this by upending the metrics that identified 
success, and building a team based on new knowledge, a data-
driven approach to team composition and project success. The 
old metrics not only did not measure actual team performance, 
those old metrics were an inhibitor to achieving great 
performance as a team. 
I wrote as much in an earlier post (February 2016) 
entitled "why projects fail", exploring the reasons that IT 
Projects continue to perform poorly despite all the 
accumulated wisdom over the past several decades. The iron 
triangle of cost, time and quality is misleading and does not 
provide the data needed for a project to succeed. The lesson 
from the Oakland Aths is that it costs less to do things 
properly - not more! 
You will save money (a lot of money) managing the 
portfolio, building a data driven and information rich 
environment to create "informed decision making". The entire 
premise of capitalism is a "ruthless drive for efficiency". 
Government outsources because "private industry can do it 
better, faster, cheaper" - except when it comes to IT projects 
it seems. Most public sector IT projects are delivered by 
commercial firms, and if the failures in the public sector are 
any indication they are simply not doing a very good job. 
Why do projects fail? 
To recap - projects fail due to the following five main 
reasons (time and cost overruns are a consequence of these not 
a driver); 
LACK OF DESIGN - projects that are successful spend on 
average 37% of their time on architecture, design and 
requirements. Projects which fail spend as little as 4% on 
these activities. 
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INCOMPETENT GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT - the Kruger-
Dunning Effect explains this phenomenon very clearly. There 
is a massive disconnect between confidence on the one hand and 
competence on the other. The research demonstrates very 
clearly that the skills needed to perform a task expertly are 
the same skills needed to identify competence in others. What 
this means for IT Procurement, Governance and Oversight is 
that the individuals and committees charged with the 
responsibility for selecting vendors and solutions, and for 
governing the performance of those projects must be capable 
and skilled to actually do the work in order for them to have 
the competence to oversee the work. Who is on your steering 
committee? 
SELF-INTERESTED BEHAVIOUR - this challenge is explained 
as the application of the Nash Equilibrium to managing the 
various parties involved in delivering a project. In order for 
the project to succeed each party has to subjugate their own 
selfish interest to what is best for the project. This does 
not mean that "the customer is always right" - indeed, the 
customer also must give up their own self interest in order 
to focus on what the project needs to succeed. 
SUPPORT WHISTLE BLOWERS - whistle-blowers may be the 
most loyal and honest members of the project team. They are 
the ones prepared to risk their own job to expose problems 
with the project. They are the ones that understand the Nash 
Equilibrium and are prepared to expose potential risks, 
failures or wrong doing. This phenomena is explained by the 
research of Stanley Milgram into "obedience to authority" and 
how individuals will follow the rules no matter how damaging. 
Every project needs to encourage, support and reward whistle-
blowers that expose risks and aid the project in achieving its 
outcomes. 
CONSEQUENCES - there are precious few consequences for 
failure, or even dishonesty, when it comes to delivering IT 
projects. This was raised by the Victorian Auditor-General 
when they reported on IT Project Failure in the public sector. 
There must be consequences for poor behaviour, otherwise 
nothing will change. 
DATA DRIVEN PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
What data is needed to effectively deliver an IT Project? 
The purpose of an IT Project is to create value in the 
enterprise - it might be internal, or it might be in how 
y create market or customer value. Nevertheless the purpose 
is the creation of value. Therefore, before a project even 
begins the organisation needs to identify the value that is 
going to be created and how that value will be measured. 
Everything and anything can be measured - do not accept the 
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argument that this project will deliver "soft benefits" such 
as customer satisfaction, or employee productivity; these 
things can be measured and must be measured. 
Let's look at an example. A health services provider has 
calculated that its TCO per claim processed is $0.15. It has 
agreed with the business that, as the number of claims is set 
to increase substantially over the next three years, it needs 
to drive down the IT-contributed cost from $0.15 to $0.12 per 
claim. It becomes a very enlightening exercise for everyone 
involved to trend IT cost per claim alongside all other costs 
per claim. Showing the trends for IT unit costs and other 
costs together can make it very clear where IT can have 
additional impact, and where overall business efficiencies are 
improving (or not). This client can construct its IT budget 
for claims processing in a very simple manner. 
Budgets and programs of work can be constructed to align 
with this very clear view of the value that needs to be created 
and the cost of doing so. 
The user, the business, does not need to get involved 
in discussions about which technology or which products are 
going to be deployed to meet these targets - those decisions 
are properly the responsibility of the CIO and the IT 
Organisation. The CIO can see very clearly what their annual 
budget is going to be for this project. What ever they choose 
to do must fit within these parameters. 
If the CIO, in this example, proposes a mobile app as 
the core of the strategy, so long as that meets the objective 
of driving the cost-per-transaction down from $0.15 cents per 
transaction to $0.12 cents per transaction over the agreed 
timescale then that would be approved. 
As the project progresses, and as "things happen" ( I 
wanted to say when 'shit happens' but some people have objected 
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to my use of common language) - the Governance and Steering 
Committees need only refer back to the very clear objectives 
of driving the cost down to an agreed metric to determine 
whether or not the project should continue on an ill-fated 
path, change direction, or be terminated. 
How do you create the data needed to manage in this way? 
1. you need to know what capabilities the organisation 
undertakes in order to serve its market - i.e.: create 
(or steal) a Business Capability Model 
2. map all of the applications to the lowest possible 
level in the business capability model 
3. understand the total cost of ownership for each and 
every application in your portfolio 
4. now you can extrapolate the cost of undertaking a 
business capability 
5. count the transaction volume for the business 
capability 
6. estimate the volume of transactions, and cost per 
transaction 
7. as the organisation develops its corporate strategy 
and competitive plans, map these to the business 
capabilities which will be impacted (e.g.: the Bank 
you work for wants to increase the volume of 
residential mortgages), which business capabilities 
will this impact and consequently which 
applications.  
8. what improvements are needed to meet the corporate 
objectives? can this be achieved with the existing 
systems? if not what will it require? how much is 
currently spent on this business capability? what is 
the value created? how much can we afford to spend 
(per transaction) to meet the organisations 
objectives? if we extrapolate the volume of 
transactions and cost per transaction out does that 
provide an adequate budget to deploy a new solution? 
can we meet the objective in some other way (there is 
always another way)? 
All of this work, and these questions should be addressed 
in the business case. All of this data should be constantly 
maintained, updated and available to the Governance and 
Steering Committee's. If there is a change in the external 
environment that fundamentally impacts the business case it 
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needs to be re-calaculated and communicated to the oversight 
bodies. 
Moneyball for I.T., sure it sounds like a lot of work - 
but it is a lot less work than trying to manage a floundering 
out-of-control project that has descended into acrimony. 
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Appendix Four: Key Words 
Scope_of_work 
Payroll_system 
Costs 
Workpbrain_issues 
Project_management_team 
Project_board 
SAP_Workbrain_issues 
Legal_issues 
Corptech 
Business_requirements 
Project_defects 
Requirements_unknown 
Project_risk_management 
QH_Meetings 
Testing_defects 
Business_issues 
Shared_services 
Evaluation_process 
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Support_contract 
Extended_lattice_support 
IBM_australia 
Total_benefit 
Contract 
Volume 
Kruger-dunning 
Nash_equilibrium 
Obedience_to_authority 
Accountability 
Payroll_staff 
Team_work 
Delivery_date_for_services 
Requirements_unknown. 
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